All are welcome... where? Which University? Which city? (I'm almost tempted to ask: which country?)
It really does look like a very fascinating opportunity, and subject. If successfully defended (and one hopes there is no doubt) do consider an article on it, and/or referencing from within other articles around the subject. Vickram On 11 Dec 2013 13:39, "Shyamal L." <lshya...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Department of Computer Science and Automation > Ph.D. Thesis Defense > > > Speaker : Mr. Swaprava Nath > Title : Mechanism Design for Strategic Crowdsourcing > Faculty Advisor : Prof. Y. Narahari > > Date : Tuesday, December 17, 2013 > Time : 11:30 AM > Venue : CSA Multimedia Class (Room No. 252, First Floor) > > Abstract > > This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using > game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise > from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time. > > The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational > technologies has made this task easier and given birth to a new era of > online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as > crowdsourcing. Two important > features of crowdsourcing are: (a) crowdsourcing > is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and intelligent > and they experience a payoff in some form through their participation, and > (b) the participants are connected over a social network. To understand > > the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to > understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In the thesis, > we have considered the following three major facets of the crowdsourcing > problem. > > (i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers: > as the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is > important to determine if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the > highest quality. > > (ii) Resource critical task execution: due to the diverse geographical, > cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain > manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design > has to > be robust enough to handle fake identities or information provided > by the crowd. > > (iii) Improving the productivity of the crowdsourcing network: as the > designer's goal is to maximize some measurable output of the crowdsourcing > > system, an interesting question is how one can design the network and/or > the incentive scheme so that the system performs at the optimal level > considering the strategic nature of the individuals. > > In the thesis, we provide novel solutions to all the questions above > > using game theoretic modeling and mechanism design innovations. Our > investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability, > and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more > efficient. > > > ALL ARE WELCOME > > > _______________________________________________ > Wikimediaindia-l mailing list > Wikimediaindia-l@lists.wikimedia.org > To unsubscribe from the list / change mailing preferences visit > https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimediaindia-l > >
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