Microsoft's New Security Mojo
Richard Forno
12 Nov 2003
Copyright (c) 2003 by author. Permission granted to reproduce in entirety
with credit to author.


Recently, Microsoft announced a program to offer rewards in exchange for
information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who exploit its
flagship Windows product through viruses, worms, and other forms of
malicious code.  Yet, despite the software giant's own executives saying
publicly over a year ago that their products "weren't designed for security"
the company continues to point fingers at third parties, hackers, and
crackers as the source of the many problems plaguing the Windows-based
portions of the Internet.  It also demonstrates the ineffective organized
chaos that remains Microsoft's response to the marketplace demands for
better-developed, better-tested products.

Security (or lack thereof) in Microsoft's products has adversely impacted
corporate profits for years, and finally is beginning to affect Microsoft's
future profit potential as well. As a result, Microsoft suddenly is
committed to improving security, despite its years of sitting idle. Hence
the company's mad rush to inject "security" into every product, speech, and
statement to reassure its customers that Windows is still a worthy operating
environment to spend money on. It's even sponsored an upcoming report
critical of Linux security to help spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt about
Microsoft's chief competitor and underscore why Windows is a better product.
Sadly, rather than address its own problems, the company is content to use
creative marketing as a substitute for good security and software
development.

The problem isn't that virus-writers are exploiting Windows, it's that
Microsoft makes Windows easy to exploit by anyone with a modicum of
programming know-how -- and instead of accepting responsibility, the company
is trying to pass the blame for such problems off onto others. Creating a
rewards program is a clever, low-cost way of diverting public attention away
from the many problems resulting from its history of exploit-friendly
programming practices so it doesn't have to address the root causes that
forced the creation of the rewards program in the first place.  It also
allows the company to portray itself taking the moral high ground (albeit
illusory) in its approach to proactive product security.

The rewards program builds on the company's recent announcement to convert
its traditional as-necessary security bulletin and patch-release process
into a predictable monthly one.  Interestingly, Microsoft's October 2003
white paper discussion of the new security release process says this will
make it easier for customers to stay current through a single cumulative
monthly patch that fixes reported problems in Windows. That sounds perfectly
reasonable until one reads that "Microsoft will make an exception to the
above release schedule if we determine that customers are at immediate risk
from viruses, worms, attacks or other malicious activities. In such a
situation Microsoft may release security patches as soon as possible to help
protect customers."  

Given that the majority of Microsoft security bulletins deal with these very
problems, one wonders if this new policy really makes a difference by
improving security or if it means that to reduce the number of security
bulletins (and associated negative media coverage) Microsoft will be more
selective in what it deems an "immediate risk" to customers. It's likely
that the company will seldom release a bulletin-patch outside of its
assigned monthly schedule, since it would not only undermine its new policy
but put it in the unfortunate position of having to defend what makes one
problem "more critical" than another and warrant a special release.

Admittedly, a monthly patch-release schedule may make it easier for
customers to stay current, but also means that a potential adversary knows
exactly when to release his next malicious code or exploit technique to the
world. Network administrators likely will resent being kept in the dark
between monthly patches, never knowing if their networks are endangered or
being compromised until the next security bulletin is announced.

Patching aside, it's more interesting - and seems very convenient - that the
company responsible for the majority of digital problems in cyberspace in
recent years is now offering a remedy for these recurring problems in the
form of Trustworthy Computing and the next version of Windows code-named
Longhorn. Of course, to receive this much-desired increase security, users
must pay for it via a product upgrade.  Unless I'm mistaken, this sounds a
bit like the Mafia offering "protection" services to local neighborhood
businesses to protect against security problems it creates (or tolerates) as
a form of revenue. Pay for your "protection" or be "at-risk" (wink-wink)
until you do.  

Microsoft has an established history of such sneaky practices to get what it
wants from its customers. Remember that over a decade ago, the company
intentionally caused early versions of Windows to display error messages if
installed on anything other than the Microsoft version of DOS - once users
installed MS-DOS, the error messages disappeared. More recently, to fix a
series of critical vulnerabilities in the Windows Media Player last year,
Microsoft forced users to accept the imposition of new and controversial
digital rights management (DRM) software as part of the security "fix."  Of
course, users were free to not install the fix if they didn't want the DRM
software on their systems, but would remain at-risk to attack and
exploitation from any number of criminals on the Internet as a result.

This brings up the question of how the definition of "security" is changing
to fit marketplace needs.  The MSDN website shows DRM is a core 'security'
function of Longhorn that runs in what Microsoft calls the Secure Execution
Environment.  The very fact that an operating system - the engine that runs
our computers and touches everything we do on them - is based on a DRM
foundation (with "hooks" for third parties including Microsoft to determine
what may be done with what information on a computer) is frightening. Ask
any objective security professional -- DRM should not be viewed as a
function of security but rather an add-on function of revenue protection for
those industries based on digital content.  

Home and business users alike should not be forced into a Mafia-like
protection agreement to be secure in cyberspace. Nor should the fundamental
definition of security be extended - or twisted - to include invasive
mechanisms of profit-protection for industries unable to adapt their
business models for the Information Age. Until Microsoft takes a realistic
view of security and defines effective real-world ways of improving product
security in the present day - such as cleaning up the existing Windows code
instead of greedily forcing mass upgrades - its existing customers will be
reluctant to adopt a newer version of the Windows product line no matter
what the speeches and marketing material promise.

Microsoft chairman Steve Ballmer recently said the company's rewards program
makes it clear that Microsoft is "taking security seriously."  What he meant
to say was that it's clear that Microsoft is taking its security reputation
seriously.  That's a big difference.

# # # # #

Brian Valentine Statement on Windows Insecurity
http://archive.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/02/09/05/020905hnmssecure.xml

White Paper: Revamping the Security Bulletin Release Process
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/
bulletin/revsbwp.asp

# # # # #

Security technologist Richard Forno is the former Chief Security Officer at
Network Solutions and author of "Weapons of Mass Delusion: America's Real
National Emergency." His home in cyberspace is http://www.infowarrior.org/.












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