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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-2198?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=14152523#comment-14152523
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Craig Welch commented on YARN-2198:
-----------------------------------
pom.xml - don’t see a /etc/hadoop or a wsce-site.xml, missed?
RawLocalFileSystem
Is someone from HDFS looking at this?
protected boolean mkOneDir(File p2f) throws IOException - nit, generalize arg
name pls
return (parent == null || parent2f.exists() || mkdirs(parent)) &&
+ (mkOneDir(p2f) || p2f.isDirectory());
so, I don't get this logic, & believe it will fail if the path exists and is
not a directory. Why not just do if p2f doesn't exist mkdirs(p2f)? seems much
simpler, and drops the need for mkOneDir
NativeIO
Elevated class - I believe this is Windows specific, "WindowsElevated" or
"ElevatedWindows"? Why doesn't it extend "Windows" - I don't think secure and
insecure windows should become "wholly dissimilar"
createTaskAsUser, killTask, ProcessStub:
These aren't really "io", I think they should be factored out to their own
process-specific class
> Remove the need to run NodeManager as privileged account for Windows Secure
> Container Executor
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: YARN-2198
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-2198
> Project: Hadoop YARN
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Reporter: Remus Rusanu
> Assignee: Remus Rusanu
> Labels: security, windows
> Attachments: .YARN-2198.delta.10.patch, YARN-2198.1.patch,
> YARN-2198.2.patch, YARN-2198.3.patch, YARN-2198.delta.4.patch,
> YARN-2198.delta.5.patch, YARN-2198.delta.6.patch, YARN-2198.delta.7.patch,
> YARN-2198.separation.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.10.patch,
> YARN-2198.trunk.4.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.5.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.6.patch,
> YARN-2198.trunk.8.patch, YARN-2198.trunk.9.patch
>
>
> YARN-1972 introduces a Secure Windows Container Executor. However this
> executor requires the process launching the container to be LocalSystem or a
> member of the a local Administrators group. Since the process in question is
> the NodeManager, the requirement translates to the entire NM to run as a
> privileged account, a very large surface area to review and protect.
> This proposal is to move the privileged operations into a dedicated NT
> service. The NM can run as a low privilege account and communicate with the
> privileged NT service when it needs to launch a container. This would reduce
> the surface exposed to the high privileges.
> There has to exist a secure, authenticated and authorized channel of
> communication between the NM and the privileged NT service. Possible
> alternatives are a new TCP endpoint, Java RPC etc. My proposal though would
> be to use Windows LPC (Local Procedure Calls), which is a Windows platform
> specific inter-process communication channel that satisfies all requirements
> and is easy to deploy. The privileged NT service would register and listen on
> an LPC port (NtCreatePort, NtListenPort). The NM would use JNI to interop
> with libwinutils which would host the LPC client code. The client would
> connect to the LPC port (NtConnectPort) and send a message requesting a
> container launch (NtRequestWaitReplyPort). LPC provides authentication and
> the privileged NT service can use authorization API (AuthZ) to validate the
> caller.
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