Brent Casavant <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[...]
> I could mmap a temporary tmpfs file (tmpfs so that if there is a
> machine crash no sensitive data persists) which is created with
> permissions of 0, immediately unlink it, and pass the file
> descriptor through an AF_UNIX socket. This does open up a very
> small window of vulnerability if another process is able to chmod
> the file and open it before the unlink.
If the process can chmod the file, it can ptrace the daemon, too.
Or, using CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, it can patch the daemon.
Both will void any security.
> However, it occurs to me that this problem goes away if there were
> a method create a file in an unlinked state to begin with. However
> there does not appear to be any such mechanism in Linux's open()
> interface.
Having no window for creating stale temp files is nice to have. We only
need a clever fool to implement it.-) But since it's hard to get killed
just in the right moment for having a stale temp file, there is very low
interest for this feature.
--
You know you're in trouble when packet floods are competing to flood you.
-- grc.com
Friß, Spammer: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
