Posted by Eugene Volokh:
Self-Defense-Blindness:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_12-2009_04_18.shtml#1239838768


   Many arguments against allowing private gun ownership or gun carrying
   strike me as quite plausible; I think they're mistaken, but they make
   sense. The arguments claim that banning guns would provide more
   benefits, especially in saving people's lives, than the costs that
   such a ban would impose (frustrated self-defense, decreased
   deterrence, and other things). I think that this argument is
   empirically unlikely, and morally troublesome. But it makes sense on
   its own terms.

   Occasionally, though, I run across a different phenomenon -- both as
   to guns and as to other things -- that I think of as
   "self-defense-blindness": a complete failure to even consider
   self-defense as one of the functions of a gun or other weapon. Either
   the speaker doesn't even think of self-defense, or at least he assumes
   that the listener can be persuaded not to think of self-defense.

   We see this, for instance, in claims that some guns should be banned
   because they lack a "sporting purpose," without considering a possible
   self-defense purpose. We also see this in statements that [1]guns are
   good only for killing. Even if one includes threatening to kill
   alongside killing (and ignores hunting and target-shooting), talking
   about "killing" in condemning guns without distinguishing criminal
   killings/threats from self-defense killings/threats strikes me as
   self-defense-blindness.

   But in doing research for my nondeadly weapons article, I saw the same
   for non-firearms devices as well. Consider Tear Gas -- Pencil Gun --
   Dangerous Weapon, 26 Opinions of the Connecticut Attorney General 207
   (1950). The question was whether "tear gas pencil gun[s]" (described
   basically as individualized irritant spray weapons) should be treated
   as "dangerous or deadly weapon[s]" for purposes of the Connecticut
   statute banning the carrying of such weapons without a permit. The
   A.G. said yes, and that's a plausible bottom-line, if the question is
   just whether the device is dangerous. But consider the A.G.'s
   rationale:

     It is obvious that the function of this so-called pencil gun is to
     injure and to disable an individual and it is inconceivable that
     this instrument would be used or has any other function than to
     disable temporarily or permanently. It may well be that in the
     hands of proper authority, such as a police official, the temporary
     disabling of an individual or individuals may ultimately serve a
     useful function. However, in the hands of an individual without any
     such authority, there is no question but that the pencil gun could
     only be calculate [to] injure.

     It is our opinion, therefore, that the so-called tear gas pencil
     gun is a dangerous and deadly weapon within the provisions of [the
     statute].

   So the only "useful function" for a tear gas pencil gun is when police
   officers use it to temporarily disable people. The possibility that a
   citizen who wants to defend himself (or herself) might "useful[ly]" do
   so with a tear gas pencil gun is simply omitted. Nor is the A.G.
   simply commenting on the physical reality that the tear gas pencil gun
   can be dangerous regardless of whether used for good or ill; he's
   making a normative judgment that the device is "useful" when used by
   the police, but not even discussing whether people might find it
   equally "useful" for self-defense.

   ([2]Show two other examples.)

   I saw the same in a 1976 Pennsylvania Attorney General opinion on
   Tasers, 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d 597, which opines on whether tasers are
   covered under the Pennsylvania ban on possessing "offensive
   weapon[s]." The law defined offensive weapons as any "implement for
   the infliction of serious bodily injury which serves no common lawful
   purpose." The A.G. treated incapacitation by Taser as a form of
   "serious bodily injury," an odd reading but one I won't quarrel with
   here. But that still left the question whether a Taser "serves no
   common lawful purpose." Here's the A.G.'s reasoning:

   (1) "Common lawful purpose" should be neither "so strictly construed
   that no item would be prohibited by the phrase" nor "so loosely
   construed that all items would be prohibited," but should "be given a
   reasonable common sense interpretation."

   (2) Under this "common sense" approach, "The Taser, like a 30-inch
   knife, metal knuckles, and a sawed off shotgun [devices that had been
   found to 'serve no common lawful purpose' under past precedents], and
   unlike a butter knife, scissors, or a pack of razor blades, is capable
   of inflicting serious bodily injury and serves no common lawful
   purposes," and is thus banned.

   Nowhere is there any mention of the possibility that self-defense
   might be a "common lawful purpose" for Taser ownership. The A.G.
   doesn't even mention self-defense as a possible purpose, or discuss
   why he thinks criminal purposes would be more common than self-defense
   purposes. Nor does he adopt the unsound but at least not
   self-defense-blind view that self-defense doesn't matter because the
   uncommonness of Tasers means that none of their purposes, lawful or
   otherwise, are "common." Self-defense is just ignored.

   Likewise, consider People v. Smelter, 437 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. Ct. App.
   1989), the only case that considers whether stun guns are protected
   under a state right-to-bear-arms provision. Here's the entirety of the
   reasoning that says they aren't protected:

     Third, defendant claims that the statute prohibiting the possession
     of stun guns impermissibly infringes on defendant's right to keep
     and bear arms for his own defense. We disagree. Const. 1963, art.
     1, § 6 provides: �Every person has a right to keep and bear arms
     for the defense of himself and the state.�

     The right to regulate weapons extends not only to the establishment
     of conditions under which weapons may be possessed, but allows the
     state to prohibit weapons whose customary employment by individuals
     is to violate the law. [People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 256 (Mich. 1931)
     (upholding a ban on carrying blackjacks).] The device seized from
     defendant was capable of generating 50,000 volts. Testimony in the
     lower court established that such weapons can not only temporarily
     incapacitate someone but can result in temporary paralysis. Our
     Supreme Court in Brown explained that the power to regulate is
     subject to the limitation that its exercise be reasonable. We
     conclude that the Legislature�s prohibition of stun guns is
     reasonable and constitutional.

   Let's say that the right to bear arms really shouldn't extend to
   weapons "whose customary employment by individuals is to violate the
   law." The trouble is that the court doesn't offer any evidence that
   stun guns are customarily used for crime rather than self-defense.
   (None of the briefs in the case offered any such evidence, either.)

   The court's argument simply points out that the weapon is potentially
   dangerous -- well, of course it is, since all devices and techniques
   for violence, even in entirely lawful self-defense, are dangerous.
   Paralyzing an attacker in lawful self-defense can be entirely
   permissible. But the court's analysis was self-defense-blind: The
   possibility of self-defense didn't even come up.

   ([3]Hide two of the above examples.)

   And all these examples aren't about guns. They can't just be described
   as the direct effect of hostility to guns. Nor can they be defended on
   the grounds that they implicitly borrow from the standard critique of
   gun ownership. Rather, they seem to be part of a broader blindness to
   self-defense, and an unthinking assumption that the "useful function,"
   the "common lawful purpose," and the "customary employment" of weapons
   simply doesn't include lawful self-defense.

   All the states of the union legally allow self-defense. They even
   allow deadly self-defense when necessary to repel a threat of death,
   serious injury, rape, kidnapping, or in many states robbery (or even
   burglary). But despite this, the arguments I quoted above (and many
   like them) simply ignore self-defense altogether. The arguer is
   self-defense-blind, or he wants his listeners to be.

References

   1. http://volokh.com/2002_04_21_volokh_archive.html#75659421
   2. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1239838768.html
   3. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1239838768.html

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