MRzine.gif

 

 

Violent Protests in Venezuela Fit a Pattern

 

 

Dan Beeton, Monthly Review, USA, 19 February 2014

 

Venezuela's latest round of violent protests appears to fit a pattern and
represents the tug-and-pull nature of the country's divided opposition.
Several times over the past 15 years since the late, former president Hugo
Chávez took office in 1999, the political opposition has launched violent
protests aimed at forcing the current president out of office.  Most
notably, such protests were a part of the April 2002 coup that temporarily
deposed Chávez and then accompanied the 2002/2003 oil strike.  In February
of 2004, a particularly radical sector of the opposition unleashed the
"Guarimba": violent riots by small groups who paralyzed much of the east of
Caracas for several days with the declared goal of creating a state of
chaos.  As CEPR Co-Director  <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-TMOAoqNPqI>
Mark Weisbrot has explained, then -- as now -- the strategy is clear: a
sector of the opposition seeks to overturn the results of democratic
elections.  An important difference this time of course is that Venezuela
has its first post-Chávez president, and a key part of the opposition's
strategy overall has been to depict Nicolás Maduro as a pale imitation of
his predecessor and a president ill-equipped to deal with the country's
problems (many of which are exaggerated in the Venezuelan private media,
which is still largely
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/the-americas-blog/media-bias-in-venezue
la> opposition-owned, as well as the international media).

 

Following Maduro's electoral victory in April last year (with much of the
opposition
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/the-americas-blog/a-timeline-of-venezue
lan-opposition-reactions-to-the-recent-elections> crying "fraud" despite
there being
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/a-statistical-note-on-th
e-april-14-venezuelan-presidential-election-and-audit-of-results> no
reasonable doubts about the validity of the results), the opposition
<http://www.noticias24.com/venezuela/noticia/171703/la-mud-esta-lista-para-l
as-elecciones-municipales-vamos-a-participar-con-todos-los-hierros/> looked
to the December municipal elections as a referendum on Maduro's government,
vowing to defeat governing party PSUV and allied candidates.  The outcome,
which left the pro-Maduro parties with a 10-point margin of victory, was a
stunning defeat for the opposition, and this time they did not even bother
claiming the elections were rigged.  According to the opposition's own
pre-election analysis, support for Maduro had apparently grown over the
months preceding the election.  As we have
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/long-awaite
d-apocalypse-not-likely-in-venezuela> pointed out, this may be due in part
to the
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/the-americas-blog/venezuela-leads-regio
n-in-poverty-reduction-in-2012-eclac-says> large reduction in poverty in
2012 and other economic and social gains that preceded the more recent
economic problems.

 

Defeated at the polls, the anti-democratic faction of the opposition
prepared for a new attempt at destabilizing the elected government, and
promoted relatively small, but often violent student protests in early
February. They then called for a massive protest on February 12, Venezuela's
Youth Day in the center of Caracas.  The demonstrations have been
accompanied by a social media campaign that has spread misinformation in an
attempt to depict the Maduro administration as a violent dictatorship
instead of a popular elected government.
<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=180977> Images of police violence
from other countries and past protests -- some several years old -- have
been presented on social media as having occurred in recent days in
Venezuela.  A  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EFS6cP9auDc> YouTube video
that has been watched by almost 2 million viewers presents a one-sided
portrayal of the situation and falsely states that the Venezuelan government
controls all radio and television in the country, among other distortions.
Similar disinformation occurred in April 2002 and in other past incidents in
Venezuela, most notably when  <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=etbEQcA7jUA>
manipulated video footage was used to provide political justification for
the coup d'etat.

 

While some in Washington foreign policy circles may attempt to portray the
leaders of this new wave of protests as persecuted pro-democracy heroes,
they in fact have histories of supporting anti-democratic and
unconstitutional efforts to oust the government.  Both Leopoldo López and
Maria Corina Machado supported the 2002 coup; in López's case he
participated in it by supervising the arrest of then-Minister of Justice and
the Interior Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, when López was mayor of Chacao.  Police
dragged Rodríguez Chacín out of the building where he had sought refuge into
an angry mob, who physically attacked him.  Corina Machado notably was
present when the coup government of Pedro Carmona was sworn in and signed
the infamous "Carmona decree" dissolving the congress, the constitution, and
the Supreme Court.  The
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2014/0218/What-s-going-on-in-Venezu
ela-video> Christian Science Monitor reported yesterday:

 

[T]he opposition has a touchy protest history in Venezuela.  Early on in
former President Hugo Chavez's administration, the opposition was
consistently on the streets calling for an end to his presidency.  In 2002,
they organized a coup that briefly unseated the president.  Though the
opposition leadership is not calling for a coup, the reputation the group
made for itself barely a decade ago may be haunting it as it vocally pushes
back against Maduro's administration.

 

Venezuela's opposition receives funding from U.S. "democracy promotion"
groups including the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and core
grantees such as the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the
National Democratic Institute (NDI).  The NED, which the Washington Post
noted was set up to conduct activities "much of" which "[t]he CIA used to
fund covertly," has made
<http://ned.org/where-we-work/latin-america-and-caribbean/venezuela> a
number of grants directed at empowering youth and students in Venezuela in
recent years, and USAID has also
<http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/Agency_USAID.aspx?budTab=tab_Bud_Impl>
given money to IRI, NDI, and other groups for Venezuela programs.  These
organizations have a history of destabilizing elected governments and
working to unify and strengthen political opposition to left-wing parties
and governments.  IRI notably played
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/international/americas/29haiti.html?pagew
anted=all> a key role in destabilizing Haiti ahead of the 2004 coup there
and also has engaged in
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/why-washing
ton-cares-about-haiti-honduras> activities aimed at weakening Brazil's
governing Workers' Party, to name a few.  In Venezuela, they
<http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/11/coup-connection> funded groups
involved in the 2002 coup, and IRI spokespersons infamously praised the coup
after it happened.

 

The Haiti example is instructive.  The parallels are numerous: notably, a
key part of the strategy was to exaggerate and fabricate killings and other
human rights abuses, which were blamed on the elected government (while
truly horrific atrocities committed by the armed wing of the opposition were
generally ignored).  Researchers -- including some from the U.N. - have
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/bad-news-fr
om-haiti-us-press-misses-the-story> since debunked the most
widely-circulated accounts of rights violations, but of course the
democratically-elected president (Jean-Bertrand Aristide) had long since
been forced from office by then.

 

The U.S.-funded destabilization of Haiti in the early 2000s also offers
lessons as to the endgame of this strategy.  As the
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/international/americas/29haiti.html?pagew
anted=all> New York Times reported and as scholars such as
<http://books.google.com/books?id=ikxwRQAACAAJ> Peter Hallward and
<http://monthlyreview.org/press/books/pb3003/> Jeb Sprague have documented,
the IRI counseled its Haitian partners not to accept any compromises from
the Aristide government (which made many concessions, including agreeing to
a power-sharing arrangement) and to continue to press further.

But the Maduro government is of course in a much stronger position than
Haiti's government ten years ago.  A key factor is that while Aristide was
relatively isolated politically, Latin American governments, through
<http://www.unasursg.org/inicio/centro-de-noticias/archivo-de-noticias/comun
icado-de-la-uni%C3%B3n-de-naciones-suramericanas-sobre-la-situaci%C3%B3n-en-
la-rep%C3%BAblica-bolivariana-de-venezuela> UNASUR and
<http://en.mercopress.com/2014/02/17/mercosur-condemns-violence-in-venezuela
-and-calls-for-dialogue> MERCOSUR, have condemned the violent protests and
the opposition's calls for Maduro to leave office and have expressed support
for the Venezuelan government.  In this case, when the Obama administration
continues to
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/us-indicate
s-support-for-regime-change-in-venezuela-once-again-south-america-says-no>
signal that it sides with the violent protests, it is an outlier in the
region.

 

 

·        Dan Beeton is International Communications Director for the Center
for Economic and Policy Research.  Follow Beeton on Twitter
<https://twitter.com/Dan_Beeton> @Dan_Beeton.  This article was first
published in
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/the-americas-blog/violent-protests-in-v
enezuela-fit-a-pattern> CEPR's The Americas Blog on 19 February 2014 under a
Creative Commons license.

 

 

From: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2014/beeton190214.html

 

 

 

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