On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 01:32:50AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Certain in-kernel operations using a trusted key (such as creation
> certification) require knowledge of the handle it's loaded at. Keep
> a copy of that in the payload.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mj...@google.com>
This looks good to me as well *as a code change*.
/Jarkko
> ---
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 ++++--
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> index 020e01a99ea4..154d8a1769c3 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
>
> struct trusted_key_payload {
> struct rcu_head rcu;
> + unsigned int blob_handle;
> unsigned int key_len;
> unsigned int blob_len;
> unsigned int creation_len;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 6357a51a24e9..a3673fffd834 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -272,11 +272,13 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> }
>
> rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
> - if (!rc)
> + if (!rc) {
> *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
> (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
> - else
> + payload->blob_handle = *blob_handle;
> + } else {
> goto out;
> + }
>
> rc = tpm2_unpack_blob(payload);
> out:
> --
> 2.30.0.617.g56c4b15f3c-goog
>
>
