My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 10:10 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've >> heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of >> an individual person. > > > The entire point of Bruno's "proof" and all of his bizarre thought > experiments is to examine and get rid of that "semantic quibble", and yet > from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already > crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were > stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person > pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is > just ridiculous. > > >This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in >> 1957. > > > No it is not for 3 reasons: > > 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum > world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was > able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said > nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to, > and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum > interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other > Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would > be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't > explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness > has nothing to do with his theory. > > 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to > think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's > just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. > > 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun "he" is always > obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of > physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with > matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that > description, and so the word "he" conveys zero information. > > > a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same >> conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter >> transmitter would > > > Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a > physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is > uncertain. > > > both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third >> person viewpoint the duplication could be observed > > > If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in "comp" and except for a few > member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either. > > > And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms > > > I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though > they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of > "comp" and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or > consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with > computers, " a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related > technology". > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
