On 04/19/2017 01:20 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <se...@hallyn.com> wrote:
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 11:45:26PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
This patch reproduces GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY functionality from the grsecurity
project in-kernel.

This will create the Kconfig SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT and the corresponding
sysctl kernel.tiocsti_restrict that, when activated, restrict all TIOCSTI
ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.

Possible effects on userland:

There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this
change.
See: <https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=ioctl%5C%28.*TIOCSTI>
notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh

However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the
Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the

It's not worthless, but note that for instance before this was fixed
in lxc, this patch would not have helped with escapes from privileged
containers.

same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this
opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS
features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the
Kconfig help message.

Threat Model/Patch Rational:

>From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.

 | There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it
 | has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in
 | the past.  Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an
 | attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other
 | processes within the same user's compromised session.

So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow
that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security
boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su
or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file
descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries.

This is also an excellent writeup about the issue:
<http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation/>

Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <m...@nmatt.com>

Thanks for working on this! I think it'll be nice to have available.

---
 drivers/tty/tty_io.c |  4 ++++
 include/linux/tty.h  |  2 ++
 kernel/sysctl.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
 security/Kconfig     | 13 +++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
index e6d1a65..31894e8 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -2296,11 +2296,15 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
  *   FIXME: may race normal receive processing
  */

+int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
+
 static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
 {
      char ch, mbz = 0;
      struct tty_ldisc *ld;

+     if (tiocsti_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+             return -EPERM;

I wonder if it might be worth adding a pr_warn_ratelimited() here to
help people identify either programs that want to use this feature or
actual attacks?


I can include that in the next version of the patch. Any suggestions on
what the warning ought to say?

      if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
              return -EPERM;
      if (get_user(ch, p))
diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
index 1017e904..7011102 100644
--- a/include/linux/tty.h
+++ b/include/linux/tty.h
@@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
      struct list_head list;
 };

+extern int tiocsti_restrict;
+
 /* tty magic number */
 #define TTY_MAGIC            0x5401

diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>

 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
              .extra2         = &two,
      },
 #endif
+#if defined CONFIG_TTY
+     {
+             .procname       = "tiocsti_restrict",
+             .data           = &tiocsti_restrict,

Since this is a new sysctl, it'll need to get documented in
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt as part of this patch.

Will add in next patch version.


+             .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+             .mode           = 0644,
+             .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+             .extra1         = &zero,
+             .extra2         = &one,
+     },
+#endif
      {
              .procname       = "ngroups_max",
              .data           = &ngroups_max,
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT

        If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

+config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT

This is an odd way to name this.  Shouldn't the name reflect that it
is setting the default, rather than enabling the feature?

This is modeled after SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT. I think the Kconfig
name is fine (given the other one), but it'd be worth maybe
reorganizing the commit message to say "this introduces
tiocsti_restrict sysctl, whose default is controlled via
CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT" or similar. Right now the commit
message doesn't, I don't think, make clear what the config does.


I will reorganize the commit message as you suggested. As for the
Kconfig name, I'm open to calling it something else. However, I thought
basing it off of SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT made sense.


Besides that, I'm ok with the patch.

+     bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
+     default n
+     help
+       This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
+       into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
+       ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+
+       If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+       unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+       If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
 config SECURITY
      bool "Enable different security models"
      depends on SYSFS
--
2.10.2

-Kees

Reply via email to