JOHN BROWN'S BODY
   
  By ADAM GOPNIK
  The New Yorker | April 18, 2005
  http://www.newyorker.com/critics/books/articles/050425crbo_books

(A new biography restores Brown's centrality to the Civil War.)

"Weird John Brown," Melville called him, in a weirdly contemporary
locution, and for a long time he was shuffled to the edges of American
weirdness, among the staring-mad homicidal nuts and assassins. In the
past several years, though, history, or at least some historians, has
become kinder, and even reverent. Long before he led the botched and
bloody anti-slavery raid on Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859, Brown,
we are taught, was a moral visionary and a man of uncanny courage and
integrity. Every one of his central moral convictions and most of his
peripheral ones, too, have been vindicated by history. He was a
dedicated feminist, who had his sons do the housework on terms of
equality with his daughters; he was a farmer who had gentle and
respectful relations with neighboring Native Americans, so that, even
before he became famous as the fighting fury of abolition, they liked
and respected him. Above all, he was convinced, throughout the
eighteen-forties and fifties�a time when even most abolitionists were
prepared to wring their hands and tolerate slavery if it could be
limited in scale�that the practice of holding men, women, and children
as property was an absolute evil, that it had, at all costs, to end,
and that the race who had been enslaved were not merely to be pitied
but to be respected and armed, as citizens and fellow-soldiers. Far
from being an incoherent fanatic, he was an eloquent speaker and
writer, who composed an entire alternative Constitution, one
reflecting egalitarian values that did not become commonplace until
our own time.

He was also, as even an admiring historian cannot deny, a man of
violence and, by almost any definition, what we would now call a
terrorist�a man who believed that the government of the United States
should be met with violence because it supported and perpetuated
oppression. He believed that there were no distinctions to be made
between innocent and guilty in a society determined to perpetuate an
evil. "It is better that a whole generation of men, women, and
children should pass away by a violent death" than that slavery should
live, he declared. He led his sons out into the fields of Kansas at
night to massacre unarmed men while their families listened, and
insisted afterward that he had been right to do it: that where
legislation and compromise had failed only violence would succeed. He
is the man who made Lincoln possible, and the acknowledged spiritual
patron of Timothy McVeigh.

Russell Banks's fine novel "Cloudsplitter" (1998) helped reimagine
Brown for our time as a flawed hero, and it was followed by the
Harvard scholar John Stauffer's "The Black Hearts of Men" (2002),
which re�stablished Brown as a serious political thinker, and, last
year, by Franny Nudelman's "John Brown's Body," which explained the
enormous role of Brown's martyrdom in the visual and literary rhetoric
of the Civil War. In a different, sharper key, George MacDonald Fraser
devoted his 1994 "Flashman" novel, "Flashman and the Angel of the
Lord," to an account of Harry's involvement with Brown and Harpers
Ferry, and produced what is, for the Flashman series, a surprisingly
admiring portrait. Now we have a full-fledged five-hundred-page
biography: "John Brown, Abolitionist," by David S. Reynolds (Knopf;
$35). Reynolds's book is a defense of Brown, whom he, too, believes to
have been slighted by a history written by the winners with an eye to
consoling the losers. He sees Brown as a visionary prophet of American
equality, whose sins and crimes, though real, have to be situated in
the bloody context of the run-up to the Civil War.

Mainly, he wants to restore Brown's centrality to the Civil War, and
he does. By writing John Brown out as an oddity or sideshow, he
insists, we miss the essential reality of the war: what was
unthinkable and extremist in 1859�the armed descent of the North on
the South to end slavery�had by 1864 become a mass movement, so that
the war could be understood as what Lincoln called "a John Brown raid,
on a gigantic scale." Brown is the first mover in the American
tragedy, the man who struck the bell and struck it hard. Reynolds's
book isn't beautifully written, and his defense of Brown can be
uncomfortably apologetic, but almost every page forces you to think
hard, and in new ways, about American violence, American history, and
what used to be called the American character.

John Brown was born with his century, in Torrington, Connecticut. His
father, Owen Brown, was a Yankee tanner, and a hard, cold Calvinist of
the very old American school. William T. Vollmann, in his dense study
of the types of violence, "Rising Up and Rising Down," tries to place
Brown within a general practice of personal violence and expiation
through discipline. Brown's father, a man of rectitude, beat him
regularly, and Brown, in turn, beat his children, making them strike
their father as often as their father struck them, but surely this
kind of punishment was common in the brutal domestic life of the time.
Nor is young Brown's subsequent history of failed careers, in tanning
and farming and real-estate speculation, quite as unusual for the
pre-Civil War period as some have tried to make it, in an effort to
create an aura of embittered resentment around the man. A figure as
different as John James Audubon went up the same Calvary of failed
minor capitalisms before he found himself.

Brown was unusual, perhaps, in his fecundity�he eventually had twenty
children by two wives, the first of whom died, predictably, of
childbed fever�and in his passionate devotion to his family; he seems
to have been so ideal a father that three of his sons followed him to
their deaths in his crusades. (Perhaps even more extraordinary, the
sons who didn't want to join him he treated tenderly.) In his own
time, he gave off a sense of being a man of some other, a throwback.
With a classic American Puritan's addiction to Scripture, he was more
a man of the Old Testament than the New, a prophet and avenger, a
Joshua rather than a Jesus. He had a particularly bad case of the old
New England identification of the Puritans with the Jews, as the armed
and chosen people. (Brown was, in his broad-mindedness,
philo-Semitic.) But he was also a resolute roundhead, an admirer of
Oliver Cromwell, and one of Reynolds's accomplishments is to help us
see how the figure of Cromwell�the common man who read his Bible, and
who killed a king�haunted the period and Brown's actions.

What's still difficult to explain about Brown is just why he turned so
hard against slavery. His father was an anti-slavery zealot, though
not an activist, but the son absorbed the creed of abolition with an
intensity and a sense of personal wrong that were unequalled among the
white men of his time. The legend has Brown, at the age of twelve,
seeing a slave boy being beaten, and swearing, then and there, to
"declare, or Swear: Eternal War with Slavery." True or not, the story
has two elements that are typical of Brown's passionate form of
abolition: it was intensely personal, and it involved an empathy,
rather than patronizing sympathy, with the sufferings of black people.

Brown turned to radical abolitionism, and to violence, only in the
eighteen-thirties. In retrospect, it is the great dividing decade, as
crucial as the nineteen-sixties in the next century. As the essayist
John Jay Chapman observed in 1913, "Between 1830 and 1835, the element
of passion was rising past the danger point, and running into
something like insanity in the Southern mind." The decade began with
Nat Turner's slave revolt, and its brutal suppression, and so it also
marked the moment when the generally benevolent Jeffersonian view of
slavery�an evil that would pass with the development of the
region�became replaced in the South by various nascent forms of
ideological racism: blacks were not an unlucky race, not yet quite
ready for emancipation, but a subhuman one, whose only hope for
salvation lay in being kept in slave labor; the evil would never pass,
because it wasn't an evil. The new, openly racist ideology produced an
uncompromising form of abolitionism in the North, under the leadership
of William Lloyd Garrison, the white Martin Luther King, Jr., whose
great words of 1829 opened the decade: "Before God I must say that
such a glaring contradiction as exists between our creed and practice,
the annals of six thousand years cannot parallel. In view of it, I am
ashamed of my country."

But Garrison, like Dr. King, was a pacifist, and, right up to the
moment when the war broke out, he had no really practical plan for
ending slavery, aside from "separation" (i.e., the decoupling of the
North from the South) and moral suasion. John Brown's insight, from
the beginning, was that slavery would end only if someone ended it.
Sometime in the eighteen-forties, he had conceived a plan to create an
army of emancipation in the South, which would hide in the mountains
and grow by leaps and defections until the institution of slavery
ultimately collapsed. Apart from the grandiosity of his long-range
scheme, Brown differed from the mainstream of Northern abolitionism in
his peculiar affinity with the South�both with the blacks he wanted to
help liberate and with the slaveholders he wanted to destroy. Where
Garrison, though utterly passionate and courageous in his
denunciations, was a thorough man of the North, with
lawyerly-journalistic gifts of argument and irony, Brown was a man of
romantic feeling. Stauffer's book documents Brown's deep sense of
identification with and admiration for black culture. In a way that
did not recur in American life until the radicals of the
nineteen-sixties stood in awe of H. Rap Brown, he wanted to be
black�to look black and think black and act black. (He may even have
had his skin darkened in photographs to try to pass, in the opposite
direction.)

At the same time, Brown�along with certain radical characters of the
black abolitionist movement�shared with the slaveowners a romantic
ideology of personal honor through violence. "Our white brethren
cannot understand us unless we speak to them in their own language;
they recognize only force," Brown's friend the black radical James
McCune Smith wrote, using words that no Garrisonian abolitionist would
have trusted but which Brown grasped and admired. "They will never
recognize our manhood until we knock them down a time or two; they
will then hug us as men and brethren."

One need only compare Brown's attitudes with those of the other key
voices of the decade to see how important this difference was. Abraham
Lincoln, in the eighteen-thirties, was grappling with the same
realities�the explosions of violence centered on the anti-slavery
disputes�but, in his first important speech, to the Springfield Young
Men's Lyceum in 1838, he took a radical position against the Southern
cult of honor and redemption through violence. Lincoln insisted that
salvation for America lay only in extreme proceduralism: "Passion has
helped us, but can do so no more. It will in future be our enemy.
Reason, cold calculating, unimpassioned reason, must furnish all the
materials for our future support and defense."

It is hard now to grasp the cultural authority that the code of
passionate honor�with its elaborate rituals of feuds and duels�seemed
to give the South in that period. Not merely the political edge but
the poetic priority seemed to lie with the feudal and honorable South
against the commercial and mouthy North. (It was a cultural advantage
that persisted right up through, and perhaps beyond, the Atlanta
premi�re of "Gone with the Wind.") Brown, though, understood it
because he felt it. He set out, in effect, not to convert the South to
Northern values but to convert the Northern abolitionists to the
Southern codes of honorable violence. He was a virus that was to prove
deadly to the Old South, because at some deep level he shared its DNA:
its assumptions, its literature, and even some of its
values�particularly the value of dying heroically for a cause over
living honorably for one, and the companion value of forcing other
people to die heroically for their cause, whether they quite wanted to
or not.

Brown's acceptance of this feudal ethic forms the general background
to his murderous night in Kansas on May 24, 1856. Brown was brought to
Kansas by his sons, who had learned their father's creed by heart. "We
must show by actual work that there are two sides to this thing and
that they can not go on with this impunity," Brown declared, after
watching his fellow-abolitionists quake and tremble in the face of
violent pro-slave mobs. He assembled a party of activists, including
four of his sons and a son-in-law, armed them with swords, and marched
them toward the little settlement of Pottawatomie Creek. Brown had his
men bang on the doors of pro-slavery households, pretending to be lost
travellers in order to get the men outside. There he ordered them cut
to pieces, watching impassively as his sons and other followers did
the work. (He seems to have executed one man, James Doyle, himself.)
Five men were murdered in this manner.

Reynolds, without wanting to excuse it, goes to great lengths to set
the Pottawatomie massacre in its context�pro-slavery thugs had been
routinely beating and intimidating and killing anti-slavery activists,
and, until then, the anti-slavery side had seemed too timid or
frightened to defend itself. Yet Brown's motives for this act remain
murky. The psychiatrist James Gilligan has argued that acts of
violence are always rooted in feelings of shame and humiliation that
can be expiated only by the destruction of someone who was a witness,
in some sense, to one's shame. Brown in Kansas at first might seem to
be without this cue to action�he was neither implicated nor
particularly humiliated by the vigilantes�until one realizes that the
real trigger was something that had happened two days before in
Washington. There, as Reynolds reminds us, a South Carolina
congressman had beaten Senator Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts,
nearly to death with the gold head of his cane for daring to speak out
against the pro-slavery forces in Kansas and, in a feudal manner, for
criticizing a kinsman of his. Sumner, though no pacifist, had been
unable to defend himself. (His feet seem to have got caught under his
little desk.)

This assault was put forward, instantly, as crowning proof of the
difference between the Southern honor culture and the Northern
procedural one; a Northerner could talk trash, but he couldn't stand
up for himself. Brown, one of his sons said, "went crazy�crazy. It
seemed to be the finishing, decisive touch." It was not a cool
evaluation of the potential uses of violence in Kansas but the
transferred sense of humiliation that he felt on behalf of Sumner that
drove Brown crazy and into the massacre.

Brown emerged from the massacre not bloodstained but magnified in the
eyes of his enemies. Before, the anti-slavery forces had had only
contempt for the abolitionists. Now they were scared to death of John
Brown. He was able to win a minor skirmish with government forces who
were out to get him simply through the fear his name invoked.

Brown did not claim particular glory for the Pottawatomie massacre but
he did not cover it up, either. What makes him a typically American
idealist is not his lust for killing�he was eager to avoid murder if
he could�but his indifference to human life lost on the way toward his
ideal. Like our current idealists in power, he didn't want to kill,
but he didn't want to count the dead he did kill, either. He shrugged
off the dead men in the dirt, even as one of his sons went mad at the
memory.

Brown was never arrested or tried for the Kansas killings, and when he
came back East he found himself a hero�though not with the members of
Garrison's abolitionist "establishment," who were firmly pacifist and
consumed by their own sectarian squabbling. Instead, it was the high
Transcendentalists, Thoreau and Emerson and Alcott first among them,
who became Brown's fervent admirers and propagandists. Some of
Reynolds's most illuminating pages are devoted to Brown's relationship
to the Transcendentalists. The historical clich� has been that the
Transcendentalists had their heads too far up in the clouds to see
what was happening on the bloody earth below. Reynolds, however,
following Stauffer, establishes that they were Brown's most important
intellectual allies.

In a way, it was an early instance of radical chic: the
Transcendentalists preferred a real man to a squabbling set of Mrs.
Jellybys. But there was more to it. They shared a disdain for
materialist Northern society�which Brown had bankrupted himself out
of, and which the Transcendentalists viewed largely with baffled
dismay. Whatever else Brown might be, he was not a trivial man, or a
worldly one: he was not a merchant with a Sunday cause. He was a free
man already in a state of liberty. In a way that recalls the
idealization of Jean Genet by the French existentialists, it was his
own freedom from constraints, as much as his urge to break the
shackles of others, that drew the Transcendentalists to him.

He received the backing of a group of wealthy abolitionists who called
themselves the Secret Six, though a less secret secret group is hard
to imagine. They included Thomas Wentworth Higginson, the man who was
later Emily Dickinson's patron. (Reynolds has some fascinating
speculative pages on traces of Brown's life in Dickinson's poetry, one
essentially fanatic American imagination speaking to another.) From
that time on, Brown was devoted to fund-raising and recruiting for his
Southern invasion plan, which soon centered on the Federal Arsenal at
Harpers Ferry. The plan was hardly well concealed; at some point, it
was placed in the hands, through an anonymous letter, of the Secretary
of War, John B. Floyd, who, in the great tradition of American
counter-terrorism, shrugged and threw it aside.

Brown brought in the black abolitionist leader Frederick Douglass, who
took a look at the plan and refused to have anything to do with it,
since it was obviously a blueprint for failure and the mass executions
of blacks. The plan was, to say the least, quixotic: Brown would
descend with a handpicked raiding party, take weapons from the
arsenal, arm the slaves of Harpers Ferry�with pikes, in a deliberately
archaic and Cromwellian touch�and then take to the Appalachian
Mountains to begin a permanent guerrilla insurrection, fed by regular
recruitments of escaped slaves.

At one level, it was not nearly so crazy as it looked: a slave
insurrection had succeeded in Haiti almost within living memory, and
Brown's plan remained a successful model for Latin-American guerrillas
into our own time, right down to the m�lange of outside agitators and
local agrarian rebels. At another level, though, it was even crazier
than it sounded: Brown, as Douglass recognized, had done no serious
advance work with the local slaves, and the blacks of Northern
Virginia (what we would now call West Virginia) were, generally, not
the kind of plantation slaves who were likely to rebel but house and
field servants, who could not be expected to bond with an unknown
white man with a flowing beard who handed them a pike and told them to
kill somebody and run for the hills.

For two years, Brown went on planning, buying guns and pikes, feuding
with a proposed second-in-command, and travelling to Canada to form a
provisional government, with a black President and Vice-President. He
drew up a multiracial Constitution made for a post-Harpers Ferry
America�a Constitution meant for "the proscribed and oppressed races
of the United States . . . together with all minor children of such
persons." (It included an article against "filthy conversation.")
Reading through accounts of life on the Brown farm, in upstate New
York, where all this was centered, you think, They weren't serious.
But they were. On October 16, 1859, Brown, two of his sons, and
eighteen colleagues, white and black, descended on Harpers Ferry and
took hostage about thirty-five people who happened to be near the
arsenal (and all of whom he treated with great consideration). They
shot a couple of bystanders�including a freed black and the generally
well-liked mayor of the town. The slaves were armed and then, for the
most part, looked around wondering what to do.

There was a moment when the operation might have been salvaged, if
Brown had moved quickly and headed for the mountains with the few
slaves who had joined him. Instead, petulantly disappointed that the
great slave uprising hadn't begun instantly upon his arrival, he sent
out for breakfast for his hostages and barricaded himself inside. By
the following night, the arsenal had been surrounded by federal
troops�led, with almost unbelievable serendipity, by Lieutenant
Colonel Robert E. Lee, then of the U.S. Army, and his lieutenant,
J.E.B. Stuart�and several of Brown's men had been killed, including
his son Oliver. Brown still refused to surrender, the federals rushed
the arsenal, and Brown was stabbed in the side and slashed around the
head.

It was what happened immediately afterward that made Brown's
reputation as a martyr and prophet. Transported to the arsenal
guardhouse, Brown, bleeding from his head wound, calmly faced down his
captors through the next twenty-four hours, arguing his case and, on
the whole, shaming what remained of their moral conscience. With the
insouciant openness that was until quite recently a feature of
American life�Oswald, let's recall, gave a press conference on the
night of the Kennedy assassination�dignitaries and reporters and even
artists for publications, North and South, rushed in to interview him.
The governor of Virginia, Henry A. Wise, sat in, as did Lee and Stuart.

Horribly wounded, expected to die, his son dead alongside him, Brown
kept his cool and his words. He observed that he could have fled but
didn't out of concern for his hostages. ("I had thirty odd prisoners,
whose wives and daughters were in tears for their safety, and I felt
for them.") Pressed on the great question, he said, simply, "I think,
my friend, you are guilty of a great wrong to God and against
humanity�I say it without wishing to be offensive�and I believe it
would be perfectly right to interfere with you, so far as to free
those you wickedly and willfully hold in bondage." When Jeb Stuart
warned, sententiously, "The wages of sin is death," Brown turned on
him: "I would not have said that if you had been a prisoner and
wounded in my hands." And then he spoke plain truth: "You had
better�all of you people of the South�prepare yourselves for a
settlement of this question. You may dispose of me very easily�I am
nearly disposed of now. But this question is still to be settled."

And they listened, recognizing the dignity and courage of the old man
who was speaking. Governor Wise went back to Richmond and called him
"a bundle of the best nerves I ever saw, cut and thrust and bleeding
and in bonds. He is a man of clear head, of courage, fortitude, and
simple ingenuousness. He is cool, collected, and indomitable . . .
fanatic, vain, and garrulous, but firm, truthful, and intelligent."
Another pro-slavery politician called him "as brave and resolute a man
as ever headed an insurrection, and, in a good cause, and with a
sufficient force, would have been a consummate partisan commander." It
was, as Reynolds says, praise for a Southern gentleman, coming from
others.

Brown triumphed rhetorically and, in the end, effectively at Harpers
Ferry, because the slaveholder's code of honor, though in many ways a
scandal, was not entirely a sham. His enemies were not demons, though
they served a cause in many ways demonic. They did not treat him as
subhuman; they did not torture him to death instantly, or lynch him,
as they might well have done had he been black. They were impressed by
his grasp of the code of honor, of courage in combat, and of
fearlessness in the face of death and one's enemies, and they honored
him accordingly. Even his trial, though "fixed" at some level, was
open and offered at least the formalities of fairness.

Mark Twain understood how this worked better than anyone. He never
tired of attacking the Sir Walter Scott-inspired honor cult of the
South, and in the feud of the Grangerfords and the Shepherdsons in
"Huckleberry Finn" he gave memorable form to its nihilistic absurdity.
But he also understood the moral force that the code gave to
individuals: in the same novel, the moment when the solitary,
aristocratic Colonel Sherburn faces down a lynch mob alone is, as
Twain imagines it, a distinctly Southern scene. Even Garrison, a man
of unexampled courage, could not face down a mob in Boston but had to
be saved by the police.

And, in a last irony, it was the language that the slaveowners of the
South used about John Brown that provided a template for the way the
North, five years later, would talk about the defeated Stuart and Lee:
brave and resolute insurrectionists, they should only have been
leaders in a better cause. Brown's first night in captivity
established the rhetorical terms on which those fighting the war would
try to deal with the humanity of their enemies. Even the courage with
which Brown went to his execution, on December 2nd, reinforced the
code. The man who made the Northern cause an armed cause, he was, in a
certain sense, the first casualty of the South.

Terrorism is an autoimmune disease; its purpose is to cause harm by
provoking an overreaction. This is exactly what happened after Brown's
failure. A rational Southern observer would have seen that the raid
was a sign of the fundamental weakness of abolitionism as an armed
cause and, with a bit of wisdom, would have seized the chance to do
something before it became a stronger one. Of course, just the
opposite happened: panic about slave revolts and further abolitionist
raids set in throughout the South. Even in distant Mississippi and
far-off Georgia, the paranoia became rampant, and, Reynolds shows, it
was this atmosphere of panic and paranoia, along with the election of
the still ostensibly anti-abolitionist Lincoln, that produced
secession and, with it, the arming of the North and the war.

Was there any other way to "settle the question"? Absent a credible
plan originating anywhere in the South for black emancipation on any
terms at all�even on a delayed basis that admitted the obscene right
of property�there probably wasn't. One anti-Brown argument, repeated
even today, was that slavery was on its way out and would have ended
in any case, under the sheer historical inexorability of commercial
change, industrialization, the impossibility of maintaining a slave
system in a fully capitalist economy, and so on. But nothing in
history is less inexorable than the inexorable forces of history.
Systems inherently rotten and unsustainable can go on for millennia
(witness the last few hundred years of the Ottoman Empire). The
reassurance that in the long run slavery would have ended by itself
puts one in mind of the famous voice-over in Stanley Kubrick's
"Spartacus," where, despite the crucifixion of Kirk Douglas and his
followers, we are told that Spartacus' revolt signalled the beginning
of the end of slavery�with only an aside to remind us that it would
take another two thousand years. In the very long run, even the best
moral arguments get their force from the readiness of men to kill and
die for them. That the very long run can sometimes become much shorter
than anyone had ever imagined is one more message from John Brown's ghost.
        













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