Thank you Xi for your message. Two months past in New Zealand.. It was very cold.. much more than my expectations.. Not yet stabilized.. but on the way.. Regards
======= S1000+ ======= ________________________________ From: xi <[email protected]> To: World-thread <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, August 29, 2009 10:54:14 PM Subject: Re: Very interesting Sumerian, Thank you very much for this post. How is life going? have you arranged everything with the kiwis as expected or working on it yet? Peace and best wishes. Xi On Aug 21, 5:49 am, "Sumerian.." <[email protected]> wrote: > James Baker Tells Tariq Aziz about the American Plan in Iraq in 1990: > > we willattack you and you know that we are a very powerful country, and we > willbring you backto the pre-industrial age and another leadership > willdecide the future of Iraq. > > http://74.6.146.127/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=Tariq+Aziz+was+told+Iraq+... > > So the Americans are very honest. They occupied Iraq and they destroyed it.. > This is honesty. > > S1000+ > > (continued) > > Q: Why did the President summon April Glaspie that day, and what do you > remember about that meeting? > Aziz: The President wanted to send a message to George Bush that we are not > the enemies of the United States, we do not intend to threaten the > interest of the United States or to threaten our neighbours. > There was a crisis with Kuwait and we really wanted to solve it > peacefully and during the meeting he received a call from President > Mubarak. President Mubarak told him that he was in Kuwait and then in Saudia > Arabia and he arranged a > meeting between us and the Kuwaitis in Jeddah, and he informed her of > that news in a happy manner. He told her, "Look, the good news, President > Mubarak told us that he's arranging a meeting between us and Kuwait." So he > hopefully wanted a peaceful settlement to that crisis and that was the > message to the Americans. > That was not the first message. On the > 6th of August, after we went to Kuwait, he summoned the American Charge > d'Affaires, Mr Wilson, I think his name, and he gave him a similar > message, he told him, "Look I want you to convey to President Bush that I > don't want a > conflict with the United States", I would like to have good relations > with the United States and I am ready to solve this problem by peaceful > diplomatic means. > > Q: In April, what was your assessment of what the Americans would do--what > was April Glaspie saying? > Aziz: She didn't tell us anything strange. She didn't tell us in the sense > that we concluded that the Americans will not retaliate. That was nonsense > you see. It was nonsense to think that > the Americans would not attack us. In the early hours of the 2nd of > August, the whole apparatus of the leadership took precautions for an > American speedy immediate retaliation. > With the exception of me, > as Foreign Minister, I had to stay in my office, the President and all > the leadership apparatus was being repositioned..... a precaution from > an American attack. So we had no illusions that the Americans will not > retaliate against being in Kuwait because they knew that this was a > conflict between the two of us-- Iraq and the United States. It was not > actually a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait and in my meeting with Mr. Baker > in Geneva, he said, "You > have a problem with the international community". I said, "No, we have > a problem with you. The representative of the international community, > the Secretary General of the United Nations is not talking with me now, > you are talking with me." > > Q: Was the plan for you to invade Saudi Arabia? > Aziz: That was not the plan. We never thought of Kuwait before, so how could > we think of Saudi Arabia? That was a big lie, used to justify the > American build up in Saudi Arabia. Of course at that time it was very > difficult for King Fahd to invite American troops. That was the first > time in the Arab history to do something like that and so he had to tell his > people that while we are being threatened we don't want to face the > same fate of Kuwait and that was the justification and so they, they > planned it in that way, sold it to the public opinion and Saudia Arabia > and the region and the world, But that was not the reality, we didn't > threaten Saudi Arabia. > > Q: When was the final decision [made] that the troops will go to Kuwait? > Aziz: When our delegation, headed by our Vice President, returned from > Jeddah, on the 1st of August, telling us that the Kuwaitis were > arrogant, and didn't show any sign of reconciliation. So we thought it > was futile to wait. We held a meeting of the Revolution Command > Council, and reached the conclusion that the diplomatic efforts have > failed and we gave the green light to the military action. > > Q: And you thought America would go to war? > Aziz: Certainly, certainly. > When the troops were heading towards Kuwait, the security arrangements > for an anticipated retaliation were immediately being taken. > > Q: Did you expect them to send millions of troops to Saudi Arabia? > Aziz: No, I wouldn't say that we thought in every detail what they would do > but we thought that there will be a retaliation and a serious one and America > is a super power and > very powerful military power in this region, with fleets and military > bases. So we didn't have any illusions about the power, the seriousness > of the American retaliation. > > Q: You thought Iraq could take on America? > Aziz: We were pushed into a fatal struggle in the sense of a struggle in > which your fate will be decided. You will either be hit inside your house > and destroyed, economically and > militarily. Or you go outside and attack the enemy in one of his bases. > We had to do that, we had no choice, we had no other choice. > Iraq was designated by George Bush for destruction, with or without Kuwait. > Inside Kuwait or outside Kuwait. Before the 2nd of August or after the > 2nd of August. > > Q: > And during the build up of American troops in Saudi Arabia, was there > discussion among the leadership of 'Let's make a deal, let's back down'? > Aziz: We were reviewing the situation all the time. Whenever there is a > political or military development, we used to review the situation, but > we didn't think that there will be a change in the strategy and tactics of > George Bush and Margaret Thatcher. > You know, at that time, until the resignation of Margaret Thatcher, she was > telling everybody that 'we will attack Iraq even if Iraq withdraws from > Kuwait,' you know that. She was asking for the dismantling of Iraqi > armament even if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, so what does that mean? It > means first, that they will not go to United Nations to seek permission > because mainly she and > George Bush were talking about Article 51 of the UN Charter, which > entitles them to support an ally, Kuwait, to attack Iraq and act against > Iraq. That was the official position of both the United States and Britain. > Secondly she was saying we must dismantle Iraq from its military power. How > could that be done without destroying Iraq, > without a war? You cannot dismantle the military power of a nation > unless there is some sort of a war. As it happened in Japan, as it > happened in Germany in the Second World War, you just don't do that by > diplomatic means. > > Q: > What were you telling the leadership about the state of American public > opinion? Did you think that because of Vietnam, perhaps they wouldn't > fight? > Aziz: No. We were watching the scene in the United States of course, we > were > interested in the mood in Congress and public opinion. But we knew as > statesmen that in the end, the leaders will decide, and they had the > capability of creating a pretext that will confuse the public opinion and > the Congress and bring it to to to the > position of the leaders. We did not bet on the United States to be > accurate. We did not bet on the position of the government of the > United States or the Congress or the people. Or the position of Britain. > We bet on the Arab world to find a solution. We thought that the Arabs, > fearing the fatal consequences, not on Iraq, but to them, would tell the > world OK, you have done your part, but we would like to find a > solution. 'Til November we hoped that we could do something with Saudi > Arabia. > The last undeclared initiative was made by King Hassan of Morocco. He > tried to arrange a meeting for a summit between President Saddam > Hussein and King Fahd. > > Q: Why did the Arabs not succeed? > Aziz: It was America. America didn't want the the peaceful initiatives to > succeed because George Bush decided to go to war. If you are seeking > the truth about that period, you should have seen that the decision for > war was finally taken in the meeting between George Bush and Margaret > Thatcher when she was there in the States. And that was the decision of > President Bush also. > > Q: They wouldn't have gone to war if you'd withdrawn, that would have been > too difficult.... > Aziz: This is very hypothetical. As I told you, Margaret Thatcher and > George Bush spoke about dismantling Iraq's military power, even if Iraq > withdraws from Kuwait, so what does that mean? It means some sort of a war, > with or without Kuwait. > > Q: > When George Bush finally offered talks--initially in Baghdad and > Washington, and then it became Geneva, I've heard stories that at that > stage the Iraqi leadership were thinking, "Well, we've failed with the > Arabs, maybe we're going to have to make a compromise." Then suddenly > this news about a meeting between Iraq and the US-- What effect did this > announcement have? > Aziz: From the very beginning we thought that that was a public relations > move and when I went to meet with James Baker, I hadn't the slightest > idea that meeting would succeed. I knew that that was public relations. > That he wanted to tell the Congress, "Look, to the end I tried to find a > diplomatic settlement", so that he could get a few more votes. > We didn't have any illusions about the military intentions of the > United States. The United States was doing everything in the direction > of a war. > > Q: Do you remember him handing you that letter? Describe that moment.. What > did he do? > Aziz: Well before I left Baghdad I was watching very closely American > television and media and I had the impression that the latter which was > being spoken about, was not a letter to build a diplomatic > initiative--it's a letter of threat. > I told my President that that was my anticipation and I told him that if I > find that letter not being cordial and objective, I will return it to to > Baker. > > Q: So you sat there, that moment as you got the letter and you're reading > it.... > Aziz: Yes, the President told me you can judge the situation and act. We > started the meeting. He told me that he's carrying a letter from President > Bush to President Saddam > Hussein and he gave me the letter. I took the letter from him and I > read it. I read it very carefully and then when I ended reading it, I told > him --'look, Mr Secretary, this is not the kind of correspondence > between two heads of State, this is a letter of threat and I cannot > receive from you a letter of threat to my President,' and I returned it > to him. > He put it in the middle between us and I was told several years later when I > went to Geneva and to the same hotel to stay there, the director who was an > American, told me that the letter is still in his closet. > > Q: What did you tell them the Americans at that meeting? > Aziz: Well, he started the threats, he said, "Look Minister, if you don't > implement fully the UN Resolutions, we willattack you and you know that we > are a very powerful country, and we willbring you backto the pre-industrial > age and another leadership willdecide the future of Iraq. > My response was very cool. I told him Mr Secretary, Iraq is a very ancient > nation, we have lived for six thousand years. I have > no doubts that you are a very powerful nation, I have no doubts that > you have a very strong military machine and you'll inflict on us heavy > losses, but Iraq will survive and this leadership will decide the future of > Iraq. > > Q: How did the meeting end, do you remember that? > Aziz: Well, we wanted sincerely to explain our position to the Americans. > At the beginning I told him, Mr Baker, it's good to have this meeting, but > why didn't it happen > in September, eh? It could have had a chance of success if it was held > in September, why not October? Why now? Anyhow I'm going to explain our > position to you fully. > Wanting to make a public relations move, he was patient and listened to my > long analysis and statements. > > Q: When that meeting finished, what were you feeling as a person? > Aziz: I was not surprised because I didn't have any illusions when I left > Baghdad that there would be a diplomatic opening. > I went to my room in the hotel, because we agreed to talk to the press.And I > told him , you can talk first to the press and I will follow you. > So I went to my room and waited until he finished his press conference, and > made some notes. I was told that George Bush was going to make a statement, > I said I will speak after the President of the United States then that was > conveyed to him in Washington. He said, "No, I will speak after Minister > Aziz." > The content of my statement was clear that there will be a war against Iraq, > but I still explained to the world our position, that we wanted a > comprehensive, peaceful solution to all the problems of the region. Why > don't they listen to us, why do they focus on the occupation of Kuwait > and ignore the occupation of the West Bank, of Gaza, the occupation of > the Golan Heights, the injustices inflicted on the Arab nations for > decades? > > Q: What was the mood as the deadline approached....the mood among the > leadership, and, the President's mood? > Aziz: I was trying to explain to my western interviewers in that period, I > told them, in this region of ours, all monolithic religions appeared, > Judaism, Christianity and Islam and the people of this region are real > believers in God, because they carry the three religions to the world. > They believe in God and in fatality you see, they believe that when > there is a fate you have to face it whether you are going to win or to > lose and you have to believe in God, you have to believe in yourself, > you shouldn't panic from the powerful whether it's a person or a state. > The general culture in this region when you go to war, this is what > dominates your thinking and feelings. > > Q: Why didn't you compromise--the Americans thought you would go > with a partical withdrawal, keep the oil field--why didn't you do that? > Aziz: I cannot argue against that--maybe the French would have withdrawn, but > the French had 10,000 troops, it doesn't make any significant change in > the military balance. > Maybe one or two Arab states would have > stopped--it makes no difference. There was a decision by the sole super > power and George Bush was in a political position to make the world do > it. Because he did it, and if you want to judge events, in a logical > manner, --I reached an agreement with Gorbachev in the middle of the > war. The agreement was based on full withdrawal from Kuwait, etc., and > Gorbachev declared that agreement and he told me that he is going to summon > the Security Council of the United > Nations and turn that agreement between us into a UN Resolution. > George Bush didn't listen to him. He moved in the ground attack without > listening to Gorbachev. > > Q: > But I spoke to James Baker who was on the phone at the same time, he > says, "We were never never never going to accept a deal where Iraq didn't > agree to all the UN Resolutions..." > Aziz: We agreed on the UN Resolutions, we agreed in the agreement between me > and Gorbachev the first item was Iraq accepts Resolution 660...? Which was > the first resolution about Kuwait. > But they didn't care about what Gorbachev said and wanted, they went > on. They didn't care about the way they attacked Iraq, there was no agreement > among the coalition to do everything they did in Iraq, > nobody cared how many sides were bombed, what was bombed, etc. And who > could have stopped them? Nobody could have stopped them. > So even > with the break up of the coalition at that time, American and Britain > could have gone ahead you see, with their war, depending on their own > explanation and interpretation of Resolution 678 on Article 51 etc on > the pretext and nobody would have told them 'stop'. Maybe people would have > criticised them, but poor people > criticising mighty nations cannot prevent such consequences. > > Q: > We interviewed Gorbachev. He said, "Look, I kept trying to say, it's > not enough to say 'you get out of Kuwait', you've got to agree to pay > the compensation, you've got to agree that sanctions will continue until you > are fully out", all these things, because the > Americans wanted to keep the pressure on. Didn't you realise by then > that you had to just back down totally? > Aziz: I don't want to speak in a harsh manner against a statesman like Mr > Gorbachev, but Gorbachev is not saying the truth. Read his > statement--why he made a statement, he said 'I reached an agreement > with the Foreign Minister of Iraq who represents the Iraqi leadership on the > following points: > First, Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait within three weeks, Second, the > withdrawal from the City of Kuwait will be in four days. > Third, an exchange of prisoners of war will be finished within three or four > days. There will be a comprehensive cease fire and in the air and the sea > and the ground. Sanctions will be lifted, etc. > It is a document. It was published in the Soviet media, it was > published everywhere, so why should he add things that he did not put > on that agreement? > > Q: > No, he accepts that agreement and he tried to sell it to Bush. He rang > Bush and Bush said, "Look, there still is not the full acceptance of > every single UN Resolution". > Aziz: Well that was polemics you see because the main resolution was > accepting the sovereignty of Kuwait and withdrawing from Kuwait, that > was the main resolution. The other resolutions could have been > discussed because the other resolutions were built on this first > resolution, so you cannot say that you have to accept them all > officially because some of them will drop automatically if you accept the > first resolution. > But the main thing was achieving first a cease fire. Then.... Bush > could have said OK, let us have a cease fire and then discuss the other > matters. He did not accept the cease fire, he continued the war. > According to his own schedule he didn't care about what Gorbachev said > and at least with me he had a schedule. When he reached the end of that > schedule he ended the war. > > Q: You must have been very angry when you heard that the deal wasn't being > accepted.... > Aziz: Yes.. that was a disappointment because I had hope that it might work. > I returned from Moscow from Amman, I met the king and the queen and > they were waiting for me and I told them what I had done in Moscow, the > agreement I reached with President > Gorbachev and they were very happy and hopeful that this will end the war > then there will be a cease fire. I went to Baghdad after that, when I woke up > to head > towards Baghdad I saw Cheney on the CNN in the Royal Guest House that > the ground attack had already started, so that was a great > disappointment. > I thought that Gorbachev, well, the Soviet Union > was weaker than it was before but it was still a super power, a > permanent member in the Security Council. I thought that he would use > his influence to make Bush accept that agreement. > What is important about the position of Gorbachev, --when I reached an > agreement with him, he couldn't sell it to George Bush, but, a month > later when the Americans presented the draft of Resolution of 678 which > added more and more conditions on Iraq, > the Soviet Union voted for it, without hesitation which means that the > position of Gorbachev was not a position you can rely on, eh? He could > have said, 'as a matter of principle, we had conditions on Iraq, Iraq during > the conflict accepted those conditions so we don't have to add > more conditions, it was you who did not accept the cease fire. You > decided to continue the war for several days more. Why are you adding > more conditions?' He didn't say that. He just endorsed the American > draft resolution as it is. Maybe some minor modifications. We got told later > that the Americans insisted that Iraq would not obtain any missile beyond > 50km. > > Q: Gorbachev needed the Americans? > Aziz: Yes, so when he says that he wanted things from Iraq and Iraq did not > listen to him, that does not correspond to the real facts. > > ======= > > S1000+ > > ======= --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "World-thread" group. 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