And since I'm in a prognisticating mood, I'll further predict that the spark that will ignite that particular region (Pakistan) will be Kashmir. Right now al-Qaeda appears to be most active in Yemen, but I think eventually we'll hear more about their activities in Kashmir. The problem in Pakistan is that the elite is basically dedicated to democracy and depends, as the lesser of two evils, on the military to protect the country from the Islamists, who are the real enemy to democracy. However, when the military conducts sham elections, as just happened (and in spite of their efforts have lost two provincial assemblies* to Islamist parties, and seen the representation of Islamist parties in the national parliament grow to the point where they are power brokers between the two mainstream parties), it weakens the roots of democracy. Thus the cycle spirals, downwards and downwards. I'm afraid we'll soon see an Islamist state with the bomb, already tested and demonstrated in the Baluchi desert.
*Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier, iirc. -- in other words, the two provinces bordering Afghanistan. Their capitals are Quetta and Peshawar, respectively. Again, just going from memory, so I'm subject to correction. My question is: why? It didn't have to happen this way, but every country conducts their foreign policy in their own direct, short-term interests. One could hardly expect otherwise. But what some see as my "anti-Americanism" is merely pointing out that when a hyperpower conducts foreign policy in this way (and again, why shouldn't they? The British, the Turks and the French all did before them), it will have unforeseen consequences in the long run that will be adverse not only to that country's interests, but to the world's interests, simply because of the power they yield. Pakistan is a case in point. As early as the first war over Kashmir, in 1971, the USA chose to back Pakistan, albeit covertly, against India, even though India was (and remains) the world's largest democracy (a messy one, but a democracy nonetheless). They did this, I think, for ideological reasons. I can't even remember who was in the White House then. Nixon? Ford? Whoever...but J. Nehru looked to Moscow for aid since it wasn't forthcoming from the west (another case of the right wing creating a vacuum for the left to fill, as with civil rights in the US). In all fairness, Nehru was a nationalist and also a statist in any case, so was predisposed to look to Moscow if he had to choose. The war forced him to choose. Since then the US has historically backed Pakistan, even when Pakistan's ISI (their secret service), patterned partly after the CIA and Mossad and the NSA, trained a cohort of anti-Soviet fighters known as the "Afghan Arabs." This cohort, which took the name "Taliban", meaning "teachers" or "scholars," iirc, came from all over the Arab world, and even the non-Arab world, but never really were of much help to the US or to Afghanistan in their fight against the USSR. At most several tens of thousands were in Afghanistan, as opposed to what we now call the Northern Alliance (a loose grouping of disparate elements, including war lords answerable to no one but themselves), who had hundreds of thousands of well-trained soldiers. It was they who defeated the USSR, not the Taliban. However, so as not to dry up the funding, Pakistan kept making the Taliban look good, and the US depended on Pakistan for information about Afghanistan (the US pulled out of Afghanistan, iirc, in the mid-70s -- its embassy remaining empty until it was blown up in the mid-90s, so it had little choice but to depend on Pakistan for intelligence). The West should have been backing India, not Pakistan, imo, despite Nehru's policies -- India has moderated its centralist policies considerably over the decades. But I think the current administration is too committed to the single-power status model, as opposed to the multi-power model (see http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/01/schwarzlayne.htm) that I believe would be in the USA's and the West's and indeed the entire world's best long-term interests. As long as short-term interests are allowed to predominate, this (multi-power) model will never happen. One saw this discouragement in action a decade ago when Europe tried to take responsibility for its own defence, by creating the EU strike force. The US insisted that it not duplicate anything NATO (which the US dominates) does, effectively emasculating the force from day one. It doesn't even trust Europe, let alone India. And many US intellectuals claim Europe is indecisive and ineffectual. No wonder! <off-the-subject rant> On a personal note, I visited NATO's procurement office once, which is located, of all places, in a sleepy little town, an ex Luxembourg army base, just west of Luxembourg City, and talked to three procurement officers, including the office head. The office head was Canadian, the two people who reported to him were U.S. All three complained that it was difficult for any major procurement for NATO to go anywhere except to the US, and suggested that my company seek a U.S. "big brother" to partner with if we wanted NATO business. The US even intervened in small matters, like the replacement of the far superior FN 7.62 mm rifle that I myself trained on at Officer Candidate school back in the 70s (at CFB Chilliwack), with the M-16, because the FN was a Belgian rifle. That was the only reason (the ammo wasn't compatible with the M-16, so one or the other had to go). I kept hearing this complaint, even from USAmericans, who were frustrated that superior technology from the French, the British, the Germans, was being quashed by US companies operating through the US military attach�'s office in Brussels, located about 5 km west of Zavendam Airport, along a main avenue that leads into downtown Brussels (I've been there, too). The M-16's now been replaced by another US-designed and made weapon (The "C"-something; I can't remember its name), which my son trained on when he did his training for the militia. He said his superiors despise it. It jams in the cold, the rounds tumble, instead of "rifle", and it depends on laying a "wall of lead" instead of encouraging marksmanship. </off-the-subject rant> Just one little warning about the article John references: the Guardian is a notoriously liberal (and I use that in the US sense) newspaper. "John W. Redelfs" wrote: > http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,2763,834287,00.html > > It looks like Marc may be vindicated in his predictions that the Taliban > will come to power in Pakistan. Why we are planning a war against Iraq > when the Taliban is coming to power in a nation that already has nuclear > weapons is a complete mystery to me. > > John W. Redelfs [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Marc A. Schindler Spruce Grove, Alberta, Canada -- Gateway to the Boreal Parkland �The first duty of a university is to teach wisdom, not a trade; character, not technicalities. We want a lot of engineers in the modern world, but we don�t want a world of engineers.� � Sir Winston Churchill (1950) Note: This communication represents the informal personal views of the author solely; its contents do not necessarily reflect those of the author�s employer, nor those of any organization with which the author may be associated. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /// ZION LIST CHARTER: Please read it at /// /// http://www.zionsbest.com/charter.html /// ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ${list_promo}
