This is the comsec dilemma. If a product or system becomes mainstream
it is more likely to be overtly and/or covertly compromised. If marginal it
is likely to be used by few and consequently not well tested against
overt and/or covert faults and compromise, may go out of of business,
or aquired by I-Q-Tel compromisers and reconfigured for wildly popular
use by those who care squat about really, really secure comsec.

Still, this is a period when "NSA-proof" has decent value as a marketing
campaign. When "snake oil" is not considered to be bad business after
all. When promises abound to "take back the Internet" are flowering
under bountiful manure of comsec reputation cultivators. When comsec
standards committees are diligently cleaning out the stables of excess
manure accumulated since comsec escaped from lifetime security
of secrecy mokus, braying like asses this time comsec will be pure
and honest, no shit.

Damn kids don't understand openness is a disease to be medicated
by exposure to working inside and outside the shithouse, lying about
scuzzy comsec as a way of life. Otherwise accept working forever as
a minimally funded volunteer with dignity and self-respect, praised
for self-sacrifice, be whispered about as if an insane idealist who
could never adjust to reality of stinking like a sewer, accumulating
bespoken suits tailored of finest dookie as if Silk Road weave.

Silent Circle is on its way, stand back, the odor is finest perfume.

At 05:45 PM 7/10/2014, you wrote:
On 7/10/2014 4:39 PM, John Young wrote:
https://blog.silentcircle.com/why-are-we-competing-with-phone-makers-skype-and-telecom-carriers-all-in-the-same-week/


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The problem is, this will never really hit the mainstream. When or if it does, I might feel better about it. I remain suspicious.


--
Kevin

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