Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > > > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It > was my > > > understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a > > > series of disjoint states. > > > > > > > > Brent Meeker > > > > > > It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational > > > steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an > > > assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of > > > implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve > > > continuity of consciousness. > > > > Maybe that assumption is inconsistent. > > > > Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them > in the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a > word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as the 1s > and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the > substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order as in > Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped arbitrarily > finely and still function as computations - or a stream of conscious states. > > > > Brent Meeker > > I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly > in the real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia.
Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 7 6 3... But in arithmtic Platonia (a small part of the kingdom) there's no spacial or temporal order that can conflict with the inherent order. >It's not as > if God has to explicitly put the integers in line one after the other: > they just naturally form a sequence, and they would no less form a > sequence if they were written on cards and thrown to the wind. Explicit > ordering in the physical world is important from a third person > perspective. If the putative sequence has a first person experience, and > the substrate of its implementation is transparent to that first person > experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment with no > external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is sufficient to > create the first person impression of continuity. > > Stathis Papaioannou I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and can't be chopped finer than some limit. I guess I need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in arithmetic Platonia. Are we to imagine that some large number 3875835442... is a single, atomic experience and another number 3876976342... is another single, atomic experience and they have no other relation than their natural order? In that case, they would be experiences in a certain bundle of streams of consciousness just in virtue of having some digits in common or having factors in common or what? Or are we to imagine another Platonic object, a Turing machine, that generates both these numbers in a certain sequence (maybe the reverse of their natural order) - and that's what makes them parts of the same experience bundle? Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---