Am Donnerstag, 15. Juni 2017, 13:03:48 CEST schrieb Michael Ellerman:
> Even with this patch, it's still pretty spammy (today's linux-next):
I would think that the issue regarding the logging is relevant for
cryptographic use cases or use cases requiring strong random numbers only.
Only those use cases should be fixed eventually to wait for a fully seeded
The logged messages you present here indicate use cases where no strong
security is required. It looks like that the logs show ASLR related use of
random numbers. Those do not require a fully seeded ChaCha20 DRNG.
IMHO, users using the get_random_u64 or get_random_u32 are use cases that do
not require a fully seeded DRNG thus do not need a cryptographically strong
random number. Hence, I would think that the logging should be removed from
Yet, logging should remain for get_random_bytes which should be denominated as
the interface for use cases where cryptographically strong random numbers are