On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com <mailto:yann...@gmail.com>> wrote:

    Liz,

    I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.


That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's /involved/ in consciousness. But yes, using that definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion.

(Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an illusion under the MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.)

    Bruno responds with the Gaussian  (somewhat like measure theory)
    which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one.


I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some decisions will have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And 0.0000000000001% will think so hard about it that they spontaneously combust.)

That raises the question of how the multiple-worlds split. Does the 0.01% imply that the world must split into 1e5 copies, in one of which you have a milkshape? Or does it require that it must split 1e15 ways so that you can spontaneously combust in one. I think Bruno's UD tries to take care of this by have infinitely many threads thru the occasion of your whim. But this is different compared to the Helsinki/Moscow/Washington thought experiment. In that case the Moscow and Washington guys are created. But in the UD's infinite threads the infinite threads all exist timelessly.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to