The amazing thing is that the George Mason L. Rev. accepted it. This is another of his recent papers: "Do Androids Dream?': Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1725983>"
On Wed, May 8, 2013 at 7:58 PM, C D Tavares <c...@libertyhaven.com> wrote: > The entire paper seems to hinge on a massave fallacy: > > Today, when a concerted effort is made to obliterate this point, it cannot > be repeated too often that the Constitution is a limitation on the > government, not on private individuals -- that it does not prescribe the > conduct of private individuals, only the conduct of the government -- that > it is not a charter for government power, but a charter of the citizens' > protection against the government. > --AYN RAND > > It is ridiculous a priori to propose that a private citizen cannot perform > actions that would be unconstitutional for a government to perform. A > private school may choose to accept only Catholics or blacks; a public > school may not. A private business owner may give hiring preference to his > brother-in-law; a government bureau may not. A fraternal organization or > club may close its business and social functions to non-members; a > government may not. A private editor-in-chief or TV producer may refuse > all content and commentary favorable to one side of a political issue; a > government media outlet may not. A private welfare organization can take a > recipient's "attitude" into account; a government welfare organization > cannot. > > Another basic error in this piece is that the state has a "monopoly of > deadly force." The state has a monopoly on INITIATING deadly force. Any > citizen has a right to RESPOND to deadly force with deadly force in defense. > > I'd also ask this fellow to point out specifically where in the text I may > find a "fundamental constitutional right to life." > > Is this what they're teaching in law school these days? I don't know > anything about USC, but I'm surprised to see sophistry of this caliber > being published by George Mason. > > On May 8, 2013, at 1:42 PM, "Olson, Joseph E." <jol...@hamline.edu> wrote: > > > "The Value of Life: Constitutional Limits on Citizens’ Use of Deadly > Force"<http://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256035&partid=47512&did=171898&eid=188278554> > [image: Free Download] > George Mason Law Review, Vol. 21, > 2014<http://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/PIP_Journal.cfm?pip_jrnl=149110&partid=47512&did=171898&eid=188278554> > > F. PATRICK > HUBBARD<http://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=624151&partid=47512&did=171898&eid=188278554> > , University of South Carolina - School of Law > Email: hubb...@law.sc.edu > > This Article argues that most states have unconstitutionally overbroad > authorizations for citizens to use deadly force in the context of crime > prevention, citizen’s arrest, and defense of one’s “castle.” Similarly, > some authorizations of deadly force for self-defense in public areas may be > unconstitutional. The starting points of this argument are the fundamental > value of life, the state’s monopoly of deadly force, and the fundamental > constitutional right to life. Because of the state’s monopoly of deadly > force, any use of such force is either legitimate or proscribed. The lack > of a third category of “private” use of deadly force affects constitutional > review of authorizations of the use of deadly force in two ways. > > First, a citizen’s use of authorized deadly force is subject to the same > constitutional limitations that apply to a governmental official’s use of > such force. Consequently, because some authorizations permit citizens to > use deadly force in a way that would be unconstitutional if a government > official had used the same force, these citizen authorizations are also > unconstitutional. > > Second, equal protection and substantive due process review of an > authorization require a stringent standard of review in terms of the rights > of citizens killed as a result of the authorization of deadly force. More > specifically, because of the fundamental constitutional right to life, the > authorization must be narrowly tailored to address a compelling state > interest. Many authorizations of deadly force do not satisfy this standard > because they are so overbroad that they include authorizations of deadly > force in situations where the state interest involved is not sufficiently > compelling to justify a denial of the fundamental right to life. > > Because of the unfairness of applying a constitutional limit in the > context where a citizen has acted in accordance with an overbroad > authorization of deadly force, a prospective declaration of > unconstitutionality may be appropriate. > > > > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Firearmsregprof@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/firearmsregprof > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are > posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or > wrongly) forward the messages to others. > -- ************************************************************************************************************** Professor Joseph Olson, J.D.(*Hon*. Duke), LL.M.(*Tax*. Florida) o 651-523-2142 Hamline University School of Law (MS-D2037) f 651-523-2236 St. Paul, MN 55113-1235 c 612-865-7956 jol...@hamliine.edu http://law.hamline.edu/constitutional_law/joseph_olson.html
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Firearmsregprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/firearmsregprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
