On 25 Nov 2012, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/25/2012 6:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Nov 2012, at 01:22, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Nov 24, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 11/24/2012 10:52 AM, John Clark wrote:
But consider what would happen before they open the boxes. Bruno
Marchal is exactly duplicated and one copy materializes in
Washington and the other in Moscow but both are inside identical
boxes. If the position of the two were then instantaneously
exchanged Bruno Marchal could not tell the difference and even
"you" could not tell the difference using any definition of "you"
that can be thought of. What's more even a third party, even the
very universe itself would not change one bit if you
instantaneously exchanged those 2 identical things.
But strictly speaking they cannot be identical. For example it is
statistically certain that they will be thinking different
thoughts as they revive from the transport. The no-cloning
theorem already ensures that they cannot be identical at the level
of quantum state and the very interactions with the environment
that make them quasi-classical will ensure they are not identical
even at a much higher level than the molecular. I'm not sure how
this affects Bruno's argument, but it is different from the
'duplication' in Everett's MWI of QM.
We may be unable to prepare to quantum systems to be in such a
state, but if the universe is infinite in size, then we might
expect it to be statistically guaranteed that disparate systems
converge to identical quantum states.
As for how it might effect Bruno's thought experiment, we could
avoid the issue of non-clonability by duplicating "uploaded" minds
rather than ones supported by biological substrates.
Yes. If QM could be used through the cloning theorem, it can only
mean that comp is false. Once we are Turing emulable (which is
still the case with a quantum brain, despite the non cloning
theorem), we know that the UD will "prepare" the exact state
infinitely often.
And then comp explains why the comp apparent "primitive matter" is
non clonable, as it is defined by an infinity of competing
universal numbers/histories.
An arbitrary quantum state can't be cloned because of linearity. I
don't see what this has to do with the "infinity of competing
universal numbers/histories".
Nothing a priori. Good remark, it gives hope to retrieve linearity
from the infinite competition. The logic of measure one (in that
competition) is given by the logic S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, which admit a
quantum like quantization, and so it makes sense to relate the two non-
cloning origin.
You single out that the sub-substitution level competition is a deeper
reason for non-cloning than linearity. Linearity is what makes it
possible to share a common comp sub-substitution level realm.
Bruno
Brent
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