lcs Mixmaster Remailer writes:
 > > The problem with Steganography is that there's basically no way to
 > > clue people in to it's location without clueing everyone into it.
 > 
 > Encryption is successful if the attacker can't find information about the
 > plaintext without the key.  Ideally, he can't answer questions about the
 > plaintext any better with access to the ciphertext than without.

I'm trying to do forward stego -- that is, publish some encrypted
steganographic document, with the idea that, once everyone has a copy,
*then* you reveal the key.  Problem is, how do you convince them to
keep a copy of that document if they're unaware that it has something
buried inside it??

In this particular case, there is no crypto -- it's completely
security-by-obscurity.  I've published the burial algorithm, or at
least sent it to the maintainer of the software.  Haven't written the
retrieval algorithm yet, so in a sense the "key" is still secret.  But
only 33 people sucked down a copy.

Maybe I should have buried it inside a pornographic picture?  :)

-- 
-russ nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  http://russnelson.com
Crynwr sells support for free software  | PGPok | "Ask not what your country
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Potsdam, NY 13676-3213  | +1 315 268 9201 FAX   | do for you..."  -Perry M.

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