> -----Original Message-----
> From: Mikael Olsson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
[...]
> 
> Kevin Steves wrote:
> > 
> > I'm tending to think TCP syslog over SSL/TLS would be a good thing 
> > to have.

Good, but expensive thing. Syslog over TCP over SSL would be much
tougher on the CPU for smaller devices - I'm not an implementor, but I'm
sure someone can also do the math on the longer TCP header, plus the SSL
packet and CPU overhead. You'd have a nasty situation where people could
DoS devices just by making them send many syslog messages. Fine for
firewalls, which have big brains, but maybe not so good for things like
routers (which are often also part of the "firewall" external security
apparatus).

Overall, I think that running a protocol that is better designed to deal
with things like reliable delivery, message integrity, replay detection
etc would be preferred.

> Yeah, I've sort of been thinking along the same lines myself. (Along
> with using a remote-only syslog receiver that doesn't need to bind 
> the local domain sockets or whatever the OS flavour uses for 
> local event delivery.) Are you aware of a syslog receiver 
> that actually supports encrypted and authenticated logs?
 
If you're aiming at secure syslog here then there's lots of work done
already - the IETF even have a WG at:
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/syslog-charter.html

Their current syslog-sign proposes a digital sig using PKI. Personally I
would have looked at using a simple HMAC with shared secrets (or at
least offering it as an option) to make things shorter and easier on
CPUs (but then I'm not an IETF s00perbrane - I'm sure they didn't for a
reason.)The reliable-delivery paper offers reliable delivery over UDP or
TCP, with different degrees of frills on each.

For firewalls, though, an SSH tunnel might be an even easier way to do
it - SSH is designed to tunnel random sockets, so wouldn't even require
that you hack the apps.

If you want to get really simple, just run IPSec (or v6) between your
firewall and log receiver, run AH only, and buy IPSec NICs - don't you
get instant integrity and replay detection, then? I'd like to see every
device on the Internal segments talking with AH IPSec anyway, for a
variety of reasons. I guess it won't traverse NAT so well, so the SSH
thing might be a better quick fix for sending stuff over the Internet.

> --
> Mikael Olsson, Clavister AB

It looks like Steve Bellovin is a key part of the IETF effort, so I've
cc'ed him, in case he has some words of wisdom for us (he used to lurk
here anyway).

And those are my random thoughts.

Cheers,

--
Ben Nagy
Network Security Specialist
Mb: TBA  PGP Key ID: 0x1A86E304 

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