MessageMost of the discussion I read in Pei's article related to inheritance 
relations between terms, that operated as subject and predicates in sentences 
that are inheritance statements, rather than between entire statements, unless 
the statement was a subject or a predicate of a higher order inheritance 
statement.  So what you are referring to appears to be beyond what I have read.

Label the statement "I am allowed to drink alcohol" as P and the statement "I 
am an adult" as Q.  P implies Q and Q implies P (assume that age 21 equals 
adult) --OR-- P is the parent of Q and Q is the parent of P.

Label the statement that "most ravens are black" as R and the statement that 
"this raven is white" as S.  R affects the probability of S and, to a lesser 
extent, S affects the probability of R (both in a negative direction) --OR-- R 
is the parent of S and S is the parent of R (although, realistically, the 
probability change is so miniscule that you really could argue that this isn't 
true).

NARS's inheritance is the "inheritance" of influence on the probability values.

----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Edward W. Porter 
  To: agi@v2.listbox.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 1:12 PM
  Subject: RE: [agi] Do the inference rules of categorical logic make sense?


  Mark, 

  Thank you for your reply.  I just ate a lunch with too much fat (luckily 
largely olive oil) in it so, my brain is a little sleepy.  If it is not too 
much trouble could you please map out the inheritance relationships from which 
one derives how "I am allowed to drink alcohol" is both a parent and the child 
of "I am an adult."  And could you please do the same with how "most ravens are 
balck" is both parent and child of "this raven is white."  

  Most of the discussion I read in Pei's article related to inheritance 
relations between terms, that operated as subject and predicates in sentences 
that are inheritance statements, rather than between entire statemens, unless 
the statement was a subject or a predicate of a higher order inheritance 
statement.  So what you are referring to appears to be beyond what I have read.

  Edward W. Porter
  Porter & Associates
  24 String Bridge S12
  Exeter, NH 03833
  (617) 494-1722
  Fax (617) 494-1822
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]


    -----Original Message-----
    From: Mark Waser [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
    Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 12:47 PM
    To: agi@v2.listbox.com
    Subject: Re: [agi] Do the inference rules of categorical logic make sense?


    Thus, as I understand it, one can view all inheritance statements as 
indicating the evidence that one instance or category belongs to, and thus is 
"a child of" another category, which includes, and thus can be viewed as "a 
parent" of the other. 

    Yes, that is inheritance as Pei uses it.  But are you comfortable with the 
fact that "I am allowed to drink alcohol" is normally both the parent and the 
child of "I am an adult " (and vice versa)?  How about the fact that "most 
ravens are black" is both the parent and child of "this raven is white" (and 
vice versa)?

    Since inheritance relations are transitive, the resulting hierarchy of 
categories involves nodes that can be considered ancestors (i.e., parents, 
parents of parents, etc.) of others and nodes that can be viewed as descendents 
(children, children of children, etc.) of others.  

    And how often do you really want to do this with concepts like the above -- 
or when the evidence is substantially less than unity?

    And loops and transitivity are really ugly . . . . 

    NARS really isn't your father's inheritance.

      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Edward W. Porter 
      To: agi@v2.listbox.com 
      Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 12:24 PM
      Subject: RE: [agi] Do the inference rules of categorical logic make sense?


      RE: (1) THE VALUE OF "CHILD OF" AND "PARENT OF" RELATIONS  &  (2) 
DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE VALUE IN DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN GENERALIZATIONAL AND 
COMPOSITIONAL INHERITANCE HIERARCHIES.

      Re Mark Waser's 10/9/2007 9:46 AM post: Perhaps Mark understands 
something I don't. 

      I think relations that can be viewed as "child of" and "parent of" in a 
hierarchy of categories are extremely important (for reasons set forth in more 
detail below) and it is not clear to me that Pei meant something other than 
this.

      If Mark or anyone else has reason to believe that "what [Pei] means is 
quite different" than such "child of" and "parent of" relations, I would 
appreciate being illuminated by what that different meaning is.




      My understanding of NARS is that it is concerned with inheritance 
relations, which as I understand it, indicate the truth value of the assumption 
that one category falls within another category, where category is broadly 
defined to included not only what we normally think of as categories, but also 
relationships, slots in relationships, and categories defined by a sets of one 
or more properties, attributes, elements, relationships, or slot in 
relationships.  Thus, as I understand it, one can view all inheritance 
statements as indicating the evidence that one instance or category belongs to, 
and thus is "a child of" another category, which includes, and thus can be 
viewed as "a parent" of the other.  Since inheritance relations are transitive, 
the resulting hierarchy of categories involves nodes that can be considered 
ancestors (i.e., parents, parents of parents, etc.) of others and nodes that 
can be viewed as descendents (children, children of children, etc.) of others.  

      I tend to think of similarity as a sibling relationship under a shared 
hidden parent category -- based on similar aspects of the sibling's extensions 
and/or intensions.

      In much of my own thinking I have thought of such categorization 
relations as is generalization, in which the parent is the genus, and the child 
is the species.   Generalization is important for many reasons.  First, 
perception is trying to figure which in category or generalization of things, 
actions, or situations various parts of a current set of sensory information 
might fit.  Secondly, Generalization is important because it is necessary for 
implication.  All those Bayesian probabilities we are used to thinking about 
such as P(A|B,C), are totally useless unless we have some way of knowing the 
probability the situation being considered contains a B or C.  To do that you 
have to have categories that help you determine the extent to which a B or a C 
is present.  To understand the implication of P(A|B,C) you have to have some 
meaning for the category A.  Generalization is important for behavior because 
one uses generalization learned from past experiences to develop plans for how 
to achieve goals, and because most action schema are usually generalization 
that have to be instantiated in a context specific way.

      One of the key problems in AI has been non-literal matching.  That is why 
representation schemes that have a flexibility something like that of NARS are 
necessary for any intelligence capable of operating well in anything other than 
limited domains.  That is why so-called "invariant" or "hierarchical memory" 
representations are so valuable.  This is indicated in writings of Jeff 
Hawkins, Thomas Serre ("Learning a Dictionary of Shape-Components in Visual 
Cortex: Comparison with Neurons, Humans and Machines", by Thomas Serre, the 
google-able article I have cited so many times), and many others.  Such 
hierarchical representations achieve their flexibility though a 
composition/generalization hierarchy which presumably maps easily into NARS.

      Another key problem in AI is context sensitivity.  A hierarchical 
representation scheme that is capable of computing measures of similarity, fit, 
and implications throughout multiple levels in such a hierarchical 
representation scheme of multiple aspects of a situation in real time can be 
capable of sophisticated real time context sensitivity.  In fact, the ability 
to perform relative extensive real time matching and implication across 
multiple levels of compositional and generalization hierarchies has been a key 
feature of the types of systems I have been thinking of for years.  

      That is one of the major reasons why I have argued for "BREAKING THE 
SMALL HARDWARE MINDSET." 

      I understand NARS's inheritance (or categorizations) as being equivalent 
two both of what I have considered two of the major dimensions in an AGI's self 
organizing memory, (1) generalization/similarity and (2) composition.  I was, 
however, aware, that down in the compositional (comp) hierarchy can be viewed 
as up in the generalization (gen) hierarchy, since the set of things having one 
or more properties or elements of a composition can be viewed as a 
generalization of that composition (i.e., the generalization covering the 
category of things having that one or more properties or elements).

      Although I understand there is an importance equivalence between down in 
the comp hierarchical and up in the gen hierarchy, and that the two could be 
viewed as one hierarchy, I have preferred to think of them as different 
hierarchies, because the type of gens one gets by going up in the gen hierarchy 
tend to be different than the type of gens one gets by going down in the comp 
hierarchy.  

      Each possible set in the powerset (the set of all subsets) of elements 
(eles), relationships (rels), attributes (atts) and contextual patterns 
(contextual pats) could be considered as possible generalizations.  I have 
assumed, as does Goertzel's Novamente, that there is a competitive ecosystem 
for representational resources, in which only the fittest pats and gens -- as 
determined by some measure of usefulness to the system -- survive.  There are 
several major uses of gens, such as aiding in perception, providing inheritance 
of significant implication, providing appropriate level of representation for 
learning, and providing invariant representation in higher level comps.  
Although temporary gens will be generated at a relatively high frequency, 
somewhat like the inductive implications in NARS, the number of gens that 
survive and get incorporated into a lot of comps and episodic reps, will be an 
infinitesimal fraction of the powerset of eles, rels, atts, and contextual 
features stored in the system.  Pats in the up direction in the Gen hierarchy 
will tend to be ones that have been selected for the usefulness as 
generalizations.  They will often have reasonable number of features that 
correspond to that of their species node, but with some of them more broadly 
defined.  The gens found by going down in the comp hierarchy are ones that have 
been selected for their representational value in a comp, and many of them 
would not normally be that valuable as what we normally think of as 
generalizations.

      In the type of system I have been thinking of I have assumed there will 
be substantially less multiple inheritance in the up direction in the gen 
hierarchy than in the down direction in the comp hierarchy (in which there 
would be potential inheritance from every ele, rel, att, and contextual feature 
of in a comp's descendant nodes at multiple levels in the comp hierarchy below 
it.  Thus, for spreading activation control purposes, I think it is valuable to 
distinguish between generalization and compositional hierarchies, although I 
understand they have an important equivalence that should not be ignored.  

      I wonder if NARS makes such a distinction. 

      These are only initial thoughts.  I hope to become part of a team that 
gets an early world-knowledge computing AGI up and running.  Perhaps when I do 
feedback from reality will change my mind.

      I would welcome comments, not only from Mark, but also from other 
readers. 



      Edward W. Porter 
      Porter & Associates 
      24 String Bridge S12 
      Exeter, NH 03833 
      (617) 494-1722 
      Fax (617) 494-1822 
      [EMAIL PROTECTED] 




      -----Original Message----- 
      From: Mark Waser [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
      Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 9:46 AM 
      To: agi@v2.listbox.com 
      Subject: Re: [agi] Do the inference rules of categorical logic make 
sense? 



      >    I don't believe that this is the case at all.  NARS correctly 
      > handles 
      > cases where entities co-occur or where one entity implies another only 
due 
      > to other entities/factors.  "Is an ancestor of" and "is a descendant 
of" 
      > has nothing to do with this. 

      Ack!  Let me rephrase.  Despite the fact that Pei always uses the words 
of 
      inheritance (and is technically correct), what he means is quite 
different 
      from what most people assume that he means.  You are stuck on the 
"common" 
      meanings of the terms  "is an ancestor of" and "is a descendant of" and 
it's 
      impeding your understanding. 



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