--- "Kazuki Omo(Company)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Folks,
> 
> May I ask some foolish questions?

So long as you're not afraid of foolish answers.

> I just want to make sure what do we need
> if we want to put new security module(which is using LSM) in mainline.
> 
> 1. Does it have to provide complete "MAC" which  Casey Schaufler
>    explained in below mail?
>    http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118252843017261&w=2

No. Your mechanism can be descretionary if you like. It can be
based on user IDs, phase of the moon, or any other scheme you
like. The arguments you've seen claiming that a module should not
go upstream because the mechanism is incomplete go against the
spirit of the LSM and should be ignored.

> 2. Does it have to provide any solution which SELinux can't cover?

HeeHee. There do appear to be some SELinux zealots out there, don't
there? No. Overlap between your module and SELinux is irrelevent.
SELinux is one security scheme, and it is intended to cover all
possible cases.

> 3. Do we have to proof the new security module "can't" implement
>    as policy on SELinux?

Well, it wouldn't hurt. But look at what happened in the AppArmor
argument. First, AppArmor claimed to do something that SELinux
couldn't do. The SELinux Zealot response was that SELinux could
do that. The AppArmor crowd requested demonstration. The Zealots
spent a couple days hacking something up, and presented it. This
bit of hackery was heavily criticized from several fronts. The
Zealots then used this criticizm to say that this proved that the
problem was with the underlying premise of AppArmor.

Don't expect it to be easy and don't expect all the arguments to
follow traditional rules of debate. Finally, if you prove that you
have something truely unique that SELinux can't do, expect to be
told that no one would want that anyway.

> 4. Does it have to provide complete security feature from beginning?
>    Can we implement just small features to mainline and develop
>    new features in same time?

Release early and often, but come in with enough so that it's
clear what you intend to do, why what you have is special, and
what impact it might have on the rest of the system. AppArmor's
big problem is the changes required to the vfs layer. It would
be very difficult to get the natives so worked up about AppArmor
if it was an LSM that required no external changes.

> 5. Does it have to have any Security model which documented/evaluated
>    in academic conference?

I certainly hope not. One of the intentions of LSM, at least early
on, was to encourage new and inovative models. I can understand
how it might seem otherwise given some of the recent debates.

> I saw LSM-ML past 1 year and sometime I saw
> "You should try and get your code into mainline".
> 
> But, anytime many people were discussing about above points and
> I think nobody put anything in mainline
> (Now I'm checking 2.6.21 kernel and I couldn't find any
> security module except "Default Linux Capabilities", "Root Plug", and
> "SELinux").

That's correct. As your questions lead the reader to summize, there
is a faction that does not want any more LSMs. Some members of the
community would be happy for LSM to be abandoned and SELinux adopted
as the Linux security infrastructure. These people often point to the
fact that there are no other LSMs to back their position. They also
work to make the notion of presenting an LSM for consideration 
frightening, and as your message here indicates, have had no small
success.

Not everyone associated with SELinux exhibits these behaviors, and
there is definitly anti-SELinux zeal in the community, too. No one
gets defensive if they've never been attacked, after all.

My suggestion? Make sure your LSM is so clean it squeeks. Provide
as much information about what it does and why it's good as you
can. Can SELinux do the same thing? Maybe, but so what? Let the
zealots prove it. Either way thank them for their input and move on.
It may take years to get your LSM upstream, it certainly took
SELinux a while, and the version that got in bears very little
resemblence to what they first proposed.

Best of luck, and thank you for making the effort.


Casey Schaufler
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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