Beautiful! Surely we don't need much imagination ... Surely (!) there exist modal pattern recognizers we could (almost) drop into a simulation to at least implement your 4 agent types. All we need is the right combination of search keywords to find them. I wonder if Edelman's "neural darwinism" simulation system, which supposedly allowed an objective function to select amongst various multi-neuron clusters, would work. Of course, I tried a few years ago to find code for the simulation(s) he claimed to have, and failed.
On 06/14/2017 03:13 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote: > One can imagine a neural net with similar inputs and outputs but different > depths of hidden layers inhibiting & exciting internal neurons of the > network. These would represent relevant contrastable features tied to > previous similar experiences. Together they'd compete to activate one or > several neurons that correspond to one or several registrations. > > A lack of experience with ambiguity in inputs would be one explanation why > premature registration would occur. [Naïve agents] Another might be no > particular pressure to distinguish similar categories -- no cost for bad > predictions -- so no reinforcement of connections to other neurons. > [Unengaged agent] Another might be that training had occurred on similar but > distinct data and re-training wasn't believed to be needed -- the learner had > been educated in a curriculum-based (programmed) way and believed that the > features in the environment were easier to contrast than they really were. > [Smug agent] > Finally, there's the no neurons available possibility... [Disabled agent] > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of glen ? > Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 2:43 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] sometimes an onion is just an onion... > > > On 06/14/2017 01:29 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote: >> The meaning is clear, but is this a term that is used in particular >> communities? The reason I ask is that I deal with people all that time >> that do this, and I'd like to be able to whack a book over their head, since >> they like to do that to others. > > On 06/12/2017 10:39 AM, glen ☣ wrote: >> Cf Brian Cantwell Smith in: >> https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-of-mental-represent >> ation-9780198250524?cc=us&lang=en& > > It's not clear to me how common the usage is. In B.C. Smith's "On the Origin > of Objects", he calls it "inscription error" instead. In the book cited > above, he states that he prefers "premature registration", mainly because it > applies not only to programming/inscribing, but to things like what happened > in this discussion (where Nick and Steve prematurely clamped on an onion > metaphor I didn't intend). I still prefer inscription error when I use it in > a simulation context because the meaning is more clear. In logic or > rhetorical contexts, the standard "petitio principii" still works. -- ☣ glen ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove