Study Decrying "Israel Lobby" Marred by Numerous Errors

Alex Safian, March 20, 2006

http://www.camera.org/index.aspx_context==7&x_issue=5&x_article=99 


A new study by Harvard professor Stephen Walt and University of 
Chicago professor John Mearsheimer charges that the "Israel lobby" 
has distorted the foreign policy of the United States to the point of 
serious damage to U.S. interests. Perhaps anticipating that their 
claims might be controversial, the authors attempt to reassure any 
who might doubt them:

Some readers will find this analysis disturbing, but the facts 
recounted here are not in serious dispute among scholars.

In fact, even a cursory examination of The Israel Lobby and U.S. 
Foreign Policy reveals that it is riddled with errors of fact, logic 
and omission, has inaccurate citations, displays extremely poor 
judgement regarding sources, and, contrary to basic scholarly 
standards, ignores previous serious work on the subject. The bottom 
line: virtually every word and argument is, or ought to be, 
in "serious dispute." 

In other words, a student who submitted such a paper would flunk.

According to the report, which is posted on Harvard's Kennedy School 
of Government website:

The U.S. national interest should be the primary object of American 
foreign policy. For the past several decades, however, and especially 
since the Six Day War in 1967, the centerpiece of U.S. Middle East 
policy has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of 
unwavering U.S. support for Israel and the related effort to spread 
democracy throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion 
and jeopardized U.S. security.

This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has 
the United States been willing to set aside its own security in order 
to advance the interests of another state? One might assume that the 
bond between the two countries is based on shared strategic interests 
or compelling moral imperatives. As we show below, however, neither 
of those explanations can account for the remarkable level of 
material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to 
Israel.

Instead, the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due 
almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the 
activities of the "Israel Lobby." Other special interest groups have 
managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in directions they favored, but 
no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what 
the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while 
simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests 
are essentially identical.


Why does America support Israel?

Is it true that U.S. policy in the Middle East, and specifically our 
support for Israel, is due almost entirely to the activities of 
the "Israel Lobby?" The authors are hardly the first to so argue, 
though one wouldn't know it from reading their report, which, as 
noted, ignores all prior serious work on the subject, including the 
seminal book refuting such claims, the late Professor A.F.K. 
Organski's The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. 
Assistance to Israel.

Though the authors do cite Organski's book once, on the strategic 
importance of Israel during the cold war, they entirely ignore his 
main point, which is that the primary reason for U.S. support of 
Israel can't possibly be the Jewish vote, or Jewish political 
contributions, or the activities of any pro-Israel lobby, for the 
simple reason that, as polls indicate, Jews were just as pro-Israel 
before 1970, when U.S. support for Israel was minimal, as they were 
after 1970, when U.S. support for Israel grew rapidly. As Organski 
put it in his preface:

In 1983 I ran across a Congressional Research Service series on 
assistance to Israel from 1948 to 1983, and I was surprised by what I 
saw. The numbers told an important story. Assistance to Israel before 
1970 had been very low. After 1972 levels shot up. The data fairly 
screamed that American Jews could not have been responsible for U.S. 
policy, for it is elementary that one cannot explain a variable with 
a constant, and American Jews had been in favor of assistance all 
along...

Now, the president in 1970 was Richard Nixon, a Republican who knew 
very well that overwhelmingly Democratic and left-leaning American 
Jews had already voted against him in large numbers and would do so 
again in 1972. So what happened in 1970 that convinced Nixon, the 
arch practitioner of realpolitik, to press for increased support for 
Israel? Here we can turn to another seminal work on U.S./Israel 
relations, Israel: The Embattled Ally, by the late Harvard professor, 
Nadav Safran. According to Safran the turning point in U.S./Israel 
relations was the so-called Black September crisis, in which the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, assisted by invading Syrian tanks, 
and in connivance with the Soviet Union, attempted to overthrow and 
assassinate Jordan's King Hussein, an ally of the United States (see 
pages 451-456). Had these two Soviet clients succeeded in taking 
Jordan, they would have created an arc of radical Soviet client 
states pointing right at the Persian Gulf, thereby threatening 
western oil supplies. As Safran put it:

In the White House conception, Jordan under King Hussein ... 
constituted an important buffer separating the pro-Soviet radical 
regime of Egypt from those of Syria and Iraq, and all three of them 
from oil-rich, friendly Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf 
principalities. The fall of the Jordanian regime would bring about a 
solid pro-Soviet bloc from the Euphrates to the Nile ...

Safran continued:

... [when] the Syrians captured Irbid, an important junction of roads 
linking Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Israel ... King Hussein sent 
additional urgent appeals for American and British help. 
Consultations with the British ... revealed that they not only 
refused to intervene militarily ... but [also] strongly counseled 
against American intervention. Similar opposition was expressed by 
other European allies. The President ordered Kissinger to work out 
contingency plans for a joint American-Israeli intervention ...

Confident of American and Israeli support, King Hussein was able to 
commit all his forces to battle; fearful of that support, 
specifically of a flanking attack by massed Israeli tank columns, the 
Syrians withdrew, and Jordan was saved. According to Safran this 
affair had a profound effect on U.S/Israel relations:

The Jordanian episode had a far-reaching effect on the American 
attitude toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict... the 
President ... was deeply impressed by the determination shown by the 
Israelis at a time when America's formal allies had quit on him. 

... the Jordanian episode drove home to the President and some of his 
advisers ... the value for the United States of a strong Israel.
(emphasis added)

Needless to say, Safran's work was also ignored by the authors.


Has support for Israel damaged U.S. interests, or caused terrorists 
to target us?

Of course, the authors don't just argue that U.S. support for Israel 
was due to the pro-Israel lobby rather than U.S. interests, they also 
argue that this support has in fact damaged U.S. interests. They 
claim for example, that because of its support for Israel the U.S. is 
targeted by terrorists:

... the United States has a terrorism problem in good part because it 
is so closely allied with Israel, not the other way around. U.S. 
support for Israel is not the only source of anti- American 
terrorism, but it is an important one, and it makes winning the war 
on terror more difficult. There is no question, for example, that 
many al Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden, are motivated by Israel's 
presence in Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinians. According 
to the U.S. 9/11 Commission, bin Laden explicitly sought to punish 
the United States for its policies in the Middle East, including its 
support for Israel, and he even tried to time the attacks to 
highlight this issue.

While the 9/11 Commission report did mention Israel as a factor in 
the attacks, there is much evidence to argue against the assertion, 
and they certainly did not point to Israel as the major factor in 
provoking the attacks. Indeed, according to documents cited by 
experts on Al Qaeda, such as Rohan Gunaratna, the group attacked the 
United States on 9/11 (and before) not primarily because of our 
support for Israel, but because of our support for Saudi Arabia and 
other "moderate" Arab countries. As Gunaratna explains in his book 
Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, after Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was horrified 
that the Saudis were considering a U.S. offer to send troops to 
protect the Kingdom. Bin Laden urged against what he saw as 
sacrilege, and offered to protect the Kingdom with his Afghan 
mujahidin, but the Saudis turned him down and invited in the 
Americans. For inviting in the infidels, the Saudi rulers would never 
be forgiven by bin Laden. Gunaratna quoted from bin Laden's key fatwa 
on the subject:

Ignoring the divine shariah law; depriving people of their legitimate 
rights; allowing the Americans to occupy the land of the two Holy 
Places [Mecca and Medina] ... the regime has torn off its 
legitimacy...

Clearly after belief (iman) there is no more important duty than 
pushing the Americans out of the holy land [Arabia]... There is no 
precondition for this duty and the enemy must be fought with one's 
best abilities.

Al Qaeda's aim is to restore the caliphate (the unitary Arab Islamic 
state that existed in the days of Muhammed and his followers), but 
they understand that as long as the United States props up Saudi 
Arabia, and Kuwait and Egypt and Jordan, with weapons and soldiers 
and financial support, and the promise of military intervention if 
necessary, these regimes are unlikely to fall. A key example of such 
regime resilience was seen in Egypt after the assassination of Sadat 
in 1981 by radical Islamists, who thought that with the leader gone 
the regime would fall. Instead the regime survived and launched a 
brutal crackdown, decimating Egypt's Islamist movement. Among those 
imprisoned, but eventually released, was a young man named Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who later rose to become Osama bin Laden's deputy and the 
operational leader of Al Qaeda. The lesson learned by Islamist 
leaders from the Sadat assassination was clear – with a powerful U.S. 
active and engaged in the Middle East, the supported regimes would 
not fall. There would be no caliphate, therefore, until the U.S. is 
humiliated and driven from the Middle East, at which point the 
corrupt regimes will crumble into the waiting hands of Al Qaeda.

Thus the earlier Al Qaeda attacks against the Unites States, in Saudi 
Arabia, in Kenya and Tanzania, in Yemen, and finally on the U.S. 
homeland on 9/11. These attacks had nothing to do with Israel and 
everything to do with U.S. support for Arab regimes. It should be 
noted also that Al Qaeda never even tried to attack an Israeli 
target, much less Israel itself, until after 9/11.


Rest of the article can be read at: 

http://www.camera.org/index.aspx_context==7&x_issue=5&x_article=99 



 










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