I think that the problem here is that the self-reference found in nature is not really the same type as Godel requires to make his proof work. Perhaps you can give me some examples of self-reference in nature other than human consciousness? None come to mind off hand.

In the matter of human consciousness, one must be careful. I don't think we can really suggest that consciousness can be conscious of itself in a meaningful way. Otherwise we'd be faced with an infinite regress. What I think we really mean in this case is that we are conscious of the thought that we are conscious, i.e. we are conscious of a symbolic representation within our consciousness, one of many contents of consciousness, rather than of consciousness itself. Consciousness is direct experience, it doesn't make logical sense to speak about directly experiencing direct experience. The initial direct experience simply is the direct experience. In other words we must distinguish between the contents of consciousness and consciousness itself. See my paper at HardProblem.pdf for more on the distinction and its relevance here.

So I don't see any true Godelian self-referentiality in nature unless you can suggest something I'm overlooking.


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