On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 13:59, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, May 24, 2023, 9:56 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 11:48, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >An RNG would be a bad design choice because it would be extremely >>> unreliable. However, as a thought experiment, it could work. If the visual >>> cortex were removed and replaced with an RNG which for five minutes >>> replicated the interactions with the remaining brain, the subject would >>> behave as if they had normal vision and report that they had normal vision, >>> then after five minutes behave as if they were blind and report that they >>> were blind. It is perhaps contrary to intuition that the subject would >>> really have visual experiences in that five minute period, but I don't >>> think there is any other plausible explanation. >>> >> >>> I think they would be a visual zombie in that five minute period, though >>> as described they would not be able to report any difference. >>> >>> I think if one's entire brain were replaced by an RNG, they would be a >>> total zombie who would fool us into thinking they were conscious and we >>> would not notice a difference. So by extension a brain partially replaced >>> by an RNG would be a partial zombie that fooled the other parts of the >>> brain into thinking nothing was amiss. >>> >> >> I think the concept of a partial zombie makes consciousness nonsensical. >> > > It borders on the nonsensical, but between the two bad alternatives I find > the idea of a RNG instantiating human consciousness somewhat less sensical > than the idea of partial zombies. > If consciousness persists no matter what the brain is replaced with as long as the output remains the same this is consistent with the idea that consciousness does not reside in a particular substance (even a magical substance) or in a particular process. This is a strange idea, but it is akin to the existence of platonic objects. The number three can be implemented by arranging three objects in a row but it does not depend those three objects unless it is being used for a particular purpose, such as three beads on an abacus. > How would I know that I am not a visual zombie now, or a visual zombie >> every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday? >> > > Here, we have to be careful what we mean by "I". Our own brains have > various spheres of consciousness as demonstrated by the Wada Test: we can > shut down one hemisphere of the brain and lose partial awareness and > functionality such as the ability to form words and yet one remains > conscious. I think being a partial zombie would be like that, having one's > sphere of awareness shrink. > But the subject's sphere of awareness would not shrink in the thought experiment, since by assumption their behaviour stays the same, while if their sphere of awareness shrank they notice that something was different and say so. > What is the advantage of having "real" visual experiences if they make no >> objective difference and no subjective difference either? >> > > The advantage of real computations (which imply having real > awareness/experiences) is that real computations are more reliable than > RNGs for producing intelligent behavioral responses. > Yes, so an RNG would be a bad design choice. But the point remains that if the output of the system remains the same, the consciousness remains the same, regardless of how the system functions. The reasonable-sounding belief that somehow the consciousness resides in the brain, in particular biochemical reactions or even in electronic circuits simulating the brain is wrong. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypUcTU%3D1P3bkeoki894AQ7PrLXSFH6zFXwGPVhrqwaKoYA%40mail.gmail.com.
