On 2 July 2013 11:25, Adam Back <a...@cypherspace.org> wrote: > I think it time to deprecate non-https (and non-forward secret > ciphersuites.) Compute power has moved on, session cacheing works, > symmetric crypto is cheap. > > Btw did anyone get a handle on session resumption - does it provide forward > secrecy (via k' = H(k)?). Otherwise I saw concerns a disk stored, or long > lived session resumption may itself start to become an exposure risk > somewhat analogous to non-forward secret SSL.
Resumed sessions do not give forward secrecy. Sessions should be expired regularly, therefore. > > Adam > > > On Tue, Jul 02, 2013 at 12:50:32PM +0300, ianG wrote: >> >> BTNS (better than nothing security) for IPSec could save it. >> >> There is precedent: the ideas behind SSH totally swept out secure-telnet >> within a year or so. Skype demolished other VoIP providers, because its >> keys were hidden. The same thing happened with that email transport >> security system. >> >> In contrast, IPSec is a complete and utter deployment failure, and it >> shares statistically unmeasurable rates of protection across the net. It's >> near cousin, secure browsing at least achieved penetration rates of around >> 1% if one counts the HTTPS v. HTTP ratio (what else matters?). Both suffered >> in large part because they insisted on the classical certificates / PKI >> schoolbook. >> >> So, if one is looking for a saviour, there is pretty good correlation >> here. > > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography@randombit.net > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
