>Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2000 21:30:52 -0500 >From: JSchaffner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Status: O > >March 24, 2000 >Committees of Correspondence >for Democracy and Socialism >11 John Street, Room 506 >New York, NY 10038 > > >President William Jefferson Clinton >1600 Pennsylvania Avenue >Washington, DC 20500 > >Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright >Department of State >2201 C Street, NW >Washington, DC 20520 > >Dear President Clinton and Secretary Albright: > >We ask you to reconsider the Administration's plan to give $1.6 billion >in (primarily military) aid to Colombia as the first installment of a >larger amount of military aid. We think this is a bad idea for the >following reasons: 1) The Colombian military has ties to paramilitary >groups guilty of gross human rights violations; 2) A military solution >to the supply side of the drug problem is ineffective due to the demand >for drugs in the U.S. and so is a misuse of money better spent on the >demand side; 3) The lack of >alternative options for peasant farmers in Colombia makes growing cocoa >a more attractive crop but drug eradication efforts do not address this >fundamental problem of poverty and so is also a misuse of funds better >spent on alternative development; and 4) An escalation of the war will >destabilize the peace process and involve the U.S. in a >counter-insurgency war. > >According to your January 11, 2000 statement on "U.S. Assistance to >Colombia," you say that the assistance is to counter drug-trafficking >and that, "as a matter of both policy and law, we will ensure that our >assistance does not go to military units that have been implicated in >abuses," but we have seen various reports that "Clinton aides privately >admit that there will be no way to separate the war on drugs from the >war on the guerrillas" (Time, March 6, 2000, 54-55). And that, "United >States officials are clearly >softening their positions that American aid will not be used for >counterinsurgency.". . . . "Anyone who believes that these counter >narcotics battalions will not be involved in counter-insurgency is >naive" (New York Times 2/26/2000). Further, "The main purpose of the >proposed American aid is to train and equip three new army battalions to >wrest military control of the southern cocoa-growing areas from the >FARC." The backers of the aid present this as a plan to fight drugs, >but "in practice, the new battalions' target >will be the FARC" (The Economist, March 4-10, 2000). And, according to >the Colombia Report 1999 of Human Rights Watch, the primary objective of >the new >950-person counter narcotics battalion, "according to U.S. officials, >was to regain guerrilla-controlled territory." > >It has been also been reported (Tim Golden, New York Times, January 26, >2000) >that 80% of the 1.6 billion in aid will be for military purposes, >whether for Colombian security forces [New York Times (February 6, >2000)], or to pay for military hardware and intervention [Time magazine >(March 6, 2000, p. 54-55]. Indeed according to the White House press >release "Fact Sheet" of January 11, 2000 on "Colombia Assistance >Package," more money will go to military spending than alternative >development strategies. > > While those in the Administration, such as Generals Charles Wilhelm and >Barry R. McCaffrey, who support military aid to Colombia to counter the >drug war do so under the simplistic equation of guerrillas equal drug >traffickers, the situation is more complex. The guerrillas profit by >taxing the drug traffickers, but it is the paramilitaries guilty of >human rights abuses that are directly tied to the traffickers. The >Colombian military has been fighting guerrillas with the help of >paramilitary groups responsible for gross human rights violations >according to Human Rights Watch. Between 1988 and 1995 there were >67,378 victims of political violence in Colombian averaging 701.9 per >month or 23.4 per day. According to the School of Americas Watch, 1.5 >million people have been displaced since 1985 in a refugee crisis >greater than Kosovo's and the third largest in the world. Political >violence caused 300,000 Colombians to flee their homes last year alone >according to The Economist, and 800,00 in the last four years. SOA >Watch reports that while the guerrillas commit some serious violations, >78% of human rights violations are committed by the paramilitaries (70% >according to State Department reports); 20% by the guerrillas and 2% by >the military. But the latter 2% figure is misleading. The army has >extensive links with the paramilitary forces at the local and regional >level and some army officers facilitate the work of the paramilitaries >or look the other way as violence occurs. > >Human Rights watch has said in the last couple weeks that at least half >of Colombia's 18army brigades have continuing links to the >paramilitaries, according to The Economist (2/26/2000). The Human >Rights Watch Report of February 23, 2000 states that there are >continuing ties between the Colombian Army and paramilitary groups. >Paramilitaries operate in coordination with the military. The military >shares intelligence, plans and carries out joint operations, provides >weapons and munitions, provides support with helicopters and medical >aid, and coordinates with the paramilitaries on a daily basis, according >to the SOA Watch. Human Rights Watch gives an example of how Colombia >is able to claim the human rights violations have decreased: >"Repeatedly, paramilitaries killed those suspected of supporting >guerrillas, then delivered the corpses to the army. In a process known >as ‘legalization,' the army then claimed the dead as guerrillas killed >in combat while paramilitaries received their pay in army weapons." > > The 1993 human rights report State Terrorism in Colombia cites 247 >Colombian >officers for human rights violations. And according to a U.S. State >Department report, Gen. Farouk Uanine Diaz, was accused of >"establishing and expanding paramilitary death squads, as well as >ordering dozens of disappearances, and the killing of judges and court >personnel sent to investigate previous crimes." Some of the more >heinous massacres include the 1988 massacre in Segovia in which 43 >people were killed, the Trujillo chainsaw massacres, which took place >between 1988 and 1991, and the 1993 >Riofrio massacre. Even in the context of 40 years of civil war, the >first two months of this year were frightening. Paramilitary death >squads killed over 140 people in several days in January alone. The >45th battalion has been guilty of bombing and machine-gunning of >civilians and the disappearances of peasant leaders. The third brigade >has also set up paramilitary fronts that have engaged in kidnaping and >murder. Yet, President Andres Pastrana has said (Washington Post, >February 6, B-5), that "In 1996, the military was accused of 2,000 human >rights violations. Last >year there were not more than 70. So, I think we are starting to do a >good job." And, in his recent visit to the U.S., President Pastrana >asked that U.S. aid not be tied to his government's progress on human >rights (Tim Golden, NYT, 1/26/2000), even though this would be illegal >in virtue of the Leahy Amendment. > >Another U.S. State Department Report on Colombia (in 1998) states that >the 20th military brigade was disbanded for its involvement in human >rights abuses, including the targeted killing of civilians. Yet, some >250-300 U.S. military personnel are on the ground in Colombia on a >typical day and now the U.S. wants to create a three new battalions to >operate on the ground in Colombia. The Economist questions the >advisability of committing $1.6 billion to such an ambiguous purpose. >"The American proposal looks as if it will merely bolt three shiny new >anti-drug battalions on to an abusive and unreformed military force." >Colombia is already the third largest recipient >of U.S. military aid. We don't want U.S. tax dollars going to >militaries guilty of egregious human rights abuses such as those the >State Department reported going on in Colombia in 1998. > >We disagree with the policy of military aid to Colombia for the purpose >of fighting the drug traffickers on other grounds as well. There are >two roots of the problem that it does not address. The first is in the >U.S. The war on drugs has been shown to be ineffective up to now due to >the demand in the U.S. As President Pastrana has said, "We could finish >the business, but if you still have big demand in the United States, >someone is going to fill that market." Military spending does not stem >the drug epidemic. Despite a 17-fold increase in U.S. drug war spending >since 1980, illicit drugs are now cheaper, more potent and more easily >available than when the "war on drugs" >began. It is throwing good money after bad. As Michael Massing >pointed out in his Washington Post article (February 6, 2000, B5), "Over >the last 10 years, the federal government has spent about $150 billion >to combat drugs," but it has not made much difference. The money would >be better spent on treatment centers in the U.S. and alternative crop >development in Colombia. To cite The Economist, "This is a war that >will not be won with helicopters." > >A military solution to the drug problem does not get at the second root >of the problem either–the inequitable distribution of land and the need >for alternative development in Colombia. In Colombia, the top three >percent of the landed elite own over 70% of arable land while 57% of the >poorest farmers subsist on under 3%. This is why there are guerillas >and why the farmers have to resort to growing drugs. A peasant farmer >makes only $250 per year growing legitimate crops, but can make $2000 >per year growing cocoa and so can feed his family. President Pastrana >has said as much. The guerrillas told him the were willing to eradicate >drugs, but that they needed "money to >invest in alternative development." He said, "if we could create new >business in these areas, we could eradicate drugs." So, purchasing 30 >new Black Hawk helicopters at more than $10 million apiece and 33 old >Huey helicopters that don't work, is a waste of U.S. tax dollars. Tim >Golden's piece in the New York Times (Feb. 6, 2000) suggests that there >are other solutions that cost little or no money, such as "taking >cellular telephones away from jailed traffickers so they cannot operate >from prison." > > Another reason the military solution to the drug problem is a bad idea, >is that the Colombian people do not support it. In October 1999, an >astonishing 10 million Colombians marched for peace, calling for an end >to violence from all sides. The U.S. can help by positive uses of aid, >which would include: relief aid for people displaced by violence; crop >substitution for small farmers to switch from coca to legal crops; >programs to strengthen government investigations into human rights >violations; and aid for civil society peace and human rights >initiatives. > >Finally, an increase in U.S. military presence and spending will have >the effect of destabilizing the peace process and escalating the war. >The FARC has greeted the "Colombia Plan" as a declaration of war by the >U.S. The ordinary people of Colombia view it the same way. "The whole >country is going to be a war zone" (NYT, 3/5/2000). It will end the >peace negotiations and re-ignite the war. It appears that the Colombian >military is not really for the peace process since it would leave the >guerrillas in control of some land, but the Colombian military can't >win--thus opening the door for greater >U.S. involvement. Already this past July, the U.S. began sharing >intelligence on guerrillas with the Colombian military, a further >entanglement in the war. The July 23 crash of a U.S. Army RC-7B >DeHavilland intelligence-gathering aircraft killing five American and >two Colombian officers, underscored the rapidly escalating U.S. >involvement. The numbers of U.S. special forces such as Green Berets >increased in 1999 from 24 to 30. We also understand that a U.S. forward >operations base with an airfield will be built on the Colombia-Ecuador >border which will support reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. >The Pastrana government is for a peaceful solution >since it believes the military can't win, but the intervention of the >U.S. into the situation changes the equation by bolstering the military >and inflaming the conflict. It also opens the door to greater U.S. >involvement in the future. Neither the guerrillas nor the military will >win, but the renewed fighting will destroy the peace negotiations and >lessen the >likelihood of future talks. In two years, the money will be gone, the >fighting will intensify, the United States will have increased its >commitment both in money and assets in the field with little to show for >it, and so will be forced to send more money or troops–or both. As the >January 15, 2000 issue of The Economist pointed out, "The current >anti-narcotics battalion has been trained in counter-insurgency. . . . >which means, in turn, that the Americans will be increasingly dragged >into Colombia's civil war." > >In view of all these reasons, we ask you to look for other than military >solutions to the complex problem of drugs. We especially do not want to >see the U.S. military become involved in a counter-insurgency war in >Colombia. Negotiations are the path to peace, not increased military >spending. > > > Very truly yours, > >Leslie Cagan, Manning Marable, Charlene Mitchell, Eric Quezada, Mark >Solomon >National Co-Chairs, Committees of Correspondence > > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
