Steve, I promised myself I wouldn't do this, speaking of too long and
don't read and all.

But do you know how powerful you are, just by being superhumanly
articulate?  

With one line, emphasizing knowing versus understanding, you directed
the whole stream into a conversation about information theory.

It seemed to me that the original quote had to do with the difference
between thinking about doing something, or talking about doing
something, and actually _doing something_.  


We work hard to make good language, with care for lexical items,
syntactic rules, and whatever we can do to formalize rules for
semantic composition.  And I have great respect for people who then
try to use that language carefully, recognizing that scientists often
don't, as much as perhaps they could.  

But in the end, we have enough cases behind us that we should now
understand that our best attempts to construct good language are
always limited reflections of what we happen to have experienced up to
that time.  (French experience, _experiment_, ...)  We could have
discoursed, and argued, and reasoned, forever, about the meaning and
use of the word "time" pre-relativity.  But if we hadn't had to
confront Maxwell's equations and various other experiences of the
world, we probably could never have merely-talked ourselves into
realizing that the word did not have an unqualified, reliable meaning
in the way we were using it (who knows, in a different reality, maybe
it could have, so logic alone could never have told us which reality
we inhabit; I don't know).  We had to be thrown back to a stage where
the most desperate among us could say "Will you stop talking about
'time' and start talking about clocks that tick, and people whose
hearts beat and who get old _where they are_ even as they move about."
And from that, we could learn for the first time how to build
spacetime diagrams, and so forth, and at some level, once we knew how
to be careful using the diagrams reliably, we were free to again use
the word time, and perhaps even use it carelessly in cases (when its
purpose was not to replace the diagrams, but merely to share attention
to them), and still be able to carry out and anticipate acts in the
world that we never could have before, with all the linguistic care in
the world.

I know this is the most shop-worn example, but I still think that it
and several others like it carry a relevant piece of meaning.
Renormalization and the theory of phase transitions did the same thing
for the notion of "object", and (simply passing by any rhetoric that
doesn't produce distinguishable results for calculations or
experiments), quantum theory taught us that "state" and "observable"
were not even in principle the same kinds of concepts.  Someday, a
sensible theory of ecology, development, and evolution will hopefully
lead to a similar sensible thinking about individuality.  Each of
these has been a wrenching experience, because we really have had to
throw away a piece of what had been fundamental to our ability to
speak and to reason, and to simply leave a void until we could build a
new foundation out of different pieces.  It was a very
extra-conversational exchange with our world of experiences, even if
it was supported all along the way by intense and labored
conversation, trying to figure out how to get oriented. 

It seems that a combination of a willingness to mistrust language
while still trying to use it well, but also, to continually try to be
rebuilding it from experience, is the pragmatic thing that
distinguishes science.  Philosophers are good at recognizing the
unreliability of language, so no corner on that market.  And I think
everybody, science and philosophy both, wants to both know and
understand.  But there is a sense in which scientists can be content
if the language of science is something like the calls at a barn dance
-- they keep us doing things together, they rely on shared experience,
and they have to change as the community changes the dance -- and
still do something productive, that seems to capture a major defining
characteristic of the enterprise.



Along with all the other stuff on information theory that is already
in this thread, all of which I also like.

Eric




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