On 17 May 2017 at 19:37, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 5/17/2017 2:35 AM, David Nyman wrote: > >> The problem comes only if you attempt to "reverse interpret" these >> transformations, in the computationalist framework, *as computation per >> se* and hence, by assumption, as having a supervenience relation with >> consciousness. This then introduces an ambiguity into the notion of such >> supervenience which is eliminated when the extraneous attachment to >> physical action is discarded. In short, physical action is always open to >> interpretation (or, alternatively, observation) whereas computation, >> properly understood, must be defined unambiguously in its very definition. >> > > But that unambiguous definition is just a symbol manipulation game with no > reference to what give consciousness content. Bruno wants mathematical > models to provide the referents, but that's not what I'm conscious of.
Brent, as I said in my previous comment, the above remarks were made in the context of a discussion of supervenience relations, not the topic in terms of which you responded. That said, on re-reading your remarks above, I'd like to address them more directly. AFAICS the "symbol manipulation game" you refer to, more generally is just mechanism, or IOW the method of explication towards which scientific enquiry and explication has converged over millennia. Essentially, the choice, whether implicitly or explicitly, has been between mechanism (whether under the aegis of computation, physics, biology, or whatever else) and magic. If that be so, the symbol manipulation game is the only game in town - and just as well for the most part, since it has proved so successful. The problem of course is that its success has not led to any intelligible formulation of the mind-body problem, which tends to polarise to two equally incoherent extremes. On the one hand mechanism in some idealised 3p sense is taken to exhaust all possibility of explanation; or on the other, there is assumed to be some supernumerary and mechanistically undiscoverable "intrinsic" nature in which our minds somehow reside. Neither of these polarities takes even a single step towards anything in the shape of an intelligible explication of subjectivity. Bruno's schema is admittedly in the toy model stage, but the logical repertoire he proposes at least begins to show in principle a way of breaking out of the mechanistic loop, in particular by the addition of the notion of truth or the view from the "inside" (which after all is the elusive space for which we are searching). Since proof and truth are both point-of-view specific they are already 1p notions. More generally, if subjectivity is to be explicated in terms of computation, then the spectrum of arithmetical truth must somehow be capable, ultimately, of encompassing the perceptual truths (i.e. factual correspondences) we seek to explain. What intrigues me about all this is the intuitive stretch required to map the problem area using these points of contact with the elusive concepts on which we're trying to gain some purchase, without dismissing the approach out of hand because of its mechanistic origins. ISTM therefore that your dismissal above is too quick. In a strong sense you're dismissing the whole scientific endeavour in this regard, plumping in effect for the first of the two polarities I mentioned above. It also seems to me, if you'll forgive me, a little naive to complain "that's not what I'm conscious of". It reminds me of Bryce DeWitt's purported comment to Everett about not feeling himself splitting. The "you" that is conscious right now is not of course the simple equivalent of the basic subjective "machines" explicated in the toy model. I would remind you again though, should that lead you to despair of the possible usefulness of the model, of the classic query (Edison, Franklin?): what use is a newborn baby? David > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
