Fred Foldvary wrote:
>
> --- Bryan D Caplan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > The outcome of democracy depends on the
> > overall rationality of public opinion, but whatever outcome you get can
> > be equally enjoyed by the rational and irrational alike.
>
> Does this not depend on the structure and method of voting?
>
> For example, would not the "demand revelation" method remedy the problem?
> It makes those who change the outcome pay the social cost.
If I remember correctly, demand revelation mechanisms are useless if the
probability of decisiveness is low and voters get some direct utility
from expressive voting or holding irrational beliefs.
Thus, suppose I get a $10 direct expressive benefit from voting for tons
of useless health care spending, and the probability of decisiveness is
1-in-a-million. I don't see how any demand revelation mechanism is
going to help.
--
Prof. Bryan Caplan
Department of Economics George Mason University
http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED]
"He wrote a letter, but did not post it because he felt that no one
would have understood what he wanted to say, and besides it was not
necessary that anyone but himself should understand it."
Leo Tolstoy, *The Cossacks*
