> No, the point is that might *really* get a $10 benefit from SAYING you > get a $1 M benefit. If your probability of decisiveness is under > 1-in-100,000, it would pay to do so. But the social cost of this > behavior could drastically exceed the private benefit. > Prof. Bryan Caplan
Right. But we need to do a complete comparative systems: 1) how prevalent is expressive voting, empirically? 2) does expressive voting still apply in secret ballots? 3) how do we get the probabilities of decisiveness? If the total values are close to the cost, the likelyhood of being decisive rises. It seems to me that in pure demand revelation, the probability is unknown and unknowable. When we add the probabilities, we mix in that with demand revelation, and it becomes a different system. When we inject a fiat probability such as 1/100K, then we have rigged the outcome. A premise of pure demand revelation is that the subjective values of others are unknown, and stated values could be lies. The person stating a value of $1 million has no way of knowing what the stated values of the others will be. He just knows the size of the voting pool and the cost of the public good. Fred Foldvary ===== [EMAIL PROTECTED]
