At least you surpassed first phase, survival. Congrats. Yes it is hard to settle elsewhere, I guess more if you bring a family and so on. Good to know that things are on their way.
Peace and best wishes. Xi On Aug 31, 10:21 pm, "Sumerian.." <[email protected]> wrote: > Thank you Xi for your message. Two months past in New Zealand.. It was very > cold.. much more than my expectations.. Not yet stabilized.. but on the way.. > Regards > > ======= > > S1000+ > > ======= > > ________________________________ > From: xi <[email protected]> > To: World-thread <[email protected]> > Sent: Saturday, August 29, 2009 10:54:14 PM > Subject: Re: > > Very interesting Sumerian, Thank you very much for this post. > > How is life going? have you arranged everything with the kiwis as > expected or working on it yet? > > Peace and best wishes. > > Xi > > On Aug 21, 5:49 am, "Sumerian.." <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > James Baker Tells Tariq Aziz about the American Plan in Iraq in 1990: > > > we willattack you and you know that we are a very powerful country, and we > > willbring you backto the pre-industrial age and another leadership > > willdecide the future of Iraq. > > >http://74.6.146.127/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=Tariq+Aziz+was+told+Iraq+... > > > So the Americans are very honest. They occupied Iraq and they destroyed > > it.. This is honesty. > > > S1000+ > > > (continued) > > > Q: Why did the President summon April Glaspie that day, and what do you > > remember about that meeting? > > Aziz: The President wanted to send a message to George Bush that we are not > > the enemies of the United States, we do not intend to threaten the > > interest of the United States or to threaten our neighbours. > > There was a crisis with Kuwait and we really wanted to solve it > > peacefully and during the meeting he received a call from President > > Mubarak. President Mubarak told him that he was in Kuwait and then in > > Saudia Arabia and he arranged a > > meeting between us and the Kuwaitis in Jeddah, and he informed her of > > that news in a happy manner. He told her, "Look, the good news, President > > Mubarak told us that he's arranging a meeting between us and Kuwait." So he > > hopefully wanted a peaceful settlement to that crisis and that was the > > message to the Americans. > > That was not the first message. On the > > 6th of August, after we went to Kuwait, he summoned the American Charge > > d'Affaires, Mr Wilson, I think his name, and he gave him a similar > > message, he told him, "Look I want you to convey to President Bush that I > > don't want a > > conflict with the United States", I would like to have good relations > > with the United States and I am ready to solve this problem by peaceful > > diplomatic means. > > > Q: In April, what was your assessment of what the Americans would do--what > > was April Glaspie saying? > > Aziz: She didn't tell us anything strange. She didn't tell us in the sense > > that we concluded that the Americans will not retaliate. That was nonsense > > you see. It was nonsense to think that > > the Americans would not attack us. In the early hours of the 2nd of > > August, the whole apparatus of the leadership took precautions for an > > American speedy immediate retaliation. > > With the exception of me, > > as Foreign Minister, I had to stay in my office, the President and all > > the leadership apparatus was being repositioned..... a precaution from > > an American attack. So we had no illusions that the Americans will not > > retaliate against being in Kuwait because they knew that this was a > > conflict between the two of us-- Iraq and the United States. It was not > > actually a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait and in my meeting with Mr. > > Baker in Geneva, he said, "You > > have a problem with the international community". I said, "No, we have > > a problem with you. The representative of the international community, > > the Secretary General of the United Nations is not talking with me now, > > you are talking with me." > > > Q: Was the plan for you to invade Saudi Arabia? > > Aziz: That was not the plan. We never thought of Kuwait before, so how could > > we think of Saudi Arabia? That was a big lie, used to justify the > > American build up in Saudi Arabia. Of course at that time it was very > > difficult for King Fahd to invite American troops. That was the first > > time in the Arab history to do something like that and so he had to tell > > his people that while we are being threatened we don't want to face the > > same fate of Kuwait and that was the justification and so they, they > > planned it in that way, sold it to the public opinion and Saudia Arabia > > and the region and the world, But that was not the reality, we didn't > > threaten Saudi Arabia. > > > Q: When was the final decision [made] that the troops will go to Kuwait? > > Aziz: When our delegation, headed by our Vice President, returned from > > Jeddah, on the 1st of August, telling us that the Kuwaitis were > > arrogant, and didn't show any sign of reconciliation. So we thought it > > was futile to wait. We held a meeting of the Revolution Command > > Council, and reached the conclusion that the diplomatic efforts have > > failed and we gave the green light to the military action. > > > Q: And you thought America would go to war? > > Aziz: Certainly, certainly. > > When the troops were heading towards Kuwait, the security arrangements > > for an anticipated retaliation were immediately being taken. > > > Q: Did you expect them to send millions of troops to Saudi Arabia? > > Aziz: No, I wouldn't say that we thought in every detail what they would do > > but we thought that there will be a retaliation and a serious one and > > America is a super power and > > very powerful military power in this region, with fleets and military > > bases. So we didn't have any illusions about the power, the seriousness > > of the American retaliation. > > > Q: You thought Iraq could take on America? > > Aziz: We were pushed into a fatal struggle in the sense of a struggle in > > which your fate will be decided. You will either be hit inside your house > > and destroyed, economically and > > militarily. Or you go outside and attack the enemy in one of his bases. > > We had to do that, we had no choice, we had no other choice. > > Iraq was designated by George Bush for destruction, with or without Kuwait. > > Inside Kuwait or outside Kuwait. Before the 2nd of August or after the > > 2nd of August. > > > Q: > > And during the build up of American troops in Saudi Arabia, was there > > discussion among the leadership of 'Let's make a deal, let's back down'? > > Aziz: We were reviewing the situation all the time. Whenever there is a > > political or military development, we used to review the situation, but > > we didn't think that there will be a change in the strategy and tactics of > > George Bush and Margaret Thatcher. > > You know, at that time, until the resignation of Margaret Thatcher, she was > > telling everybody that 'we will attack Iraq even if Iraq withdraws from > > Kuwait,' you know that. She was asking for the dismantling of Iraqi > > armament even if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, so what does that mean? It > > means first, that they will not go to United Nations to seek permission > > because mainly she and > > George Bush were talking about Article 51 of the UN Charter, which > > entitles them to support an ally, Kuwait, to attack Iraq and act against > > Iraq. That was the official position of both the United States and Britain. > > Secondly she was saying we must dismantle Iraq from its military power. > > How could that be done without destroying Iraq, > > without a war? You cannot dismantle the military power of a nation > > unless there is some sort of a war. As it happened in Japan, as it > > happened in Germany in the Second World War, you just don't do that by > > diplomatic means. > > > Q: > > What were you telling the leadership about the state of American public > > opinion? Did you think that because of Vietnam, perhaps they wouldn't > > fight? > > Aziz: No. We were watching the scene in the United States of course, we > > were > > interested in the mood in Congress and public opinion. But we knew as > > statesmen that in the end, the leaders will decide, and they had the > > capability of creating a pretext that will confuse the public opinion and > > the Congress and bring it to to to the > > position of the leaders. We did not bet on the United States to be > > accurate. We did not bet on the position of the government of the > > United States or the Congress or the people. Or the position of Britain. > > We bet on the Arab world to find a solution. We thought that the Arabs, > > fearing the fatal consequences, not on Iraq, but to them, would tell the > > world OK, you have done your part, but we would like to find a > > solution. 'Til November we hoped that we could do something with Saudi > > Arabia. > > The last undeclared initiative was made by King Hassan of Morocco. He > > tried to arrange a meeting for a summit between President Saddam > > Hussein and King Fahd. > > > Q: Why did the Arabs not succeed? > > Aziz: It was America. America didn't want the the peaceful initiatives to > > succeed because George Bush decided to go to war. If you are seeking > > the truth about that period, you should have seen that the decision for > > war was finally taken in the meeting between George Bush and Margaret > > Thatcher when she was there in the States. And that was the decision of > > President Bush also. > > > Q: They wouldn't have gone to war if you'd withdrawn, that would have been > > too difficult.... > > Aziz: This is very hypothetical. As I told you, Margaret Thatcher and > > George Bush spoke about dismantling Iraq's military power, even if Iraq > > withdraws from Kuwait, so what does that mean? It means some sort of a > > war, with or without Kuwait. > > > Q: > > When George Bush finally offered talks--initially in Baghdad and > > Washington, and then it became Geneva, I've heard stories that at that > > stage the Iraqi leadership were thinking, "Well, we've failed with the > > Arabs, maybe we're going to have to make a compromise." Then suddenly > > this news about a meeting between Iraq and the US-- What effect did this > > announcement have? > > Aziz: From the very beginning we thought that that was a public relations > > move and when I went to meet with James > > ... > > read more »- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "World-thread" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/world-thread?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
