Olá,
Recebi da ONG Verified Voting Foundation, uma ONG americana de objetivos
similares ao Fórum do Voto-E e à CIVILIS só que muito mais bem organizada do
que nós, a nota circular abaixo que fala dos recentes resultados publicados
sobre os testes de penetração nas urnas-e da Diebold americanas, os quais
revelaram que as urnas-e poderiam ter seus programas adulterados para desviarem
votos.
Não vou traduzir o texto inteiro, mas algumas de suas frases são interessantes.
Aí vão:
"
É facil as pessoas apreenderem a lição errada deste incidente: que é preciso
segurança computacional mais forte. Segurança computacional mais forte é
desejável (dependendo quanto custará), mas não irá resolver o problema
verdadeiro. A causa do problema real é o uso de votação eletrônica sem papel,
que é um conceito fatalmente equivocado. Sistemas informatizados modernos não
conseguem ser feitos com segurança suficiente para controlar uma eleição
puramente eletrônica com votos secretos. Erros e fraudes em qualquer nivel, dos
programas aos circuitos nos chips podem mudar votos eletrônicos de forma
indetectável.
Este incidente é apenas mais um de muitos, involvendo produtos de fabricantes
diferentes. E não será o último. De fato, tais problemas nunca acabarão
enquanto houver votação eletrônica sem papel.
... Mesmo no melhor dos cenários, sempre haverá pessoas que poderão atacar e
fraudar as máquinas (inclusive os programadores que escreveram o código
original). Os eleitores nunca saberão se seus votos foram gravados e contados
corretamente.
Dado o presente "estado da arte" em Tecnologia de Informação, eleições não
serão confiáveis a menos que haja o voto impresso conferido pelo eleitor e que uma parte
significante destes votos impressos sejam contados manualmente para conferir a contagem
das máquinas. Nós não podemos garantir que máquinas sempre funcionarão corretamente, mas
cada eleitor poderá ter certeza que seu voto foi corretamente gravado em papel
(preferencialmente pela própria mão do eleitor).
"
[ ]s
Amilcar Brunazo Filho
www.votoseguro.org
EU SEI EM QUEM VOTEI.
ELES TAMBÉM.
MAS SÓ ELES SABEM QUEM RECEBEU O MEU VOTO.
-------- Mensagem Original --------
Assunto: Verified Voting Special Edition
Data: Wed, 17 May 2006 05:41:22 -0400 (EDT)
De: Verified Voting Foundation <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Para: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
VERIFIED VOTING SPECIAL NEWSLETTER
May 16, 2006
Latest Security Vulnerability in Paperless Electronic Voting
Underscores Urgent Need for Paper Trail; Auditing
A critical security vulnerability has been brought to light in Diebold
touch screen voting machines, just as several primaries are about to occur.
In a May 12th New York Times article
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/us/12vote.html
<http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?key=124460095&url_num=1&url=http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/us/12vote.html>),
Avi Rubin, a Professor at Johns Hopkins and Verified Voting advisory
board member, said “I almost had a heart attack” when he understood the
nature of the problem. Michael Shamos, a computer scientist and voting
system examiner in Pennsylvania, was quoted in the same article, "It's
the most severe security flaw ever discovered in a voting system."
Indeed, several experts have urged that the technical details of the
problem not be discussed because it is so easy to exploit. Such
recommendations are extraordinary, coming from a community that values
openness and transparency on computer security issues.
According to the report (available in redacted version at
www.blackboxvoting.org
<http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?key=124460095&url_num=2&url=http://www.blackboxvoting.org>)
by computer expert Harri Hursti, the machines have insufficient
protection to prevent malicious firmware from being installed. If bad
firmware were installed, it would be difficult to detect, and it might
be difficult to install new “clean” firmware. A wide variety of poll
workers, shippers, technicians and so on, have physical access to voting
machines at various times; any of these people might be able to use that
access to install bad firmware.
Shockingly, news of the security flaw was topped off on Monday with news
that both Diebold and the State of Maryland have been aware of the
security vulnerability for at least two years.
Further adding to the scandal is the fact that the backdoor (or doors)
were designed into the machines intentionally, against accepted design
practice and, indeed, simple common sense, as Diebold spokesman David
Bear admits in the same New York Times article. He goes on to say, “For
there to be a problem here, you're basically assuming a premise where
you have some evil and nefarious election officials who would sneak in
and introduce a piece of software,” he said. “I don't believe these evil
elections people exist.”
Diebold's confidence in election officials is heartwarming. But what
really matters is the confidence of the voting public. What are these
same election officials to do when disgruntled candidates question the
results of their elections? They can’t point to federal and state
safeguards, which completely overlooked this glaring problem. In most
places using Diebold touch screen machines, there will be no
voter-verified paper records to recount. In those jurisdictions in
particular, Diebold has left election officials with no method to defend
themselves or their elections when questions arise.
It is easy for people to learn the wrong lesson from this incident: that
we need more stringent computer security. More stringent security is
desirable (depending on how much it costs), but won’t solve the real
problem. The cause of the real problem is the use of paperless
electronic voting, which is fatally flawed as a concept. Modern computer
systems cannot be made sufficiently secure to handle all-electronic
voting with secret ballots. Mistakes or tampering at any level, from the
software to the circuits in the chips can change electronic votes,
undetectably.
This incident is just one of many, involving products from many
different manufacturers. It won’t be the last. Indeed, such problems
will never end as long as paperless electronic voting is in place.
Suppose we had the best possible practices, such as thorough background
checks of the ownership, management, and employees of vendors,
meticulous and intrusive reviews of the design and manufacture of the
equipment by truly independent experts, and so on – the kinds of
measures used for regulation of gambling equipment. Even these measures
would not eliminate programming errors and security holes. Even in a
best-case scenario, there will always be people who can “hack” the
machines (including the programmers who write the code in the first
place). Voters will never know whether their votes were recorded and
counted accurately.
Given the current state of technology, elections cannot be trustworthy
unless there are voter-verified paper records of the votes and a
significant portion of those paper records are manually counted to check
the machine counts. We can’t guarantee that machines will always
function correctly, but each voter can make sure that his or her vote
has been correctly recorded on paper (preferably by the voter’s own hand).
Fortunately, twenty-seven states with over fifty percent of the U.S.
population require voter-verified paper records. Some counties in those
states may use the Diebold touch screen machines with “paper trail”
printers. If they must use the machines, we would urge them in the
strongest terms to be especially diligent in protecting and auditing
those paper records – including manually counting more than the minimum
number required by law.
Every jurisdiction with voter-verified paper records (paper ballots or
paper audit trail printouts verified by the voter) should publicly carry
out a manual audit, after the initial vote count is reported, with
random selection of the areas to be counted. Voters should encourage
their election officials to carry out such an audit – regardless of
whether it is required by law in their state – in order to check the
voting system for accuracy. Currently, more than twice as many
jurisdictions offer voter-verified paper records than there are
jurisdictions that require audits.
Whatever you do, don’t let these problems discourage you from voting.
If you don’t vote, you can be sure that your vote won’t count. Instead,
contact your elected officials and the candidates and make sure they
understand that paperless electronic voting must be replaced with
systems that provide a voter-verified paper record that is manually
audited – our democracy depends upon it.
###
Verified Voting Foundation
1550 Bryant St., Suite 855
San Francisco, CA 94103
415-487-2255 telephone
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
/The Verified Voting Foundation
<http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?key=124460095&url_num=3&url=http://verifiedvotingfoundation.org>
is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation; your contributions to the
Foundation are tax-deductible to the extent provided by U.S. tax law. To
donate online, visit http://verifiedvoting.org/donate
<http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?key=124460095&url_num=4&url=http://verifiedvoting.org/donate>
--or if you prefer to mail a check, please send to Verified Voting at
the address shown above./
______________________________________________________________
O texto acima e' de inteira e exclusiva responsabilidade de seu
autor, conforme identificado no campo "remetente", e nao
representa necessariamente o ponto de vista do Forum do Voto-E
O Forum do Voto-E visa debater a confibilidade dos sistemas
eleitorais informatizados, em especial o brasileiro, e dos
sistemas de assinatura digital e infraestrutura de chaves publicas.
__________________________________________________
Pagina, Jornal e Forum do Voto Eletronico
http://www.votoseguro.org
__________________________________________________
