---Forwarded Article--
From: "Middle East Report
Online" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Gaza's Wars of Perception
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2004 10:09:36 -0400
Gaza's Wars of Perception
Mouin Rabbani
October 14, 2004
(Mouin Rabbani is senior Middle East analyst with the International
Crisis
Group and a contributing editor of Middle East Report.)
Operation Days of Penitence, launched on September 29, 2004, is the
Israeli
military's most extensive incursion into the Gaza Strip since the
beginning
of the current Palestinian uprising and its largest offensive within
the
Occupied Territories since the 2002 reconquest of West Bank cities
during
Operation Defensive Shield. Two weeks and more than 100 deaths later, it
is
increasingly clear that Israel's determination to prevent
Palestinian
militants from using the northern Gaza Strip as a launching pad for
rocket
attacks on Israeli border towns provides a partial explanation at best
for
the unfolding drama. The stakes are much higher, and they extend well
beyond
the conflict zone.
The backdrop for the incursion is, of course, Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel
Sharon's plan for "unilateral disengagement" from the Gaza
Strip, initially
unveiled in late 2003. Stripped to its foundations, Sharon's plan
revives
the traditional Israeli view that the structure of
Israeli-Palestinian
relations should be determined not by negotiation with the
Palestinian
national movement but rather by Israel's undisputed military superiority
and
physical control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Sharon and his
fellow
travelers reject the concept of a Palestinian partner because they are
loath
to contemplate the Israeli concessions that any negotiated agreement
would
necessarily entail. But, at root, "disengagement" is widely
popular in
Israel because the Labor Party failed to conclude a viable agreement
with
the Palestinians in the framework of the Oslo accords. The resulting
four
years of increasingly violent conflict have seen a growing majority of
the
Israeli public prepared once again to give unilateralism the benefit of
the
doubt.
SHARON'S STRATEGIC OPENINGS
While Sharon had little trouble rallying the public and the
parliamentary
opposition to his side -- the Labor Party was so enthused by his plan
that
it initiated coalition negotiations to ensure its success -- his
core
constituencies within the Likud Party and the settler movement have
been
uncooperative and often hostile. Blinded by their resolve to keep
the
Occupied Territories in their entirety, they refused to appreciate
the
strategic opportunities so evident to Sharon. In the months
preceding
announcement of the disengagement plan, the Israeli premier had
overseen
calculated sabotage of the "road map" initiative advanced in
May 2003 by the
Quartet of the US, UN, Russia and the European Union. Europe's
subsequent
embrace of the informal Geneva Accord, concluded in mid-October 2003
between
prominent Israelis and Palestinians, carried with it the risk that
the
international community might seek to fill the diplomatic void if Israel
did
not act first. On the other hand, Washington's virtually
unconditional
embrace of Sharon, coupled with the reality and regional implications of
the
US occupation of Iraq, meant that if Israel did act it would enjoy
an
unusual degree of latitude. The continuing Palestinian uprising --
particularly the increasing sophistication of the Hamas attacks within
the
Gaza Strip and associated public criticism of the costs of retaining
that
benighted territory -- and the need to keep up appearances formed the
only
constraints.
Much as Menachem Begin had in 1979 evacuated the Sinai Peninsula in order
to
retain the other occupied Arab territories, Sharon proposed to
relieve
Israel of the burden of Gaza in order to consolidate Israel's grip
within
the West Bank. No sooner had he formulated his intentions than George
W.
Bush rushed to embrace them. At an April 2004 joint press conference at
the
White House, Bush told the world he had given the Israeli prime minister
a
letter stating that Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 armistice line
demarcating the internationally recognized boundary between the West
Bank
and Israel was "unrealistic" as it would require leaving
"major Israeli
population centers." The letter also conveyed Washington's
understanding
that Palestinians made refugees in 1948 would not be settled in Israel.
With
this letter, Bush reversed decades of formal US policy on
settlements,
borders and refugees while a beaming Sharon looked on. Indeed, the
letter
took down the entire legal edifice undergirding the peace process
launched
by Bush's father in Madrid in 1991 and the policy upheld during the
Clinton
years that any changes thereto must be mutually agreed upon by Israel
and
the Palestinians.
CANDOR AND CIRCUMSPECTION
The significance of these developments, even if they do reflect what
had
effectively become US policy in practice, is difficult to overstate.
Dov
Weisglass, Sharon's most senior political adviser, hit the nail on the
head
in a particularly candid interview that appeared on October 6 in the
Israeli
daily Haaretz. Weisglass told the interviewer: "The significance of
the
disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process. And when you
freeze
that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and
you
prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem.
Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all
that
it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And all
this
with...a presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses
of
Congress. The disengagement is actually formaldehyde. It supplies the
amount
of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political
process
with the Palestinians."
Coming at the height of the US presidential campaign -- an unlikely
coincidence -- Weisglass's statements elicited only a tepid reaction
from
Washington. A State Department spokesman spun the comments with the
claim
that Sharon did not really mean what his closest adviser had just
publicly
enunciated on his behalf. "It's for the Israeli government to
explain Mr.
Weisglass's comments and for them to explain what the position of
the
government of Israel is," said Richard Boucher on October 7.
"The Prime
Minister of Israel has issued a statement where...he states...that the
road
map is the only way forward to achieve peace." Washington has shown
similar
circumspection about the present Israeli incursion in Gaza, with
Secretary
of State Colin Powell following a US veto of a strongly worded UN
resolution
by asking that Israel end its offensive "as soon as
possible."
In addition to the White House's endorsement, Sharon's plan has the
advantage of not relinquishing physical control of the Gaza Strip.
While
Jewish settlements and Israeli military bases within the territory would
be
removed, there would be continued Israeli control of boundaries and
borders
(including access to and from Egypt and the West Bank), air space
and
coastal waters. Those elements of the plan, along with Israel's
self-proclaimed right to "fight terror" inside Gaza even after
withdrawal,
ensure that the strip will remain the world's largest open-air
prison.
STARK CHOICES FOR PALESTINIANS
Sharon's determination to act unilaterally means that, as a matter
of
design, there is to be no Palestinian counterpart with whom to implement
the
initiative. This reality has produced both a new series of dynamics
within
the Palestinian political system in the Gaza Strip, and added extra
dimensions to existing Israeli-Palestinian ones.
On the Palestinian side of the equation, three main trends have emerged.
The
first, represented by Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, sees
disengagement
primarily as a threat, and is above all determined to avoid the
political
consequences of Sharon's initiative as spelled out by Weisglass.
Sharon's
success necessarily entails their failure to achieve their
strategic
objective of a viable Palestinian state within the Occupied
Territories
established on the basis of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to
maintain
their stewardship of the Palestinian national movement. The second
trend,
associated with former Gaza security chief and current strongman
Muhammad
Dahlan, views disengagement as an opportunity to revive the
political
process interrupted by the renewal of violent Israeli-Palestinian
conflict
in September 2000. Rather than seek to scuttle Sharon's initiative,
they
believe that through cooperation or, failing that, reciprocal
Palestinian
measures, disengagement will establish the basis for renewed
international
engagement leading to an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Their ability
to
ensure stability in the Gaza Strip in the wake of an eventual
Israeli
withdrawal will both place them at the helm of the political system and
mark
them out as reliable partners with whom Israel and the
international
community can do business. The third trend, most visibly represented
by
Hamas but encompassing a broader array of Islamist and nationalist
militants, sees disengagement as vindication. As in southern Lebanon,
a
strategy of armed struggle is compelling Israel to withdraw from
occupied
territory without an agreement or a political quid pro quo. It
therefore
follows that those who sowed the seeds of resistance will reap the
harvest
of political profit.
Both Dahlan and Hamas have their power base in the Gaza Strip, and
Dahlan's
agenda is all but predicated on his ability to neutralize the Islamists.
So
it is perhaps surprising that the internal Palestinian conflicts
that
emerged in July 2004 were between forces loyal to Dahlan and Arafat.
Simply
put, Dahlan's first priority has been to establish control over the
Palestinian security forces and the Fatah movement. For this reason,
the
ongoing spate of kidnappings, attempted assassinations and arson attacks
has
been widely attributed to armed elements enjoying his support. If
the
methods have been thuggish, they are also clever, in that they
target
officials who are both universally reviled for their malfeasance and
closely
identified with Arafat. Such activities have also been accompanied
by
increasingly vociferous calls for democratic reform and public
accountability.
Yet Dahlan's assumption of the reformist mantle is also his
greatest
weakness. Security chiefs, particularly in the Gaza Strip, have virtually
no
public credibility in this respect. Given the broader political
context,
Dahlan has additionally been denounced as a putschist -- and his
campaign
portrayed as an instrument of foreign forces -- by Arafat loyalists. No
less
importantly, Hamas, ambivalent about Dahlan since he led the PA's
brutally
successful anti-Islamist crackdown in the mid-1990s, remained
decidedly
aloof. Its only intervention, a telephone call to Yasser Arafat placed
by
Hamas politburo head Khalid Meshaal in mid-July to emphasize the need
for
national unity and reform, sent a clear message that the Islamists would
not
be facilitating Dahlan's ambitions.
THE STAKES
Rather, Hamas has been preoccupied with ensuring that Israel is at
least
seen to be withdrawing from Gaza under fire, and that its efforts
are
translated into a requisite share of the political pie in any
post-withdrawal scenario. Formerly content with the luxury of
rejectionist
opposition, today Hamas seeks the opportunities of power but not -- yet
--
the burden of leadership. Indeed, no faction has been as systematic
in
registering its followers for the first tranche of municipal
elections
scheduled for December 2004.
Hamas's tactics -- increasingly bold attacks on Israeli encampments
within
the Gaza Strip, close cooperation with other armed groups and,
particularly,
launching improvised missiles over the fence meant to isolate the
Gaza
Strip -- could well portend the future of the West Bank if Sharon
does
indeed withdraw and complete the separation barrier in the West Bank. It
is
precisely for this reason that Sharon is determined to crush the
Islamists
in the course of Operation Days of Penitence. By neutering them in
their
Gazan strongholds, he hopes to reassure the Israeli public that they
need
not fear disengagement and that it will have no strategic
ramifications
within the West Bank. Simultaneously, Israel is sending a shot across
the
bow of Palestinians who might contemplate similar tactics from West
Bank
regions that abut the Israeli heartland.
The political stakes invested by Israel in the disengagement plan,
coupled
with the personal stakes for Sharon, also explain the extraordinary
brutality of the current offensive -- schoolchildren shot dead in
their
classrooms, an officer emptying his magazine into the body of a dying
girl
and increasingly brazen accusations leveled at international
organizations
like the UN Relief and Works Agency. It seems unlikely the worst has
passed.
Palestinian armed groups are bent on demonstrating that Sharon will
be
leaving Gaza in the same manner that his predecessor Ehud Barak
left
Lebanon. They have been neither deterred nor defeated by the security
zone
established by the Israeli military within the northern Gaza Strip.
Inexorably, Sharon is being driven to pursue the militants ever deeper
into
the Gaza Strip in order to demonstrate that Israel's generals only
retreat
in the wake of decisive victory. Horrific as the current reality
undoubtedly
is, it could yet prove to be the opening gambit of a larger
conflict.
Indeed, Sharon's refusal to countenance either a negotiated disengagement
or
even a reciprocal ceasefire that would necessarily curtail Israel's
freedom
of action within the Occupied Territories makes further bloodshed all
but
inevitable. In the meantime, the choices facing Palestinians are stark.
To
many, the conflict between those allied with Arafat and Dahlan appears,
in
the words of a Fatah activist, as little more than "a struggle
between
Palestinian thieves and collaborators over the privilege of governing
the
world's most desolate corner on behalf of Israel's foremost war
criminal."
By the same token, people have little faith that Hamas can end the
occupation with homemade rockets, but full confidence that Israel
will
extract an increasingly high price from the civilian population in lieu
of
its inability to eliminate the rocket crews. Meanwhile, the
periodic
attempts to forge a Palestinian strategic consensus, now sponsored by
Cairo,
remain blocked on account of competing strategies and interests. Yet
these
on-again, off-again talks could offer the only escape hatch from an
increasingly desperate reality.
-----
For background on the disengagement plan, see Peretz Kidron, "Sharon
Sets
Sights on Strategic Objective," Middle East Report Online, April 14,
2004.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041404
Middle East Report Online is a free service of the Middle East
Research
and Information Project (MERIP).
---End of Forwarded Article---
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