> Ian Brown[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > Ed Gerck wrote: > > Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal > > that addresses one of the major weaknesses of electronic > > voting. However, it creates problems that are even harder to > > solve than the silent subversion of e-records. > > > > For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by > > using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera, > > obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the > > vote, or keep the job. And no one would know or be able to trace it. > > As a voter could record what they did with pencil-and-paper or a > mechanical voting machine. > > The partial defence in all three systems is that the voter should be > able to void the vote after photographing a "receipt" to hand over later > to the vote-buyer, and then cast a real vote. In the UK, for example, > you can obtain a new ballot paper from a polling station official in > exchange for a "spoiled" one. I believe Rebecca Mercuri has always > suggested that a voter should be able to confirm whether a receipt > printed by an electronic voting machine correctly records their intended > vote, and if not to void it. > I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it. This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling described above, and second, if a recount is required, it allows the recount to be done on the basis of a trustworthy record, already certified by the voter as accurate.
This loses some of the economic benefits of all-electronic systems, since security still needs to be provided for the receipts for some period, but is far less prone to invisible abuse. Peter Trei --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]