On Monday, March 17, 2014 12:58:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 16 Mar 2014, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, March 16, 2014 4:38:42 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, Mar 16, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:26:46 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> At this point my impression is: with a bucket so personalized and >>>> leaky, I can see how everything just goes in MSR, as long as Craig says >>>> so. >>>> For that reason I've taken MSR in the other thread and just filled it >>>> arbitrarily with my own primitives. You weren't amused because you thought >>>> I was selling you nonsense; so you didn't even reply. Perhaps you can >>>> relate to how I feel with many of your statements on MSR, then. >>>> >>> >>> If you don't like what I write, and how I write it, I suggest you follow >>> my example and ignore it. >>> >> >> That you ignore what and how you write is indeed becoming increasingly >> clear. Why others should care or read it becomes murkier though. >> >> I already stated I find your thoughts to be inspiring on many levels, in >> many ways. Just not the first level. >> >> Plugging sense into sense, relations into relations, without specifying >> some object seems empty to me, or at least so complex, that I couldn't wrap >> my head around it in a hundred lives. I hope you find something that >> clarifies this. >> > > If dreams don't require objects that are real outside of the dream > experience, why should the universe? > > > Yes, indeed, why? Good point. > > > > Objects require an experience which defines them as objects, > > > Why? I mean that is not necessary, a priori. >
Not logically, but empirically, if objects could simply exist without needing to be experienced or detected, then why have experience or detection? Our body would know about its environment in the same way that any other object would interact with its environment...unconsciously, and objectively. > > but experiences do not, in theory, require anything to define them. > > > I don't think the experiences themselves can even be defined. > I agree. What is already 'plain' cannot be ex-plained, nor does it need to be. > They can be shared when they have enough "3p" features in common, like the > "Madeleine of Proust" effect. Poets and novelists exploit that, but it is > an unending exploration. > > With comp, of course, experiences requires subject, that is person, and > person requires bodies/beliefs when getting a life, with deep scenarios > (deep = necessitates long computations). > > With the comp supervenience thesis, one first person experience supervenes > on an infinity of relative computational states. > It isn't clear though why experiences on the personal level require persons, but interaction on the computational level do not require sub-personal experiences. It seems to me that arithmetic itself is a machine, and one which cannot explain itself. Craig > > Bruno > > > Craig > > > >> PGC >> >> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>> >>>> PGC >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Craig >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> PGC >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You can't strike gold if sense contradicts its existence. PGC >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Contradiction requires sense to 'exist'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Craig >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Craig >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Craig >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I'll now watch the clip you posted! >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kim >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Email: kimj...@ozemail.com.au >>>>>>>>>>>> kmjc...@icloud.com >>>>>>>>>>>> Mobile: 0450 963 719 >>>>>>>>>>>> Phone: 02 93894239 >>>>>>>>>>>> Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *"Never let your schooling get in the way of your education" - >>>>>>>>>>>> Mark Twain* >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the >>>>>>>>>>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from >>>>>>>>>>> it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com >>>>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group >>>>>>>>>>> /everything-list. >>>>>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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