[Only the first part of this message is displayed. The entire message has been
turned into a text attachment, which you can retrieve by selecting Download.
Once downloaded, open it with a word processor or text editor for reading.]
http://38.201.154.103/articles/?a=1999/3/22/190929
Russia and China: A Pattern of Belligerence � Part 1
J.R. Nyquist
March 23, 1999 War Preparations Continue in Russia
All around the globe, a pattern of belligerence toward the United States and
her allies is emerging: from the Korean peninsula down through the Spratly
Islands near the Philippines, enveloping Taiwan, then reappearing in Central
Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. The rhetoric from Beijing, Moscow,
Belgrade, Pyongyang, and Baghdad suggests possible coordination. Forward
military deployments by China, Iraq, Serbia, and Russia, together with
sinister construction projects and major troop movements, have been noted in
East Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East.
In the past month, numerous developments have taken place in Russia that
suggest war preparations:
RUSSIA CREATES UNIFIED COMMAND OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In January, the Russian General Staff announced that all of the country�s
nuclear forces -- Strategic Rocket Forces, submarine-based weaponry, and nukes
on their strategic bombers -- would now be placed under one command.
ANALYSIS: This development was widely reported in Russia and by the Associated
Press. The AP story indicated bafflement that Russia, in the middle of
economic problems, would be reorganizing its armed forces, especially the
nuclear forces. But this development fits the thesis that Russia is, in fact,
preparing for war.
In war, the principle of "unity of command" is considered crucial. By moving
to unify nuclear command, the Russian armed forces can now better coordinate a
nuclear surprise attack involving all nuclear service branches, obviating the
friction of interservice rivalry. In a strictly
defensive situation, centralization of the nuclear forces is unnecessary, even
counterproductive. Decentralization is better for defense. However, this is
not true for attack. Coordinating an effective, disarming first strike
requires a high deg
http://38.201.154.103/articles/?a=1999/3/22/190929
Russia and China: A Pattern of Belligerence � Part 1
J.R. Nyquist
March 23, 1999 War Preparations Continue in Russia
All around the globe, a pattern of belligerence toward the United States and
her allies is emerging: from the Korean peninsula down through the Spratly
Islands near the Philippines, enveloping Taiwan, then reappearing in Central
Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. The rhetoric from Beijing, Moscow,
Belgrade, Pyongyang, and Baghdad suggests possible coordination. Forward
military deployments by China, Iraq, Serbia, and Russia, together with
sinister construction projects and major troop movements, have been noted in
East Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East.
In the past month, numerous developments have taken place in Russia that
suggest war preparations:
RUSSIA CREATES UNIFIED COMMAND OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In January, the Russian General Staff announced that all of the country�s
nuclear forces -- Strategic Rocket Forces, submarine-based weaponry, and nukes
on their strategic bombers -- would now be placed under one command.
ANALYSIS: This development was widely reported in Russia and by the Associated
Press. The AP story indicated bafflement that Russia, in the middle of
economic problems, would be reorganizing its armed forces, especially the
nuclear forces. But this development fits the thesis that Russia is, in fact,
preparing for war.
In war, the principle of "unity of command" is considered crucial. By moving
to unify nuclear command, the Russian armed forces can now better coordinate a
nuclear surprise attack involving all nuclear service branches, obviating the
friction of interservice rivalry. In a strictly
defensive situation, centralization of the nuclear forces is unnecessary, even
counterproductive. Decentralization is better for defense. However, this is
not true for attack. Coordinating an effective, disarming first strike
requires a high degree of control and coordination, which a unified nuclear
command facilitates. This move,
coupled with the fact Russia has been moving its strategic warheads onto
submarines in the past six months, should be viewed with alarm.
TOP GENERALS RESIGN FROM STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES
In the second half of January, the commander of Russia�s Strategic Rocket
Forces, Col.-Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, resigned his post together with his three
chief deputies, allegedly throwing Russia�s nuclear forces into disarray.
After taking this unprecedented action, Yakovlev stated that the reason for
his resignation was a personality conflict with Gen. Sokolov, the commander of
Russia�s early-warning service.
ANALYSIS: According to Col. Stanislav Lunev, ranking defector from the Main
Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff, Yakovlev�s retirement
was planned some time ago.
"They already have civilian jobs waiting for them," Lunev said. "There will be
no disruption of the rocket forces."
Lunev believes the resignations stem from the reorganization of Russia�s
nuclear forces under a single chief, but he nonetheless admits that Yakovlev
and his deputies are hard-liners and careerists. After closer analysis, it is
difficult to argue that they would resign in protest over a measure they
themselves long advocated, as they were supporters and proteges of Defense
Minister Igor Sergeyev, the man most responsible for the reorganization of the
nuclear forces.
There are serious inconsistencies here that must not be passed over. Why did
Yakovlev and his deputies resign? Has a secret nuclear command center been
established? A centralized nuclear command would have to create alternate
command posts in several bunkers, with many capable
general officers at the ready. Were these resignations made in protest over
the reorganization of Russia�s nuclear forces, or were they part of the
reorganization itself?
RUSSIA�S NORTHERN FLEET PUT ON ALERT
When President Clinton bombed Iraq in December, Moscow put its Northern Fleet
on alert. This curious move, which makes no sense in terms of reacting to a
Middle East crisis, and coming at a supposed time of reduced superpower
tensions, has serious implications that ought to be
explored.
ANALYSIS: Prior to a surprise nuclear attack on the United States, it is
believed the Russians would attempt to put most of their nuclear missile
submarines to sea. Therefore, the question that must be asked is whether the
Russians used the alert to deploy their missile submarine forces. Despite what
some analysts might say, any large-scale deployment to sea is a red flag.
The Northern Fleet contains the lion�s share of Russia�s naval strike
capability, and any alerting of that fleet needs to be carefully scrutinized.
In fact, any Russian fleet alert should be answered by a comparable U.S. fleet
alert. It is alarming in and of itself that the United States did not respond
in kind.
RUSSIANS CONTINUE NUKE TESTING
The Russians have abandoned the agreement to forgo underground nuclear tests.
They have admitted to testing three tactical nuclear warheads in recent weeks.
These are part of a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons that the
Russian armed forces have developed. In addition, during the period of the
agreed suspension of underground tests, there have been suspicious earthquakes
in Russia with signatures characteristic of strategic nuclear tests.
ANALYSIS: Nuclear readiness requires the occasional testing of nuclear
warheads. New, more efficient weapons must be tested before they are deployed
to the armed forces. The United States has not tested its nuclear stockpile in
several years, while the Russians have been testing
their weapons.
The importance of tactical nuclear weapons to the Russians lies in the fact
that these cannot be kept track of by arms control specialists. The START
agreements require Russia to destroy the bulk of its strategic nuclear
stockpiles, which cannot be hidden. But tactical nuclear weapons have a
number of advantages over strategic ones. First and foremost, they are more
efficient in terms of their use of nuclear fuel. Also, tactical nuclear
weapons can be packed into ICBMs, bombers, fighter-bombers, or artillery
units, making them the most versatile type of nuclear weapon. Last, but not
least, tactical nuclear weapons can be delivered as a cluster, which is a more
effective means for destroying large urban areas, and obviates the terms of
the START treaties, which call for the elimination of multiple independently
targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).
THE RUSSIANS LIE ABOUT THEIR READINESS
The chief of the Russian General Staff, Anatoly Kvashin, a hardened
professional known for his stony silence, now claims that Russia has halved
its western military deployments, reducing its strike capability near Finland.
On Jan. 11, Kvashin stated: "We have extremely low defense
readiness."
ANALYSIS: These are curious words from an ordinarily obsessive, secretive, and
paranoid functionary. Such a pronouncement is uncharacteristic and probably
deceptive. Throughout history, when Russian forces have been weak or unready,
no Russian general officer would dare to acknowledge the fact. Such
acknowledgment, under normal conditions, would lead to immediate dismissal.
Russian military doctrine pays close attention to the dictum of Sun Tzu, the
ancient Chinese strategist, who said: "All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we
must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are
away. ... Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him."
If Russia is really moving troops off its border with Europe, as well as
troops away from its Chinese border, where are the troops being relocated?
UNPRECEDENTED SLAUGHTER OF RUSSIAN FUR ANIMALS
Russia and Belarus have large collective farms dedicated to the breeding of
polar foxes and minks. Russia is the world�s largest fur consumer, annually
buying 40 percent of the furs produced worldwide. But now, Russian officials
claim that demand has stalled, and they are slaughtering their fox and mink
herds because they cannot afford to feed them.
Slaughter is normal at the onset of winter, of course, but this slaughter is
of unprecedented numbers of animals. At the same time, Russia is importing fur
from China, as well as coats, jackets, and boots. If Russian demand has
stalled and the market for furs is flooded, why the imports?
ANALYSIS: Wherever we see an inconsistency in Russia�s economy, we have to
think twice. In World War II, Russian spies infiltrated all of the sheep
ranches in Europe. Their mission: to watch and see if sheep were being sheared
for 5 million sheepskin coats. Soviet military intelligence reasoned that if
Hitler intended to invade Russia, he would need heavy winter clothing for his
troops. The shearing of the sheep would be a dead giveaway.
Unfortunately for Hitler, he did not make the 5 million coats. And though he
caught Soviet military intelligence off guard, his troops in Russia suffered
frostbite and amputations once winter began. In fact, one of the medals struck
for German soldiers during 1941-42 was called "The Order of the Frozen Meat."
Logistical preparations are a necessary part of war. National leaders ignore
such preparations at great peril. In this context, what are we to make of this
huge increase in the production and importation of furs and uniform clothing
in Russia?
While this activity could indicate Russian economic miscalculation, one has to
wonder why the fur herds were increased to such a size to begin with. Since
these fur farms are state-controlled, an increase in production suggests an
increase in projected consumption. But as civilian consumption has remained
steady, the obvious conclusion is that somebody in Moscow was anticipating a
huge increase in the military�s demand for winter clothing. With the aforesaid
cover story of a collapsed market, Moscow might well mask a planned troop
mobilization of very large dimensions. If Russia called up her reserves either
before or after a nuclear exchange, she would need winter coats, boots, and
headgear (even if the attack took place in warm weather).
Russia�s soldiers may have to confront winter weather conditions in North
America if Russian military doctrine is followed. This doctrine calls for an
invasion of America. Always cognizant of history, the Russian General Staff is
well aware of Hitler�s mistake in World War II and would never repeat that
mistake in World War III.
As Russia openly makes moves for war, its new partner, China, has been taking
equally dramatic steps. Coming Wednesday: Part 2 -- Chinese Premier Calls For
Nuclear War Preparations.
====================
http://www.drudgereport.com/
XXXXX DRUDGE REPORT XXXXX THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1999 17:19:04 ET XXXXX BAILOUT
BUST: RUBIN NOW SAYS U.S. TAX MONEY WENT TO WEALTHY RUSSIANS Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin told a congressional panel that he suspected that much
of the $4.8 billion in loans sent to Russia last summer by the International
Monetary Fund "may have been siphoned off improperly." Rubin's comments
marked the first public confirmation by the Clinton administration that much
of the bailout money the U.S. Treasury Department organized last year went to
wealthy Russian oligarchs who move billions of dollars to Switzerland and
other safe havens.
================
Russian PM back in Moscow after cancelled U.S. trip
MOSCOW, March 24 (Reuters) - Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who
cancelled his visit to the United States because of imminent NATO strikes
against Yugoslavia, returned to Moscow on Wednesday. ``His aircraft landed at
6:05 a.m. (0305 GMT),'' a duty official at the Vnukovo-2 government airport
outside Moscow said by telephone. Russian news agencies said Primakov was
expected to make an official statement on the situation in Kosovo.
22:27 03-23-99 Copyright 1999 Reuters Limited.
================
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-03/23/036r-032399-idx.html
Russian IMF Loans Routed Through Offshore Company
Issue Could Cloud Primakov's U.S. Visit
By David Hoffman
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, March 23, 1999; Page A11
MOSCOW, March 22�Former Central Bank director Sergei Dubinin said today that a
secret offshore firm now under investigation was used to manage some of the
funds the International Monetary Fund lent to Russia in 1993. Dubinin claimed
that no laws had been broken, but his explanation differed from a previous one
and raised new questions on the eve of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's trip
to Washington on a mission to win renewed IMF lending -- which was suspended
after the Kremlin devalued the ruble and defaulted on domestic debt last
August.
Primakov's trip, perhaps the most important he has undertaken in his six
months in office, could be clouded by questions about how previous Western aid
was used, as well as by a host of other issues, including looming conflict in
the Balkans. Dubinin said the Central Bank told the IMF that "operations with
part of the reserves were conducted through that financial company; it was a
known fact. It was not news for the IMF." He was speaking in an unusual
television interview devoted to questions about the secret firm, Financial
Management Co., known as Fimaco, based on the largely autonomous British
island of Jersey.
In Washington, an IMF spokeswoman said that while the Fund knew the Russian
Central Bank was managing much of its international reserves through European
subsidiaries, it did not know about Fimaco in particular. The Washington Post
has reported that internal documents show billions of dollars of the Central
Bank's foreign currency reserves were funneled through Fimaco starting in 1993
and that some of the profits from investments of that money appear to be
missing. Part of the reserves
were secretly reinvested in Russia's high-flying treasury-bill market through
Fimaco and a related company in Russia, Eurofinance, the documents show.
Russia's embattled prosecutor general, Yuri Skuratov, who is caught up in the
aftermath of of a sex and videotape scandal, has said the Central Bank's
handling of the reserves is under investigation. In an open letter published
Feb. 11, Dubinin defended the use of the offshore firm, saying a Swiss
businessman was seeking to seize Russian currency reserves in a legal dispute
and the money had to be hidden. He said at the time that it was appropriate
for Fimaco to remain secret.
Today, Dubinin offered a different explanation. He said that Russia was not
part of the international financial system in the early 1990s, and "there
appeared a necessity to manage the reserves" outside of Russia. "We needed a
channel of management. It was not hiding money from anybody; everything was
legal, clear and in line with international practice."
Nikolai Gonchar, a leading independent member of the lower house of
parliament, the State Duma, and a member of its budget committee, has raised
questions about whether Russia's currency reserves were used for private gain.
He has said that profits from investing the overseas money may not have been
returned to Russia. It is not clear yet where they wound up.
According to the internal documents, $1.7 billion was transferred through
Fimaco in 1993; part of it was to be reinvested from abroad into Russia's
nascent short-term treasury-bill market. More funds continued on that path in
1994, '95 and '96.
In the months before President Boris Yeltsin's reelection campaign -- from
Feb. 29 to May 28, 1996 -- hundreds of millions more were pumped through the
secret overseas channel back into the treasury-bill market, which at the time
was yielding more than 200 percent interest annually.
Dubinin said the money was withdrawn from Fimaco in 1997.
Dubinin also lashed out at the prosecutor's office, saying it was under the
influence of "blackmailers," whom he did not name, and asserted that the
Central Bank never violated Russian laws. Prosecutor General Skuratov is
facing demands from Yeltsin that he resign and has offered to do so, but the
upper house of parliament has rejected his offer.
In Washington, Primakov will be seeking IMF agreement to borrow enough to
cover $4.5 billion in Russian loan repayments due this year to the lending
agency. Russia's total debt due this year is $17.2 billion, or 80 percent of
its national budget. It has already missed some payments
on debt that dates to the Soviet era.
As Primakov prepared to leave for Washington, Russian officials have been
trying to lay the groundwork for talks that will focus not only on Russia's
IMF debt but also on a host of other issues, such as Russian cooperation with
Iran, conflict in the Balkans, the stalled START II
arms-control treaty and the endangered 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.
Primakov also met today with American Jewish leaders and pledged to fight
antisemitism in Russia.
The chief reason for Primakov's trip, however, is to win approval for
resumption of the IMF loans. "Primakov must prove to the United States that
Russia is making headway with reforms and that Russia is a partner that can be
trusted," said analyst Andrei Kortunov. "He also must get
United States support on this issue, concerning credits from the IMF."
President Clinton has said he would like to help Russia but wants to make sure
the money is properly used. The IMF has made it clear that Primakov's chances
of cinching new funding on this trip are remote. While Russian officials have
shown more willingness to cut the country's
massive budget deficit, they said, the two sides are still far apart. "It
would be premature to say we're on the verge of inking a new deal," an IMF
spokesman said.
Staff writer Paul Blustein in Washington contributed to this report. �
Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company
=====================
Russia seeks more U.S. food aid, farm equipment
By Charles Abbott
WASHINGTON, March 22 (Reuters) - Moscow asked for more U.S. food aid on Monday
to supplement $1 billion in U.S. assistance already promised to help offset
Russia's worst grain harvest in 40 years.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Gennady Kulik raised the issue of additional
food aid during a 75-minute meeting with U.S. officials. He told reporters
afterward this was "a very difficult year" due to the short harvest and the
weak rouble. His request came on the eve of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov'
arrival on Tuesday for a series of talks with top U.S. officials about Kosovo,
Russia's urgent need for loan credits and other issues. Along with food,
Kulik said Russia was pursuing $2 billion in deals with two of the world's
largest farm equipment manufacturers, Case Corp <CSE.N> and Deere and Co.
<DE.N> for farm implements and construction of factories in Russia.
Officials from both nations said additional food aid was discussed in general
terms only. Primakov and Vice President Al Gore "will discuss it further,"
Kulik said. "He (Kulik) did indicate his desire to augment the assistance
package that is already flowing," Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman told
reporters. Glickman, who greeted Kulik with a bear hug, said any new package
would likely include roughly the same mix of grains, meats and other
commodities as now. Wheat accounts for half of the 3.1 million metric tons of
aid now being shipped. Imports supply one-third of the food on the Russian
market, Kulik said, but the collapse in the value of the rouble makes imports
expensive, both for vendors and consumers.
Families pay up to 70 percent of their income on food -- "They cannot spend
anymore," Kulik said. "Therefore, we need some support here as well," he said.
"Today, we cannot do without governmental support."
Kulik, speaking through a translator, said modern farming equipment -- grain
harvesting combines, multi-purpose tractors and grain processing and storage
equipment -- was needed to boost Russian output and reduce wastage that claims
a sizable part of the harvest. Financing for the potential deals with Case
and Deere was under negotiation, Kulik said, citing meetings with the Ex-Im
Bank and the World Bank.
"This program is going to work as a commercial program," Kulik said, adding
that Russia wants to stimulate further investment in agriculture. The first
shipment from the $1 billion U.S. package -- a cargo of seeds -- arrived early
this month. Full-scale shipment of the wheat, soybeans, meats and other
commodities was expected to get under way in a week or so. Part of the goods
were donated and some were offered on concessional sales terms.
Some members of Congress have expressed concern about the safety of shipments
and demanded the U.S. government closely monitor to make sure the food is not
hijacked by criminal gangs or corrupt officials. Russia suffered its worst
grain harvest in 40 years in 1998, about 47 million metric tons of wheat and
feed (coarse) grains, about 20 million tons below average. The small crop
could imperil meat production.
Drought and a decline in grain sowings present "a troubled start" to this
year's crops, according to the U.S. agricultural attache in Moscow.
19:14 03-22-99 Copyright 1999 Reuters Limited.
=====================
http://chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/article/0,1051,CTT-6030679,00.html
U.S. FOOD LANDS IN RUSSIA
By Colin McMahon
Tribune Foreign Correspondent
March 14, 1999
ST. PETERSBURG, Russia--The initial shipment of U.S. food aid to Russia
finally landed Friday at the port city of St. Petersburg. Originally described
as a way to help Russia through a difficult winter, the aid now arrives just
in time for spring planting. U.S. officials shrugged off the delay, contending
that the phrase "getting Russia through the winter" was more metaphorical than
literal. The goal, they said, is to build a kind of bridge from harvest to
harvest. Yet the fact that about six months have passed since the United
States first offered the food underlines how complex even a seemingly simple,
ostensibly altruistic deal can be in Russia.
Problems arose from the start.
Critics suggested the aid plan was aimed less at feeding Russia than at
helping U.S. farmers unload excess grain. They said officials from both
nations were exaggerating the potential for Russian food shortages. They also
warned that the aid, as well as food from Western Europe due to arrive soon
under a separate program, might not reach those most in need.
So far, the giant nation's food supply is holding up. Though Russia has made
little progress in turning around its economy, its people have weathered their
fiscal crisis far better than initially feared. "We're really looking at a
small and sporadic food-shortage problem," said Peter Westin, an analyst at
the Russian European Center for Economic Policy in Moscow. "It's more of a
transportation problem." Enough flour, condensed milk and other products
remain to go around, Westin said, but getting them to where they are needed is
not always easy. Such difficulties have plagued Russia before, and the Soviet
Union before that, even during times of bountiful harvests.
Harder to gauge than the current food supply is the future one.
A harsh drought last year, combined with chronic inefficiencies in the farming
sector, dealt Russia what officials called the worst harvest in 40 years. Not
only did wheat stocks fall, so did seed harvests and yields of grain to feed
livestock. An Agriculture Ministry official said Friday that Russia faces a
shortfall of more than 1.2 million tons of grain seed, with spring planting
just around the corner.
The U.S. shipment Friday, green pea seeds destined for sale to farmers in the
northern Caucasus, is part of nearly $1 billion in aid due to arrive over the
next few months. More than 1.7 million tons of wheat, dried milk, and corn
and vegetable seeds will be handed over for free. Then 1.32 million tons of
soybeans, corn, beef, poultry and other foodstuffs will be sold to the Russian
government on easy credit. The first payment on Russia's low-interest
loan is due in five years.
American farmers were paid full market price for their products.
The program's delay was blamed in part on haggling over whether the Russian
government could tax the food. In the end, Washington swatted away Moscow's
efforts to impose duties, though the U.S. is paying to transport the aid to
Russia and unload it at Russian ports. Other U.S. concerns were who would
handle the food and how it would be distributed. At a short ceremony Friday on
a frosty St. Petersburg pier, U.S. Ambassador James Collins said he is
satisfied with the safeguards now in place.
"The ship arrives, it unloads. We know what's in the ship, we know how much is
there," Collins said. "I believe we've got in place a system that is pretty
straightforward and ensures that this stuff goes where it is intended. "It
is not rocket science to know that if you put things on a train, the train is
going to arrive somewhere," the ambassador said. "And the train can be checked
for what the load is."
U.S. Agriculture Department officials will track the shipments as they head to
regions reportedly low on food and struggling to afford imported goods made
more expensive by the fall of the Russian ruble. The U.S. says it is
prepared to pull the plug should major irregularities occur. In 1992-93,
U.S.-donated food meant for poor Russians ended up being sold in stores and
markets, according to
numerous reports. The U.S. said the reports proved to be unfounded. Criminal
groups and corrupt bureaucrats, according to the allegations, pocketed the
profits.
This time the U.S. will give 100,000 tons of non-perishable food directly to
five private volunteer agencies, including Feed the Children and the American
Red Cross. These organizations, working with local partners, will then pass
out the food to hospitals, orphanages, soup kitchens and other agencies that
assist the poor. Then 3 million tons of wheat and other commodities will be
delivered. Some of it will be passed along without charge to various Russian
institutions; some of it will be sold to distributors and then fed into the
market. All money received must be placed in the Russian pension fund.
"The real issue is to make sure that adequate supplies are available until the
next harvest starts, and that's in the fall or late summer," Collins said. "So
we have every confidence that this set of supplies that is going to come over
the next several months in fact will come into Russia at a time of greatest
need."
Westin and other analysts remain skeptical. One red flag is that the Russian
government, through a closed tender, decided that the food distribution would
be overseen by the same company that was responsible for the troubled program
in 1992-93. "I am highly suspicious of this plan if the main purpose is to
get food to people who need it," Westin said.
