On Feb 26, 2017, at 2:58 PM, Stephan Beal <sgb...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> 
> just FYI, Linus' own words on the topic, posted yesterday:
> 
> https://plus.google.com/u/0/+LinusTorvalds/posts/7tp2gYWQugL

Point #1 misses the fact that people *do* rely on Git hashes for security.  
Maybe they’re not “supposed” to, but they do.

For example, the CentOS sources are published through Git these days, rather 
than as a pile of potentially-signed SRPM files.  This means the only assurance 
you have that the content checked into Git hasn’t been tampered with is that 
the hashes are consistent.

(I randomly inspected one of their repos, and it doesn’t use GPG signed 
commits, so the hashes are all you’ve got.)

This is adequate security today, but once bad actors can do these SHA1 attacks 
inexpensively, it’ll be a problem if git.centos.org is still relying on SHA1 
hashes.


Point #2 is also questionable.  Torvalds is assuming that any collision attack 
on a Git checkin will be detectable because of the random noise you have to 
insert into both instances to make them match.

Except that you don’t have to do it with random noise.

Thought experiment time: Given that it is now mature technology to be able to 
react to a useful subset of the spoken English language either over a crappy 
cell phone connection or via shouting at a microphone in a canister in the next 
room, complete with query chaining (e.g. Google Now, Amazon Echo, etc.) how 
much more difficult is it to write an “AI” that can automatically generate 
sane-looking but harmless C code in the middle of a pile of other C code to 
fuzz its data bits?

I have no training in AI type stuff, but I think I could do a pretty decent job 
just by feeding a large subset of GitHub into a Markov chain model.  Now 
imagine what someone with training, motivation, and resources could do.

Or, don't imagine.  Just go read the Microsoft Research paper on DeepCoder:

   https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13720580

I suspect there are parts of the Linux kernel sources that are 
indistinguishable from the output of a Markov chain model. :)  *Someone* 
allowed those patches to be checked in.


As for his point #3, he just offers it without support.  He says there’s a 
plan.  Well, we have a plan, too.  Plans are easy.  Execution is the hard part.
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