inept - a. Displaying a lack of judgment, sense, or reason; foolish:
an inept remark. b. Bungling or clumsy; incompetent

Adj. 1. inapt - not elegant or graceful in expression; "an awkward
prose style"; "a clumsy apology"; "his cumbersome writing style";


Inept -- especially when it relates to judgment or reason.  Inapt has
more to do with style.



On Jan 26, 9:05 am, xi <[email protected]> wrote:
> It is always interesting to find a Western economist that is not
> severily brainwashed. Thanks a lot for your post Sumerian.
>
> Questions:
>
> I use to call those parrot-economists "inapt" while this athor call
> them "inept", which is the right word?
>
> Also, I call  those brainwashed Westerners "China-haters" while this
> author calls them "China-bashers", which is the right word?.
>
> Peace and best wishes.
>
> Xi
>
> On 26 ene, 11:11, "Sumerian.." <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Instead of these depreciating dollars being used again and
> > again, in that back-and-forth flow of trade, those dollars have been removed
> > from global markets – and replaced with renminbi.
> >  
> >  
> >  http://seekingalpha.com/article/184229-why- china-s-about- to-end-dollar- 
> > peg
>
> > Why China's About to End Dollar-Peg
> > by: Jeff Nielson January 25,
> > 2010 | about: UDN / UUP / CYB / CNY    
>
> > Jeff
> > Nielson
> >  
>
> > Having received several comments and questions from readers about the future
> > of China's monetary policy, which “pegs” the price of the renminbi to the 
> > U.S.
> > dollar, that usually serves as a good indicator that this is a topic worthy 
> > of a
> > more detailed discussion.
>
> > The general attitude I have encountered (which is obviously fueled by how 
> > the
> > mainstream media chooses to report this issue) is that China's government is
> > likely to retain the dollar-peg either because a) that has been its policy
> > throughout the last decade; or b) that China is somehow “trapped” into
> > maintaining the “peg”. I firmly believe the exact opposite: that China's
> > government is very close to abandoning the dollar-peg, and (in fact) has 
> > made a
> > multitude of preparations to do so.
>
> > Obviously, the first and more simpler basis for believing the dollar-peg 
> > will
> > continue is easiest to address, so I will begin with that. While it can 
> > always
> > be seen as simplistic to conclude that some trend will continue, simply due 
> > to
> > some form of “inertia” (or just habit), we live in a universe where inertia 
> > is
> > one of the most dominant forces.
>
> > Thus, the “inertia” argument must always be considered carefully. I would
> > argue that the appropriate way to conduct such an analysis is to look at 
> > what
> > caused a particular event/trend (in the first place), and whether those
> > causative factors still exist. Once any particular trend (especially an 
> > economic
> > trend) is no longer being driven by anything other than “past practice”, 
> > than
> > the probability that such a trend is about to end rises considerably.
>
> > Looking back to when China first chose to link its currency to the U.S.
> > dollar in this manner, in April of
> > 1994, there are several obvious factors to list. First of all, China had a
> > much less-mature economy. It was a smaller economy, in absolute terms. It 
> > was
> > much earlier in the major transition from a primarily agricultural, peasant
> > population to a much more urbanized, 21st century society.
>
> > Because of this, it lacked the population centers and distribution networks
> > which must be present before a stronger, more consumer-oriented domestic 
> > economy
> > can take hold. In turn, lacking a large domestic economy, its rapid 
> > industrial
> > expansion was inevitably dependent on continued strength with its exports.
>
> > What China already did have was a population with rapidly rising incomes,
> > large pools of savings, and a manufacturing base that has clearly 
> > established it
> > as the new, global leader in many categories of production. In other words,
> > China possesses many of the same characteristics today as were seen in the 
> > U.S.
> > economy – just before it became a global, consumption- juggernaut.
>
> > While dogmatic idealogues may choke on the notion that China is “following 
> > in
> > America's footsteps”, China has long since stopped being a “communist” 
> > nation in
> > any remotely literal sense. Unfortunately, many of the people who insist on
> > using labels, use the wrong ones, time and time again.
>
> > “Communism” and the sort of breath-taking industrial expansion currently
> > taking place in China are simply not compatible. While “communism” may not
> > prevent the leading Communists from setting aside a larger piece of the pie 
> > for
> > themselves, it has always prevented the amassing of large personal fortunes
> > through open commerce – which is officially anathema in any true, communist
> > society.
>
> > Obviously, the China of the late-20th and 21st centuries has engaged in a
> > complete ideological reversal, and officially endorsed the concept of
> > individuals seeking to prosper through their own efforts – something which 
> > we
> > “capitalists” have always considered a trait which separated us from all
> > “communists”. It is important to be clear about this point, since one must
> > assume that the endless rants of the China-bashers are fueled (for the most
> > part) by their failure to understand the changes which have taken place in 
> > both
> > its economy – and its society.
>
> > Clearly, many of the factors which existed at the beginning of China's
> > dollar-peg have changed considerably. China is now the world's 
> > second-largest
> > economy – having leapfrogged nations such as Japan, and the world's other
> > exporting-powerhous e: Germany. With this economic growth being largely 
> > based
> > upon manufacturing, this means that there has been a great deal of 
> > additional
> > wealth created in China's economy, further boosting both incomes and savings
> > (i.e. cash-flow, and investment capital).
> > While many myopic observers of China continue to conclude that China lacks
> > enough domestic demand to reduce its reliance upon exports, not only is it 
> > the
> > second-largest economy, but its domestic economy has been exploding. An 
> > analysis
> > of China's economy published by the Harvard Business School (.pdf) in
> > October of 2008 is highly illuminating.
>
> > In 2007, the last year in which China's economy was supposedly being driven
> > by exports, China's 11% growth was achieved through contributions of 5% 
> > growth
> > from domestic consumption, 4% growth from investment, and a puny 2% growth 
> > from
> > exports. That's right, in the year before China began to seriously move away
> > from “export dependence”, those exports accounted for less than 20% of 
> > China's
> > growth.
> > Furthermore, even when Chinese exports were at their peak, the “dependence”
> > on mature (and sagging) Western economies was never what is pretended by the
> > China-bashers. Together, exports to the U.S. and Europe accounted for less 
> > than
> > half of China's total exports.
>
> > Yes, those levels are falling further – and that is great news for China's
> > economy. Less and less of China's goods are being paid for with Western 
> > IOU's
> > (of highly dubious worth), while a greater and greater percentage of Chinese
> > exports are being paid for with cash: the trade surpluses of other 
> > developing
> > economies. Only the warped minds of the China-bashers could construe this 
> > shift
> > to paying customers as being “bad” for China's economy.
>
> > I could go on and on about China's domestic economic strength, but there is
> > much more material to cover. Those interested in more reading on this area 
> > could
> > refer to a couple of previous commentaries (“China's
> > Problem: Too Much Money”, “Soaring
> > retail sales in China demonstrate economic shift”).
>
> > Just as China's government has rapidly (and admirably) prepared China's
> > domestic economy to replace some of the demand for its exports through 
> > increased
> > domestic consumption, so too has China been rapidly preparing the renminbi 
> > to
> > take over as “reserve currency” from the U.S. dollar. This has taken the 
> > form of
> > reducing the use of U.S. dollars in global trade, combined with shoring-up 
> > the
> > “reserves” with which it backs its own currency.
>
> > The move to reduce the use of U.S. dollars in trade has been a two-part
> > process. While China has engaged in a long series of bilateral trade 
> > agreements
> > to boost its share of global trade, it has simultaneously inked numerous
> > “currency swaps”, supplying its trade partners with renminbi to use in their
> > future trading – and permanently excluding the U.S. dollar from those 
> > bilateral
> > relationships.
>
> > Indeed, inept Western analysts point to the large hoard of U.S. dollars 
> > still
> > in China's possession, and conclude (erroneously) that the Chinese 
> > government is
> > still increasing its holdings of U.S. IOU's through “buying” its debt. In 
> > fact,
> > such accumulation has almost stopped.
>
> > China is willing to take whatever “hit” that it must on the U.S. dollars
> > which it is holding (through currency swaps), because it is effectively
> > “sterilizing” global trade from the cancerous effect of the biggest flood of
> > greenbacks in history (and the horrific inflation they would cause). 
> > Instead of
> > these depreciating dollars being used again and again, in that 
> > back-and-forth
> > flow of trade, those dollars have been removed from global markets – and
> > replaced with renminbi.
>
> > The second aspect of China's monetary campaign is to improve the “backing” 
> > of
> > the renminbi through a “hard asset”: gold – instead of the worthless paper 
> > of
> > Western bankers. Indeed, this is clearly the favorite means of China's
> > government to rid itself of dollars – by swapping them for gold. Now, every 
> > time
> > the anti-gold cabal drives down the price of gold a few percent, the Chinese
> > government steps in, buys the cheap gold, and rids itself of unwanted
> > dollars.
>
> > The only problem with this program (from the perspective of China's
> > government) is that it is holding at least one hundred excess U.S. dollars 
> > for
> > every dollar of bullion which the cabal still has left to dump onto the 
> > market.
> > More generally, with other central banks taking the “cue” from China (and 
> > India)
> > to accumulate gold reserves, China must now compete for limited gold 
> > stockpiles
> > with several other central banks (and, soon, dozens of them).
>
> > Having detailed China's thorough preparations to abandon the
>
> ...
>
> read more »

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