Bruno, I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction.
> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when > you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink > coffee. Maybe "We love coffee, so we will drink coffee" (with "we" referring to many moment-selves). Or, perhaps, "Abram loves coffee, so Abram will drink coffee" (no identification of a self, only of an identity). > It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this > sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you > did'nt, you are the copy. Since all possible moments exist, that old self did not die. My after-reading consciousness can observe that it is not the before-reading consciousness, and the before-reading consciousness could observe that it is not the after-reading consciousness, but that is all. There is no switching from one to the other, since that would require time (which does not exist). :) Of course, that is where I-as-time-skeptic have trouble knowing what it means to choose. I can understand being-in-a-state-of-choosing, but I refuse to accept the cause/effect reasoning that gos along with that state. (In other words, I can understand choosing from the 3rd person perspective, but cannot understand it from the 1st person perspective.) --Abram On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > I wrote: > > > >> Abram wrote >>> >>> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not >>> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the >>> number of my copies that will be so carried. >> >> ? > > > OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism? And *you* (in your > sense) you die. > Is this what you mean? > > And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant. > > And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor > because you care by altruism for the copy. > > With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not). > > But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future > as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about the > satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon > the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the future. > > Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any > statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.) concerns > our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is > not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be it > by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity. > > Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when > you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink > coffee. > > I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none > will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi-tautology > that none *feels* dying at each instant. You have to meditate eight > hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something > (legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of > what dying could be, according to some. > > But your view is coherent and rather cool too, so let us continue the > UDA reasoning, by altruism for *all* our descendants and why not the > many others descendant to:) > > It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this > sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you > did'nt, you are the copy. > > Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the > assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in > teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self- > multiplication). > > (I know you are playing the role of the "time person skeptic"). > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---