On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:48:03PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> This protocol uses lots of complex cryptography that relies on securely
> generated random numbers. Thus, it's important that the RNG is actually
> seeded before use. Fortuantely, it appears we're always operating in
> process context (there are many GFP_KERNEL allocations and other
> sleeping operations), and so we can simply demand that the RNG is seeded
> before we use it.
>
> We take two strategies in this commit. The first is for the library code
> that's called from other modules like hci or mgmt: here we just change
> the call to get_random_bytes_wait, and return the result of the wait to
> the caller, along with the other error codes of those functions like
> usual. Then there's the SMP protocol handler itself, which makes many
> many many calls to get_random_bytes during different phases. For this,
> rather than have to change all the calls to get_random_bytes_wait and
> propagate the error result, it's actually enough to just put a single
> call to wait_for_random_bytes() at the beginning of the handler, to
> ensure that all the subsequent invocations are safe, without having to
> actually change them. Likewise, for the random address changing
> function, we'd rather know early on in the function whether the RNG
> initialization has been interrupted, rather than later, so we call
> wait_for_random_bytes() at the top, so that later on the call to
> get_random_bytes() is acceptable.
Do we need to do all of this? Bluetooth folks, is it fair to assume
that hci_power_on() has to be called before any bluetooth functions
can be done? If so, adding a wait_for_random_bytes() in
hci_power_on() might be all that is necessary.
- Ted
