Of Braveheart and Bush

Max Boot | Wall Street Journal* | 05 January 2008

http://www.cfr.org/publication/15180/of_braveheart_and_bush.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Dop_ed


President Bush will travel to the Middle East next week, where he
will become the latest U.S. president, going back to the 1940s, to
make a major push to achieve peace between Israel and the
Palestinians. It is hard to see what in the current situation—with
the Gaza Strip in the hands of a rabidly anti-Israel group and the
West Bank in the hands of only a mildly less anti-Israel group—makes
him think he will succeed where his predecessors failed.

Those who insist on pursuing the "peace process," notwithstanding
the low probability of success, claim that we have no choice. "What
is the alternative?" they ask. "Perpetual war?"

Well, yes.

To be skeptical of the peace process is not to suggest that such
never-ending strife is desirable, but merely to acknowledge that it
may be inevitable. The contrary view—that even a conflict as
intractable as this one should end soon—rests on a sunny, if
ahistorical, Enlightenment faith that peace is the natural order of
things and war a temporary aberration.

There is also a uniquely American perspective at work here: We
normally fight short wars overseas, with even our longest conflict,
Vietnam, lasting less than a decade (1965-1973) if measured by the
deployment of ground forces. Win or lose, we are used to having the
shooting end within a few years. Given this outlook, many Americans
believe that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has been raging
in one form or another for 60 years, is overdue for resolution.

But if measured by the length of other tribal and territorial
disputes throughout history, there is no reason to think that the
Arabs and Jews will soon beat their swords into plowshares. Consider
just one such conflict, pitting the Scots against the English. The
divide between the two nationalities—with similar religions (first
Catholic, then Protestant), ethnic origins, languages and political
systems—should have been easily bridged. But the Scots and English
spent centuries killing one another.

War broke out in 1296 after King Edward I of England tried to claim
the empty throne of Scotland. This sparked a prolonged resistance
led first by William Wallace and then, after his execution, by
Robert Bruce. Both the Scots and the English resorted to terrorist
tactics, with frequent burning, looting and killing on both sides.

This savagery was evident early on: In 1297 William Heselrig, the
English sheriff of the small town of Lanark, burned down a house
belonging to Wallace's wife or girlfriend, Marion Braidfute, killing
her and everyone else inside. Wallace's riposte is recorded in a
medieval chronicle: "Gathering together a band of desperate men, he
fell by night on the sheriff and his armed guard, hewed the sheriff
into small pieces with his own sword and burned the buildings and
those within them."

Some scholars have cast doubt on elements of this traditional tale
(which was dramatized in Mel Gibson's 1995 film, "Braveheart"), but
there is no doubting the ferocity or frequency of such small-scale
clashes. There were also some major battles—the Scots prevailed at
Stirling Bridge (1297) and Bannockburn (1314), the English at
Falkirk (1298), Halidon Hill (1333) and numerous later battlefields—
but none proved decisive. Scotland was too small and poor to defeat
England. And English monarchs lacked the resources or the will to
pacify the prickly Scots. So the war ground on, century after
century, interrupted occasionally by truces and treaties.

The accession of a Scottish monarch to the throne of England in 1603
as King James I might have been expected to end the strife. Yet the
two realms clashed again during the English Civil War in the 1640s.
The conflict did not truly end until 1745, when a revolt by mainly
Scottish supporters of the Stuarts (descendants of James I), was put
down—449 years after the start of Anglo-Scottish hostilities.

It is instructive to contemplate the virulence and length of the
English struggles with the Scots (and also the similar, more recent
battles with the Irish), given that their cultural and religious
differences are trivial compared to those separating Israelis and
Arabs. Attempts to end such conflicts before both sides are
thoroughly exhausted are likely to have no more success than the
Treaty of Northampton, which was supposed to end the Anglo-Scottish
dispute in 1328. The only exception is if outside powers commit
massive military force to bring peace, as happened in Bosnia and
Kosovo in the 1990s. But that's unlikely to happen in the Holy Land.

While there is plenty of evidence that most Israelis are tired of
today's war, there is little sign that their enemies are likely to
give up anytime soon. Jihadists speak of their struggle to eliminate
the "Zionist entity" as the work of centuries. Even if many ordinary
Palestinians privately long for peace, their preferences are
unlikely to prevail over those of the gunmen. Hard as it may be to
accept, we have to confront the possibility that the Arab-Israeli
conflict may not have a "solution," at least not in the foreseeable
future, and that trying to create one represents a triumph of hope
over experience.

*This article appears in full on CFR.org by permission of its
original publisher.


Reply via email to