On 13 Jan 2014, at 23:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/13/2014 11:37 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
William,
No, it's not the reification fallacy, unless you apply the same
definition to all theories, none of which are real. Of course
theories aren't reality.
In any case the quantum vacuum, out of which real particles can
appear, is a well accepted concept. I just generalize it a little
in my theory to include everything which could become possible.
So is that just the things that can be made out of the particles
that appear? Everything nomologically possible? Or everything
mathematically possible, i.e. all consistent axiomatic systems. Or
all worlds that have consistent descriptions, i.e. aren't self-
contradictory?
"Possible" is ambiguous.
That is why modal logic exists. But some philosophers, like Quine, was
extremely opposed to modal logic. he believed that possible p =
necessary = p = "verum(p)".
And, ... I agree with him, except that "provability" is a 100% quinean
mathematical notion, and yet it defines a (pretty) bunch of modal
logics (G and G*, and the unavoidable intensional variants).
So Quine anti-modal stance can be said refuted by incompleteness.
Some point that he made remains interesting an d even correct for "too
much rich" Löbian machine.
For example you can extend formally the G and G* logic in their
quantified extension (which I note qG and qG*), but this makes precise
sense only for arithmetical-like theories. A Löbian being like ZF
does not admit those quantified extensions, and the technical reason
for that are precise form of Quine attacks against modal logic.
This provides an argument against set theoretical realism, actually,
and is the reason why I don't really believe we can use set theory in
an ontology of a TOE. It is already too much big. of course Tegmark
naive stance on math (his MUH) is even logically stronger and
basically does not make sense at all.
Tegmark is in good company, as *all* attempt to formalize *all* math,
done last century, have failed up to now. They have all be shown
inconsistent.
Bruno
Brent
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