On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 02:23:07AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: > On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 10:48:06AM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote: > > In a pure Condorcet system with a default option, lying about the > > acceptability of A *doesn't* help B. > > 40 C A B > 30 A B C > 20 B C A > > C defeats A 60:30, A defeats B 70:20, B defeats C 50:40; the weakest > defeat is dropped, C wins. If the ABC voters switch to: > > 30 B C A > > then B wins -- lying about the acceptability of A *does* help B, even in a > pure Condorcet case (well, pure CpSSD -- although even in pure Condorcet, > B winning is probably preferable to no result).
This is the point that I noted complicates the analysis: Strategic voting can work in Condorcet+CpSSD. It just works less often than in the proposed system. If you carry out more examples, I think you'll conclude that it works in appreciably fewer cases, though I don't know how to quantify this. Eg, sincere: 9 ABD A>B 12:8 6 BAD A>D 15:5 3 DAB B>D 15:5 2 DBA B can swap and make D>A 11:9, but in Condorcet/CpSSD A still wins. I think this is related to the Strong Defensive Strategy Criterion. Andrew -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]