On 26 Nov 2012, at 22:51, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> the H-man doesn't have the right to call himself the W or M man
because they don't exist yet and the future is always uncertain.
> Well, not always, but certainly in this case. This betrays that
you get the point. The H-man cannot say it will be the M-man, or the
W-man
We're talking about the future so the H-man can't be certain that
the machine is going to work or even that you were telling the truth
when you said you had a duplicating machine.
You change the protocol. We do theoretical reasoning.
And even if the H-man was certain of all that he knows nothing about
either Washington or Moscow and knows nothing about what sights and
adventures his future self will have in either city so the Helsinki
man can't identify with either the Washington man or the Moscow man;
Irrelevant.
however they can and do identify with them because they remember
being him and they know more about the past than the future, that's
why time has a direction.
Irrelevant.
> ?
!
From the third person, after the duplication
As a point of interest, up to this point it's OK to use the word
"you", it's clear who the pronoun refers to.
> and box opening
But at the instant the box is opened and different things revealed
"you" is turned into the Washington man and "you" is turned into the
Moscow man, so back in Helsinki to ask "what will "you" see?" is
ambiguous.
No it is not. It is indeterminate, but no less ambiguous than talking
on my future in case I am proposed interesting job in bit Washington
and Moscow and I am hesitating about which one.
> the brain differentiate quickly
Perhaps, it depends on how different Washington is from Moscow.
You can replace the cities by two rooms differing only by the content,
0 or 1,in an envelop.
You make only non relevant remark.
> and the question is about which differentiation you will live.
The question is who is "you", is it:
On the contrary. You need just consciousness, not self-consciousness.
The average first person memory content in an iterated self-
duplication match the average sequence of a random coin. With the
definition of first person use in the UDA, the first person
indeterminacy is simply factual.
By definition of comp, "you" means in the 3p the guy in Helsinki and
then in W and M. Then the 1-you becomes exclusive once they have
differentiated. In the 3p there are two such 1-you, but for the 1p
view themselves they got one bit of information: W or M.
A) The man who is still experiencing Helsinki
B) The men who remember being the Helsinki man
C) Neither of the above but just a unspecified other.
Your answer seems to be C and that is at the root of your confusion.
The you are all the guy who feel to be you, all the time. It is closer
to your "B", in the 3-views, which are doubled, once duplicated, but
still single, for the 1-views seen from the 1-view after. As you can
see by reading their personal diaries.
> The prediction is on which different brain (the one in W after the
box is open, versus the one in M) you will feel to own.
Both answers can be confirmed by people who remember being the
Helsinki man;
Exact!
John Clark doesn't know how that relates to "you" and Bruno Marchal
doesn't know either, if Bruno Marchal did know Bruno Marchal would
stop using personal pronouns when Bruno Marchal knows of the
confusion they create, but then clarity my not be desired if ideas
are bad.
You are using the pronouns in the confusing way, as you use "you",
when I use always 1-you, and 3-you. In the mulitiplication, the 3-yous
multiplies, and the 1-you mutliply too, in the 3-views, but not from
any of each possible 1-views. So from the 1-views, it is like a
sequence of random event, and this verifiably for the majority, which
inherits incompressible sequences.
You are introducing a confusion by never been clear on the 3 and 1-you
distinction.
> The Helsinki guy cannot be sure if he will experience seeing W or M.
>> WHO THE HELL IS "HE"???
> Some guy who will have an experience. He is notably, the Helsinki
guy.
But it's not just "you", Bruno Marchal is also inconsistent on who
the Helsinki guy is, sometimes he's:
1) the guy experiencing Helsinki and then the Helsinki guy will see
no city at all when he pushes that button, not even Helsinki;
This contradicts comp. It would mean he did not survive classical
teleportation, and so you bactrack to step 0.
but at other times Bruno Marchal says
2) the Helsinki guy is the Moscow man seeing Moscow and only Moscow
AND the Helsinki guy is the Washington man seeing Washington and
only Washington.
I can accept either definition of "the Helsinki man" but not both,
for me to understand what you're trying to say you need to make up
your mind.
Just look at the context, and chose the meaning which makes the point
consistent. It seems obvious for most.
Once you understand that "W and M" is false for all copies, you can
understand what was meant by the 1-views.
The 3-views can see the two diaries, but the 1-view see only one
diaries "directly", and none contents "W & M": once will content "W"
and the other will content "M", and that gives one bit of information.
>> Bruno Marchal just agreed that the Helsinki guy will turn into
the Washington guy and see Washington AND Bruno Marchal just agreed
that the Helsinki guy will turn into the Moscow guy and see Moscow
> In the 3p view on the 1p views.
It might be helpful if Bruno Marchal could explain, without using
pronouns but by giving the subject a actual name, how "the 3p view
on the 1p views" (whatever that is) differs from some other view.
After the duplication:
There is one relevant 3p view, and it is:
"John-Clark-M enjoys Russian coffee and John-Clark-W enjoys American
coffee".
There are two relevant 1-p views, which are
"I enjoy a russian coffee". And,
"I enjoy American coffee".
And this would work even if the copies got a sudden amnesia and don't
remember who they are.
> But the guy in Helsinki knows that he will with certainty feel to
be in one city,
And that is exactly what happens he will feel to be in Washington
and only Washington and he will feel to be in Moscow and only Moscow
because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.
> and obviously he cannot predict which one.
One? How can there be one? There are two cities and two hes.
Yes, in the 3p-view! But in all 1-p views there is only one city
directly available. As you say, because he has been duplicated, so
both will have to choose between W and M, to put in the diary, and it
is easy as they have been asked to put just the unique city they see
in the diary. One 1-view, say the view of John-Clark-M will put M in
the diary, and the other 1-view will put W, and both will understand
that they were unable to predict that personal outcome, and by comp we
know why.
>he cannot predict his future 1view,
I don't know what he can or can not predict because I don't know who
he is, but I just predicted the Helsinki man's future and I was
correct, assuming "the Helsinki man" is not just the guy
experiencing Helsinki.
You predict correctly the 3-views on the 1-views, but fail to predict
the 1-views from the 1-views. You talk like if being duplicated did
kill you somehow, you stop to identify to any of the copies.
>> so obviously the Helsinki guy will see Moscow AND the Helsinki
guy will see Washington.
> That's correct, but does not address the question which is about
the unique future 1view that he will live with certainty.
If that's correct, and it is, then obviously there is no unique
future 1 view for the Helsinki man,
Why?
Even in the 3p views, they are two unique (subjectively unique) futures.
although there is a unique past one for the Moscow man and the
Washington man.
> Here you persist in avoiding the question about the future unique
first person view,
That is the exact point where Bruno Marchal's reasoning fails, in a
world with duplicating chambers the future first person view is NOT
unique,
In the 3p views. But obvioulsy false in all 1p-views whan we assume
comp and usual (non altered) state of consciousness.
the Helsinki man's future includes being BOTH the Moscow man AND the
Washington man.
Like me and you belongs to the future of the amoeba. That's correct in
the 3p-views of the 1p views, but it does not address the question
asked.
However even with duplicating chambers the past first person view
remains unique, the Washington man was the Helsinki man and only the
Helsinki man and the Moscow man was the Helsinki man and only the
Helsinki man
Very good!
> You just explain the indeterminacy, which is not paradoxical
because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED INDEED.
Yes YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, so when Bruno Marchal asks the
question "what city will "you" see?" who is supposed to be doing
the seeing?
> The point is that with comp, we cannot tell.
So the pronoun "you" doesn't refer to anything
Why? It refers clearly to two persons, in the 3-views, and to one
person from each of those 1-views with respect to the two cities. It
is no more ambiguous that my usual future in case of doubt for
important decision.
In the iterated self-duplication, the point is combinatorially
obvious: almost all futures are random (incompressible) when described
by the persons actually living them.
and your question is equivalent to "what city will qskfhdkt44t see?".
Of course not. the question is asked to you before the duplication,
about the obviously indeterminate outcome, among W and M, you (first
person) will describe in the diary.
In other words the question is gibberish.
> And given that both the duplication and the seeing happens in the
future who is Bruno Marchal asking the question of?
> Nobody needs to know that.
So you don't know what the question means and you don't know who
you're asking it to.
It means that we don't need to know "who" is the candidate to the
experience. It works also with robots + tools for self-localizing
themselves. The only correct prediction for all possible robots and
robots future will also be "W v M", and never "W & M", if "M" and "W"
represent the outcome that they have to describe in the diary.
> The prediction W is wrong
But I find Bruno Marchal in Washington and Bruno Marchal informs me
that the prediction was correct.
Which shows how much biased you are. You have to listen to Bruno
Marchal in Moscow too.
> The prediction M is wrong
But I find Bruno Marchal in Moscow and Bruno Marchal informs me that
the prediction was correct.
> The prediction W and M is wrong
Bruno Marchal disagrees.
> The prediction W or M is correct
OK Bruno, the experiment is long over and now that you have all the
information you will ever have on the matter what would have been
the correct prediction back in Helsinki, W or M? I'm not asking for
a prediction, the experiment is now in the past so interview anybody
and everybody and tell me did "you" see W or M? Bruno Marchal
insists there is one unique answer so let's hear it!
?
On the contrary they all agree with "W or M", ad they all live W, or M.
If there still isn't a answer then the question must have been
gibberish.
You keep confusing the 3-views on the 1-views and the 1-views about
themselves, whoever they are.
Or study AUDA: the 3-view are model by Gödel's beweisbar predicate Bp,
and the 1-views by Bp & p. G* star proves them equivalent, on the
arithmetical propositions, but they still obey different logic.
AUDA has notably been developed to provide another transparent
definition of the 3 and the 1 views, but most people find easier the
"access-consciousness" type of definition used in UDA: the content of
the diary. All diaries contains "I have just been duplicated into W
and M, I open the door and I see ... M", or "I have just been
duplicated into W and M, I open the door and I see ... W". In none
case they could predict that outcome with certainty (relative to this
protocol).
I don't see why you are stuck here. Nothing you say is wrong, but it
is only distracting non relevant points with respect to the asked
question.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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