On 26 Jun 2017, at 03:50, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 26/06/2017 2:14 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Keep in mind that to refute Mechanism (in cognitive science), it is
not enough to show that a piece of matter is not Turing emulable. You
need mainly to show that its behavior is not retrievable from the
statistics of the first person indeterminacy on all computations.
I do not accept this reversal of the burden of proof. I do not have
to prove a universal negative: you have to prove the positive by
actually deriving physics from the statistics of the first person
indeterminacy on all computations.
I was just saying that to refute computationalism by invoking infinite
matters does not work, as computationalism predicts infinities in the
material domain. You need to show that there are *special* infinities,
not recovered by the global First Person Indeterminacy. It is a not a
reversal of the burden of the proof, it is just a question of validity.
If not that would beg the question (as shown by the UDA). You give a
criteria of verification, which I accept and indeed, if nature violate
Z1*, we will know that the classical computationalist theory of mind
and matter of the computationalist universal (Löbian) machine is
wrong. But until today it is rather confirmed (even in the startling
aspects), and it is to my knowledge the only clear account of the 1p
relation with the 3p relations (measurable or not).
The reversal of the burden of the proof is the main basic first
result. It shows that using an universal extrapolation of the physical
laws from a finite number of number measurements cannot be invoked to
prevent the need to address the infinite renormalization procedure
that the arithmetical reality provides when seen from the (true,
consistent, provable, and conjunctions) possible points of view of the
universal numbers.
I do not criticize the theory which would assume a primitive physical
reality. I criticized its misuse in the "philosophy of mind",
especially when both a (primitive) matter and mechanism are assumed.
With mechanism, we need to make *infinite sum* on the histories
(computations 1p-filtrated), the reason why we get "negative
probabilities" might be related to the fact that 1+2+3+4+5+... "="
-1/12.
It is just because I am not enough competent in algebra that I am
unable to make clear the general "Galois theory" of (mechanical)
consciousness. Consciousness is on the side of truth, and semantics,
and meanings, and thus of models. Like in number equation, the more
you have equation, resp. axioms, the less you have solutions, resp.
models (in the mathematical sense of the logicians).
So I still don't know if (assuming mechanism) consciousness increase
or decrease with the number of neurons, the 1p spectrum grow, and
consciousness is related to relative "spectrum anticipation".
Around 2000, I read the book by William Seager, which encourages me in
the belief that in the Theaetetus "[]p & p" (I believe p & it is the
case that p), the consciousness/knowledge still relied in the key role
of the machine's body/representation/3p encapsulated in the box []p,
or Bp, (Gödel's provability predicate). But today, I think
consciousness is more on the side of "p" or "Dt". It is not unrelated
with Brent's insistence to call up an environment. The machine
"understand" this already (arguably, in some precise technical sense
using the many modal logics of "self" reference). My current theories,
written in G, is that consciousness is Dt v t. D is the diamond of G
(consistency) and Dp v p is the diamond of S4Grz(1). A very good book,
btw, that William Seager (even if physicalist by default).
You might need to read/study at least Smullyan Forever undecided, and
well, also "To mock a Mocking Bird" to study G, G*, S4Grz1, X1*, etc.
Or better, Mendelson and/or Boolos' 1979 book.
Bruno
Bruce
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