On 12 Jun 2014, at 18:33, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> the randomness (in the sense of normal statistical testing) of that deterministic chaos has no other rĂ´le in free-will than [...]

Before you start lecturing about what does and does not have a role in "free will" you first must explain what the hell "free will" is supposed to mean.

We have already agreed on the definition; more than one. You said it was not interesting, but I took that as a subjective opinion, relative to what we are interested in.

We have agree that free will = will = ability to make an image of an uncertain local future (will I drink tea or coffee?), and to make choice relatively to some high or higher level goal(s) (thirst, diet, economy, ...).






 >>> its necessary self-indeterminacy

>> We have self-indeterminacy?? I could not fail to disagree with you less.

> This astonished me

What astonishes you?

That you dismiss the Turing indeterminacy. Usually you dismiss the first person indeterminacy.






>>> Randomness adds nothing, as you see well

>> I have no idea what you mean by that, randomness clearly adds a whole lot of stuff, usually more than we'd like.

> I meant "randomness adds nothing in the free will"

That's not surprising, I've been on this list for several years and I've yet to find one person who could add anything of interest to the "free will" noise, a sound that many like to make with their mouth. There are endless debates about if human beings have "free will" or not but both sides of the argument quite literally don't know what they're arguing about. It's as if geometers where debating if squares were klogneated or unklogneated but nobody thinks to ask what klogneated means.



Only bad philosophers do that. Scientists start from the general idea, usually inconsistent, and propose definition which make sense, and develop theories, and prove theorems in those theories.

Interesting or not is relative to the problem you to try to solve.

Bruno




  John K Clark







except that it can augment the freedom spectrum, and it might diminish the complexity of the task or of comparing the possible tasks.

I just defend the (well known in philosophy) compatibilist theory of free-will. It is (simply) the will of a subject in a free (virtual or real) environment, or in a structured set of such free (virtual or real) environments (emulated in arithmetic, for example).

Bruno





 John K Clark



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