Posted by Randy Barnett:
"Constitutionality" and the Real Constitution:  
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_09_20-2009_09_26.shtml#1253566626


   I agree with the predictions of my fellow conspirators: When deciding
   whether a Congressional mandate to buy private insurance is
   "constitutional," the Supreme Court will likely ignore the
   Constitution. And since this mandate is unprecedented, their actions
   won't be dictated by their precedents either, even if they were
   inclined to follow their precedents when they don't want to, which
   they aren't. But all this evades my original disagreement with
   Professor Jost that Orin though was resolved by his is-ought
   distinction between "what the Constitution is" and "what the
   Constitution ought to be."
   Professor Jost wrote two things that got my attention. Thing #1 was
   his reference to those who cite the Tenth Amendment as "Tenthers." In
   response, I cited the first sentence of Article I, and the Necessary
   and Proper Clause as reiterating the view that Congress only has the
   powers "herein granted" or "vested by this Constitution in the
   government of the United States, or in any department or officer
   thereof." So Supreme Court doctrine that, in effect, finds no limit to
   Congressional power must disregard not one, not two, but three
   explicit passages of what many Americans still naively believe to be
   "the Constitution."
   Thing #2 was the following statement: "a basic principle of our
   constitutional system for the last two centuries has been that the
   Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the Constitution, and the
   Constitution the Court now recognizes would permit Congress to adopt
   health care reform." In this passage, Professor Jost articulates the
   view of most con law professors--including Orin apparently--that "the
   Constitution" is what "the Court now recognizes" so the answer to the
   question of "constitutionality" is to engage in predicting how the
   Court will rule.
   I reject the proposition that "the Constitution" is whatever the Court
   says it is or, more accurately for present purposes, how the Court may
   rule in some future case. I insist that "the Constitution" is the
   wording of the document under glass in DC. So whether something is
   "constitutional" depends on what "the Constitution"--the real
   one--says. (Of course, because the written constitution does not
   answer all questions to which we need answers, constitutional
   construction is needed to supplement constitutional interpretation.
   But such construction may not contradict what the Constitution--the
   real one--says or that construction is itself unconstitutional.)
   Whatever basis Orin, Ilya, David or I have for our predictions of
   future Supreme Court decisions, there is one thing on which none of us
   rely: the Constitution, the real one. Not the Constitution as it
   "ought to be" but the Constitution--or "this Constitution"--the
   enacted one, the one that thousands of Americans visit each year.
   In support of his reasonable prediction, Orin offers the following
   equally reasonable proposition: "If there is a federalism issue that
   doesn�t have a lot of practical importance, there�s a decent chance
   five votes exist for the pro-federalism side. . . . As soon as the
   issue takes on practical importance, however, the votes generally
   aren�t there." But what type of proposition is this? Is it "the
   Constitution"? Is it even "constitutional law"? If it is neither, then
   I do not see how it is responsive to the question of whether a mandate
   to buy private insurance in constitutional, unless one redefines
   "constitutional" to mean "whatever the Court can be predicted to
   rule." THIS is what Orin calls a "semantic" issue, which it is, but it
   is not merely semantic. It is also substantive and very important
   issue to boot.
   If "the Constitution is what the Court says it is," why did Justice
   Sotomayor repeatedly insist she would follow the law, and that
   following the law was all a judge should do? Did she secretly mean "I
   will follow the law, which is exactly the same as how I may want to
   rule for political and policy reasons"? OK, she did secretly mean
   that, but why keep it a secret?
   Could it be that, had she admitted what Professor Jost, and apparently
   Orin, thinks is obviously true about "constitutionality," SHE WOULD
   NOT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED AS A JUSTICE? I think that is a pretty safe
   prediction. Indeed, I predict that she and the White House actually
   made this very prediction, which explains her repudiation of
   everything constitutional law professors believe about
   "constitutionality."
   Why would this prediction have been so safe--even safer than Orin's,
   Ilya's, David's, and my prediction about a future Supreme Court ruling
   about a health insurance mandate? Maybe because, unlike law
   professors, the American people still believe that "the Constitution"
   is the words on that piece of parchment, and that "constitutionality"
   depends on what those words say. True, many Americans do not know what
   it says, but that does not changed the brute social fact of what the
   Constitution still IS. Hence Justice Sotomayor's testimony that she
   will follow the words.
   So here is my question: if Orin and Jost are right, why not come out
   and testify to that position under oath: That "constitutionality" is
   what the Supreme Court says it is unconnected from what the
   Constitution actually says? And until that happens, maybe the
   Constitution still IS the words on the parchment under glass that most
   Americans believe it to be. And if this is true, then does not
   "constitutionality" depend on what those words say--including the
   Tenth Amendment--regardless of how the Supreme Court can be predicted
   to rule, and regardless of whether the Supreme Court follows the words
   of the Constitution--the real one.
   Let me close by repeating something else I posted on the Politico that
   lies at the very heart of this debate:

     if the Supreme Court adopts a "presumption of constitutionality" by
     which it defers to the Congress's judgment of the constitutionality
     of its actions--as it has and as "judicial conservatives" urge--and
     the Congress adopts Professor Jost's view that
     "unconstitutionality" means whatever the Supreme Court says, then
     NO ONE EVER evaluates whether a act of Congress is or is not
     authorized by the Constitution. A pretty neat trick--and a pretty
     accurate description of today's constitutional law.

   This point is so important that I should repeat it. Then it comes to
   the enumerated powers of Congress, the Supreme Court should defer to
   Congress's assessment of constitutionality (because of judicial
   restraint); and Congress should defer to the Supreme Court's
   assessment of constitutionality (because "the Supreme Court is the
   ultimate authority on the Constitution"). So NO ONE SHOULD ACTUALLY
   INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION! This is current American constitutional
   "law" in nutshell.
   I kid you not.
   [PS: Any academic reader who reads the above as claiming that the
   "real" Constitution is the written one because it says it is "the
   Constitution" should reread the portion about Justice Sotomayor's
   confirmation testimony.]

_______________________________________________
Volokh mailing list
Volokh@lists.powerblogs.com
http://lists.powerblogs.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/volokh

Reply via email to