On 29 May 2017 at 17:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 28 May 2017, at 19:32, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 28 May 2017 at 18:02, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 28 May 2017, at 16:53, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 May 2017 at 14:38, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>> Yes, that's what I meant.
>>
>>
>>> It is there that many confuse:
>>>
>>> the number s(0),
>>> the Gödel number of s(0),
>>> the Gödel number of the Gödel number of s(0), which plays very different
>>> role, all important, when we translate UDA in arithmetic.
>>>
>>> Of course, this needs a good familiarity with the understanding of the
>>> difference between language, theories, and truth (models).
>>>
>>
>> Indeed :(
>>
>>
>> Well no, I still don't quite understand. I didn't mean that we couldn't
>> accept a physical universe as 'true' in the sense of a brute fact. What I
>> meant was in that case how would a notion of truth be related to the
>> perception of that world? Would it merely be an identity relation between
>> it being true that such a world was primitive and consequently true that
>> this also entailed a perception of it on behalf of a subject? If so, I
>> wouldn't find that either coherent or intelligible.
>>
>>
>> It would make the identity-thesis consistent. I agree it is not really
>> intelligible, but the actual infinities would could consistently be used to
>> justify the magic. That crazy (I think we share the intuition here) move is
>> no more available when we assume mechanism, as we inherit from arithmetic
>> infinitely many copies, and we have to take them into account.
>>
>
> Yes, and then in that case Brent really would be correct that an
> 'engineering solution' would be about as close as we could get.
>
>
> Yes. It is akin to the usual use of mechanism by atheists, to dismiss all
> "religious" notions, from God to ... consciousness, and which lead to a
> sort of eliminativism.
>
Yes, it even seems to lead to a kind of reactive or defensive dogmatism. I
appreciate very much Feynman's suggestion that science is a method of
checking that we aren't fooling ourselves. But of course we must remember
that this method should also be applied to itself.
> Somehow, mysteriously the mind and the brain becomes identifiable, by
> being both actual non duplicable infinite entities. Typically, you can no
> more say yes to the doctors, or if someone say yes, they can invoke that
> infinities, as there are mysterious anyway. Everything becomes magic here:
> the physical universe, consciousness, etc. It looks like a fairy tale
> identifying all the mysteries, but logically, it can make sense by pushing
> the substitution level in the infinitely low, if that can make sense.
>
Yes, it can make sense. In another, perhaps related sense the
'substitution' level is almost infinitely low, if indeed the 'tuning' were
fine enough such that only a unique physics can be associated with our own
existence. But nevertheless the assumption of CTM implies that the
substitution level of our minds isn't necessarily that low, but could be
approximated classically by a digital prosthesis. The doctor will have a
lot to answer for.
That moves seems to me premature to say the least, but we have to find a
> difference between quantum logic, and the quantum logic associated to Z1*
> to get a clue on the necessity of such moves.
>
I won't hold my breath.
> Usually, the scientists tries to discard the commitment into actual,
> physical and psychological entities.
>
Understandably perhaps.
> I'm not sure I fully understand you here. My intention recently has been
>> to clarify
>> in a certain way
>> an explanatory distinction between ontology and epistemology in terms of
>> theory in general. In this way of parsing the thing any 'observable', even
>> if viewed from the imaginary Wittgenstein's ladder perspective of 3p, is
>> part of the epistemological component of the theory. To simplify a bit,
>> anything that requires interpretation and hence explanation is an inference
>> from, not a part of, the assumptive ontology, which is by definition *not*
>> itself in need of
>> such
>> explanation. Consequently it was that ontology that I referred to as 0p.
>>
>>
>> OK. But when making the mechanist assumption explicit, that 0p becomes
>> 3p, or that 3p becomes 0p, (unlike the apparent "3p physics", which becomes
>> 1p plural).
>>
>
> I'm OK with this. I think that people sometimes forget the crucial
> distinction between 3p and 1p-plural, by referring to epistemological
> constructs as 3p. That's why I thought of the Wittgenstein ladder as a
> reminder of the implicit adoption of a privileged interpretation in this
> case. It seems to be quite difficult sometimes for people to intuit that
> they are doing this.
>
>
> I continue to thing that we have a "level" problem here.
>
I don't think so. Probably I wasn't clear enough. By 'epistemological
construct' I meant a 1p-plural observable, as I said in the remark above
that you previously commented. This is the topic I've been discussing most
recently with Brent. I notice that he tends to talk about something like,
say, the Mars Rover as if it were in some sense independent of
any
interpretation from a 1p and hence ultimately a 1p-plural perspective.
That's not a 'public theory'; it's a privileged point of view.
> Once we bet on mechanism, we accept the idea that "2+2=4" is pure 3p, and
> we asbrtact from the fact that we need the 1p to assert this, but that need
> is no more in the theoretical assumption, like blackboard's and chalk
> existences are not part of General relativity (despite we need them to
> discuss GR in between humans).
>
> Any public theory is 3p, almost by definition. With mechanism, we can use,
> as ultimate 3p truth, all the arithmetical truth, or even just the sigma
> one (keeping the whole arithmetical truth at the meta-level). The 1p is
> retrieved by linking strongly the indexical 3p-self (the believer) with
> truth (which we cannot define, but can intuit, especially about the
> numbers' arithmetical relations). That gives the modality [1]p = (Bp & p).
> Consciousness, which is the essence of the 1p, is explained in a first
> approximation by the facts that:
>
> --- [1]p obeys a logic of S4 (which answers the desiderata of the
> analytical philosophers), it is the knowing aspect of consciousness.
> --- [1]p is not definable in any third person way in the language of the
> machine, like truth, which satisfies Brouwer, Dogen, Maharshi, Plotinus, or
> anyone trying to define itself, etc.
> --- [1]p provides a temporal logic of evolving knowledge state, which
> implies that consciousness has a topological duration, which satisfy
> Brouwer, but seems to dissatisfy ... "lady salvia" (but then I pursue the
> experimentation to try to understand why).
>
OK
> A better approximation is given by <1>p = p V ~B~p. As it keeps the points
> above, but makes consciousness trivial, which it should be, and
> undoubtable, yet not justifiable rationonally without assuming mechanism in
> a very explicit way.
>
But this might lead to inconsistency, as we go very near the theological
> trap/blaspheme.
>
Careful now (pace Father Ted).
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Any other part of the theory is relative to some point of view even, as
>> I've said, if that point of view is an implicit one adopted
>> imaginatively
>> for reasons of interpretation.
>> So in this way of thinking *all* the views emerge epistemologically from
>> the assumptive ontological base, which neither has, nor depends on, a view
>> in this sense.
>>
>>
>> Which makes it 3p. 3p means the same for all views. With mechanism, we
>> have top assume that 3+3=6, for all observers, knower, and even if there is
>> no observer at all.
>>
>
> Independent of us IOW.
>
>
>> The 0p is the absolute 3p assumed at the start.
>>
>
> OK
>
>
> OK, nice. Some philosophers hates this, because it is the place where
> mechanism transforms a philosophical question in a mathematical problem.
>
But it makes the problem more tractable and interesting.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> T
>> he assumption of arithmetic is
>> then
>> 'independent of us' in
>> just
>> this sense, because
>> we don't rely on it being
>> in any way
>> point-of-view dependent.
>>
>>
>>> which I think is OK, but one step closer to the blaspheme,
>>>
>>
>> OMG :( Why is that?
>>
>>
>> Saying a proposition from G* minus G. That is, saying something true, as
>> long as we don't assert it. Like <>t, (I am consistent). Those things go
>> without saying, and becomes false if asserted without interrogation mark.
>> I suspect that the 0p and 3p discussion might comes from that. "0p = 3p"
>> belongs plausibly to G* minus G.
>>
>
> OK but I think we end up with agreement below.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> the YD, without interrogation mark, assumes that the doctor is a
>>> scientist,
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but how is that implied by the above? The doctor, whether posing as
>> scientist or priest, still cannot offer us definitive proof of any theory
>> he proposes in support of the operation. In point of fact we ourselves
>> cannot know, even after the operation has been declared - by ourselves - as
>> successful, that we are still 'the same person'. At best we may be able to
>> say that our the continuity of our consciousness *seems* to be invariant
>> after the substitution. So the act of faith seems unavoidable in any
>> circumstance.
>>
>>
>> OK. No real problem then.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> when he is really only a priest.
>>>
>>
>> Surely yes, to the extent that he's asking for an act of faith on our
>> part.
>>
>>
>> Yes. It is why saying that comp is a theology, is an act of modesty, like
>> reminding we are ignorant, and we have to bet the survival, without
>> pretending having a proof.
>> Maybe it is due to my reading of Nagel, but I associate the 0p with the
>> "outer god", and that makes the 0p = 3p statement, which follows from "God
>> = arithmetical truth", into a "blaspheme", like if we could knew by reason
>> that God is the arithmetical truth.
>>
>
> I understand your compunction. For a long time I wondered about your use
> of theological terminology in this regard but I think now we may even be
> ready for its rehabilitation in a modestly scientific manner, at least in
> Europe. In the US it still seems to "frighten the horses", as we say here
> in England.
>
>
> I have to use other terminologies, but eventually, it slow down the
> comprehension a lot, and when people approaches understanding, they feel
> uneased, because they see it is theology. Some realize it, and stop the
> debate by saying it is ... theology. Saying that it is theology is an act
> of modesty, because it reminds that "saying yes" to the doctor requires
> already a theological act of faith. When a materialist defend mechanism, he
> will usually insist that mechanism is obvious, that ~mechanism is fairy
> tales religion (which is close to the truth, but not obvious). That is well
> illustrates by John Clark, who said more than once that mechanism or
> computationalism is obviously true, but then we see he eliminates the first
> person (despite he denies this), notably to stop the thought experiment at
> step 3.
>
> Another reason to use the term theology, is that we get in a rather
> precise way the theology of the neoplatonists, and the lexicon between them
> and arithmetic is simpler to explain.
>
> But we are brainwashed with theological fallacies since long, so it will
> take a lot of time. Salvia might accelerate this a lot, because it refutes
> in a quasi diagonal way the usual materialist dismiss ("all mystical
> experiences are just hallucinations"). Salvia refutes this by making people
> hallucinating that indeed, *everything* is an hallucination, even salvia
> and brains. Coming back from such "awakening" throws a doubt on the
> materialist dismiss, because from "there" it would entail the dismiss of
> *all* experiences. Many people doing salvia can be so confused that they
> believe for some moment that the salvia hallucination *is* the coming in
> this reality and the current continuation of this life. More than one
> experiencer told me that they understood mechanism and its consequence for
> the first time in some non intellectual way. What is interesting with
> salvia, also, is that you get clear the G* \ G difference, and you
> understand why a part of theology has to remain secret. That is often
> referred or illustrated in salvia reports. The half-wise people wrote often
> "I am not supposed to say this, but ..", and then they talk too much, and
> can even have problem "there" in the next experiences if they do it again.
> Most people dislike the experience, and it is normal, They reacts a bit
> like people suddenly understanding the consequence of mechanism, and this
> is shocking for the Aristotelians, especially for those who are not aware
> that the existence of a physical primary universe was an assumption, a
> theory, partially ingrained in our mind, and that it is not a fact. It is
> billions of years of prejudice put in question. So salvia will accelerate
> the coming back to theology when people will be more open to enlarge they
> faculty of doubt.
>
We shall see. Meanwhile I have found my reading of Plotinus on your
recommendation helpful in conjunction with our conversations.
David
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>> Maybe I should describe comp by CT + YD?. The "?" is not technically
>>> avoidable: it requires a "religious" act of faith, and cannot be enforced
>>> to people (and there is a problem with the kids, like in all religion,
>>> solvable in practice by the "legal age" notion for deciding or not to ask
>>> the kid's act of faith or not).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> David
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> is equated with the truths, as distinct from the formal procedures, of
>>>>> arithmetic. The strength of the logical models that Bruno utilises in the
>>>>> machine interviews is then that they can be characterised in this sense as
>>>>> "accessing truths". However, their purely extrinsic formulation is in the
>>>>> relevant sense "incomplete" in this regard. Their completion in that same
>>>>> sense is to be found in the conjunction of an extrinsic formulation with
>>>>> an
>>>>> intrinsic (reflexive) logic that is comprehensible only in terms of what
>>>>> the subject thus modelled perceives to be true, i.e to correspond with its
>>>>> perceptually-available "facts". The consequence is then that consciousness
>>>>> is equated in this view with whatever is perceptually true, in the first
>>>>> instance, for a given subject.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I mainly agree. I would use "intuit" for the Bp & p, and "perceive"
>>>>> with the Bp & Dt (& p). But that is an old bad habit, perhaps, as I
>>>>> thought
>>>>> that Bp & p collapse on p sigma. But that is not the case, and Plotinus
>>>>> was
>>>>> right (!), the soul (Bp & p) has already a intuition/perception of the
>>>>> physical reality).
>>>>>
>>>>> Here we have the problem that we get three quantum logics, and thus
>>>>> three physics. Normally Bp & p, with p sigma, is "heaven physics", and Bp
>>>>> &
>>>>> Dt (& p), p sigma, is terrestrial physics. Normally Bp & Dt gives the
>>>>> quanta, and Bp & Dt & p gives the qualia, but it is slightly more complex
>>>>> than that, for technical reason.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Now, toy model or not, ISTM that there is surely something in the
>>>>> foregoing that offers certain relevant conceptual footholds that are
>>>>> unavailable in alternative schemas. It's also something that can in
>>>>> principle be examined and tested rigorously even though it is at present
>>>>> largely neglected and at a very early stage of development. At least it
>>>>> seems to offer a way of avoiding the equally unpalatable polarities I
>>>>> mentioned before - of brute identity theory on the one hand, or the
>>>>> fruitless search for some "internal" state of matter on the other. Either
>>>>> of these alternatives has struck me for a long time as falling into the
>>>>> category of "not even wrong".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OK. I agree, but I think that Brent's main mistake is that he is
>>>>> oblivious that I show the existence of a problem with Mechanism, and show
>>>>> that the problem can be translated in arithmetic, and that it leads up to
>>>>> now to a theology, testable by the constraints it put on the core of
>>>>> physics (indeed, we do get a quantum-like logic). I show that Gödel's
>>>>> theorem is not only a chance for mechanism by justifying the existence of
>>>>> the knower (Bp a p), but Gödel's theorem justifies the existence of the
>>>>> matter appearances as well, when p is sigma, and when we add the
>>>>> "probability" clause: that is the "Dt".
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>>
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